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Abstract
This thesis analyses two issues in public economics: (1) water allocation in Israel;
and (2) malaria prevention in Ghana. In both cases a computable general equilibrium
modelling approach has been applied for policy analysis.
Part I: In Israel, parliamentary investigative committees and water researchers
have concluded that for decades, the administrative water allocation mechanism has
mismanaged water allocation. Over subsidising of the agricultural sector, and un-
derfunding of desalination plants, had led to a severe hydrological deficit. Critics
argue that a water market allocation could solve these issues. However, the adminis-
trative allocation is crucial because it protects social value, which is not represented
in a market mechanism. Part I of the thesis compares these two alternative alloc-
ation mechanisms using a general equilibrium model, for the case of Israel. The
model concludes that from 1995 to 2006, the upper-bound water misallocation in
Israel was relatively small, on the average of 5.5% of the potable water supply. The
lower-bound value of agricultural amenities is imputed at approximately 2.3 times
agricultural economic output. At the margin, introducing a water market in Israel is
not recommended, i.e., net-social welfare would fall.
Part II: Research that links between malaria and economic growth have, so far,
used econometric approaches. These provide results that are too broad, and not
particularly useful for policy analysis. We, therefore, develop a multi-region multi-
household dynamic computable general equilibrium (DCGE) model, which is calib-
rated to Ghana as a case study. Households are disaggregated by five epidemiological
malaria regions, urban-rural divide, and income level quintiles. The model links with
malaria through regional demographic effects, and labour effectiveness indices. Hy-
pothetical interventions simulate reducing malaria prevalence by 50%, for children
under-five years with varying degrees of coverage. We find that even under this lim-
ited intervention, malaria prevention clearly adds to economic growth and reduces
income inequality. Our approach is particularly useful for policy makers to compare
alternative intervention strategies using cost-benefit methods, which are not com-
monly used in health policy.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This PhD thesis examines two separate themes within applied public economics. Part
I discusses water allocation and compares the benefits of an administrative water
allocation mechanism in Israel, to a market mechanism. Part II deals with the issue
of malaria prevention and assesses the economic impact of malaria prevention on the
economy in Ghana. In both, computable general equilibrium (CGE) modelling is
used to analyse and discuss the implications of alternative policies.
Policy analysis is a process by which researchers analyse the various components
relating to a specific issue, define appropriate goals, propose alternative policies, and
examine their interactions and results. Models are used when it is infeasible to exper-
iment on real economies, for example because of size limitations, the issue at hand,
or the time frame. There are, however, several modelling techniques to choose from,
and as Box and Draper (1987) famously wrote: “...all models are wrong, but some
are useful.” This thesis employs applied CGE modelling, which is a useful simulation
laboratory for quantitatively assessing the effects of external shocks and/or policies
on the economy.
As discussed by Dervis et al. (1982); Shoven and Whalley (1992); Mas-Colell et al.
(1995); Lofgren et al. (2002) and many others, in its core, general equilibrium models
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view the many markets of goods and inputs as an interrelated system, whereby values
at equilibrium for all variables are simultaneously determined. Consumers maximize
utility subject to their budget constraint, forming the demand-side of the model,
while producers maximize profits, forming the production-side of the economy. In
equilibrium, prices adjust so that equilibrium must hold, and demand equals supply.
In cases with constant returns to scale (CRS), zero profit conditions are satisfied for
each industry.
Furthermore, general equilibrium is based on the Arrow-Debreu theorem that
provides a proof of a given equilibria (Arrow and Debreu, 1954). This fixed point
theorem is essential for policy issues because before attempting to compute the equi-
librium of the model, and compare it to counter-factual scenarios, it is necessary to
first believe that equilibrium exists.
Applied CGE modelling is now a standard tool of empirical analysis. It is predom-
inantly used for analysing policy issues, such as income distribution, trade policy, en-
vironment, structural adjustments to external shocks, growth and structural changes,
government tax (subsidy) policy, etc.
The two themes discussed in this thesis focus on environmental issues and external
shocks to labour resources. To analyse such themes, other modelling approaches, such
as partial equilibrium, may in principle be sufficient. However, partial equilibrium
only examines the direct effect of a limited component while keeping all other effects
fixed. If we believe that the endogenous inter-linkages between the various markets is
an important element in the analysis, and that the indirect effects are sizeable, then
general equilibrium methods are needed. Furthermore, alternative policy scenarios
cannot be similarly assessed using partial equilibrium techniques.
CGE models most often simulate comparative static results, an approach used in
the water allocation model in Part I of this thesis. In the last decade, it has, however,
become increasingly popular to incorporate dynamic elements using either a forward
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looking approach, or a recursive (myopic) approach. The latter is used in the malaria
prevention model in Part II of the thesis.
Finally, a number of additional features can be added to CGE models, e.g., varying
“closure rule” assumptions, imperfect competition, imbalances, and various structural
and institutional rigidities. These are all approaches that I have worked with during
the PhD studies and in the development of my research. For example, the water
allocation model uses a re-calibration approach to impute the value of the agricultural
amenity, while the malaria prevention model started-off as a forward-looking “toy”
model, and due to computational constraints, was later converted into a recursive
model.
Water allocation (Part I)
Part I of the thesis, discusses water allocation and uses Israel as a case study. It
is motivated both by my personal experiences as a child in Israel, and my academic
interest in the allocation of limited resources. In the mid ’70s through the ’90s, I grew
up in a small village approximately 20 kilometres south of Tel-Aviv. As a hobby, my
parents have cultivated more than 70 different types of fruit trees, a vegetable patch,
and small vineyard. Hundreds of acres of citrus fruits were grown around my house,
and I have many fond memories of the agricultural landscape surrounding me.
Today, my “jungle” playground has, however, nearly dried-up, and is gradually
being replaced by lucrative housing projects. My childhood village is steadily being
absorbed by the nearest city, claiming it as one of its many neighbourhoods. With
urbanization has come modern infrastructure, such as street lamps, a modern sewer
system, and the city water supply. However, until 2001, water supply came from the
village’s own water well, and water prices were under agricultural tariffs, which were
substantially lower than city water tariffs. (See Table 3.2 in Chapter 3.)
Water in semi-arid Israel, as well as in Palestine, Middle Eastern countries, and
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Mediterranean countries, is a limited resource. How to allocate it efficiently, how to
decide who owns the resource, and how to protect it, are all very important questions.1
In 1959, a Water Law was enacted to control and protect Israel’s water resources, and
an administrative body called the Water Authority was empowered to allocate water.
The main tool of the Water Authority is to classify water users according to different
characteristics, e.g., households, industrial, or agricultural users, and then assign to
them different water quotas, water tariffs, and increasing block tariff structures. In
order to enforce the administrative allocation, water resale is prohibited, and this
further disconnects market forces from the pricing and allocation of water.
Similar to many households that were living in rural areas, but were not agrarian,
my parents and our neighbours benefited from household water consumption at ag-
ricultural prices. However, the largest of such irregularities probably originated from
the communally organized kibbutzim and moshavim that used a sizeable portion of
agricultural water for non-farming activities and/or businesses, e.g., a recreational
swimming pool, or a “black” water market. With the gradual urbanization of the
country, these irregularities were reduced, and tighter regulatory control of the water
resource was enabled. However, it could be argued that this came at the cost of the
rural environment.
The depletion of the water reserves in Israel has seriously damaged water quality.
Excess pumping from water reserves over many years has caused a hydrological deficit
of the most severe proportions. Every few years, when annual rainfall is very low,
the Israeli Government announces a “Water Crisis.” Critics (e.g., Plaut, 2000) argue
that this illustrates why an administrative mechanism cannot accurately account for
the true environmental value of water, and why it often misallocates water compared
to a market mechanism. An administrative mechanism is politicized, subjective, and
1This thesis has no intention of entering the complex political and social conflicts within the
Middle East. Water ownership and allocation between Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, and
Syria, who share many of the same water resources, is an important and interesting topic in its own
right.
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slow to respond to weather conditions and population needs. Furthermore, the over-
subsidization of agricultural water has driven farmers to increasingly grow low-revenue
water-intensive crops. In some sense, it could be argued that a portion of the water
resources in Israel are “exported”, as embodied by farm exports.
Using a traditional CGE approach, to evaluate these arguments, would naturally
favour a water market because it allows water inputs to flow to those users valuing
them the most. In this thesis, however, I recognize that an administrative mechanism
also promotes social goals that are not valued economically, such as green areas, food
security, rural environment, and population dispersion. The main contribution in this
part of the thesis is to compare two alternative allocation mechanisms in a context
of erroneous policy choices. A type I error would be to introduce a water market,
but then lose social welfare in the form of reduced agricultural amenities. A type II
error would be not to introduce a water market, and therefore to inefficiently allocate
water by an administrative mechanism.
Weighing the outcomes of these two errors, I find that at the margin, introducing
a water market in Israel is not recommended, i.e., net-social welfare would fall. In
addition, infra-marginal social losses could be even larger, if other forms of amenities
were to be included, e.g., the loss to historical heritage, and especially the irreversible
destruction of nature.
Part I of the thesis thus relates to two areas of research. It has relevance for natural
resource management that aims to improve the efficient use of a scarce resource, and
it has implications for political and social policy. Chapter 2 of the thesis is aimed
as a future journal paper. It presents the issue, summarizes the main results, and
discusses their policy implications. Chapter 3 of the thesis contextualises water policy
in Israel, and documents the model developed in the previous chapter.
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Malaria prevention (Part II)
Part II of the thesis focuses on malaria prevention in Ghana. This work is partially
funded by GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), and is a result of a joint research effort with
RAND Europe. It is motivated in spirit by the health targets of the Millennium
Development Goals, mainly Goal 4, which is to reduce child mortality, and Goal
6, which is to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases (WHO, 2005). More
specifically, the aim is to assess the economic and distributional impact of malaria
prevention in an endemic country.
A variety of agencies, who work either cooperatively or individually, are involved in
combating malaria. These include governments of malaria-endemic countries, donor
countries, international bodies, international firms, and private individuals.2 GSK
is one of the largest international pharmaceutical firms, and is directly involved in
developing anti-malarial drugs and vaccines.3
In 2010, the economics department of GSK Vaccines decided to fund an academic
research project on malaria, with the intention that it will be published in a peer
reviewed journal. RAND Europe was contracted to carry out the research, and I was
invited to join the team. Consequently, I took a lead role in the research: I designed
and programmed the dynamic computable general equilibrium (DCGE) model (from
scratch), and we shared equal burden on other aspects of the project. Due to my
level of contribution, we agreed that I am the first and corresponding author on the
future journal paper.
So far, research on the link between malaria and economic growth has used econo-
metric methods. These give, however, results which are too broad and not particularly
useful for policy analysis. Furthermore, critics argue that they over-state the benefits
2International bodies include the World Bank, WHO, and the GAVI Alliance. A well-known
individual donor is the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.
3A new malaria vaccine candidate is being developed by GSK. Results were recently published
and suggest an efficacy of 55% (Agnandji et al., 2011). Malerone is a brand name anti-malarial drug,
which was also developed by GSK.
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of malaria reduction because they do no include general equilibrium effects, especially
those of diminishing returns to effective units of labour (e.g., Acemoglu and Johnson,
2007).
Our research fills this gap, and provides a more detailed estimate of the impact of
malaria at various levels, e.g., household, regional, and/or age level. This is important
for policy makers who must operate within a limited budget, and require information
to design malaria intervention policies. On the same note, pharmaceutical firms, who
are negotiating with government and donors on the provision of drugs and vaccines,
have an interest in understanding market demands and communicate opinions. This
approach is useful for cost-benefit methods, which are not commonly used in health
policy. Finally, it has the potential to be similarly used to assess other diseases, e.g.,
TB, HIV/AIDS, and obesity.
In the research, we simulate the impact of reducing malaria morbidity and mor-
tality on the Ghanaian economy utilising a micro-based approach. A multi-sector,
multi-agent, recursive DCGE model is developed and linked to (1) regional demo-
graphics with cohort-component projections for fertility, mortality, migration, and
urbanization; and (2) labour effectiveness indices for production and productivity of
parents with sick children, or adults affected by malaria during childhood. The model
is calibrated to Ghana, with households disaggregated by five epidemiological malaria
regions, urban-rural divide, and five income level quintiles. Hypothetical intervention
scenarios simulate reducing malaria prevalence by 50% for children under-five years
and with varying degrees of coverage.
The project is still on-going, and we are currently working on additional counter-
factual scenarios that represent other possible health provision strategies. The final
results submitted to a journal, may be slightly different from those presented here. In
general, however, we find that malaria prevention clearly adds to economic growth and
reduces income inequality, even under a limited intervention where only the under-
7
five year old population is treated. In this case study of Ghana, the benefits from an
intervention, per child covered, vary across regions, and generally contributes more
to the high prevalence regions.
Chapter 4 of the thesis is a joint effort with Pricillia Hunt and Stijn Hoorens, and
is aimed as a future journal paper. It describes the methodology by which we link
malaria and economic growth, discusses policy issues, and summarizes the results of
three hypothetical health intervention policies. Chapter 5 of the thesis is a detailed
explanation of the DCGE model that I developed.
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Part I Water allocation
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Chapter 2
Which is preferable for Israel, a
market or an administrative water
allocation mechanism?
2.1 Introduction
Most arid and semi-arid regions use an administrative water allocation mechanism,
whereby the state monopolizes the water resource, and erects a regulatory body to
administer it. The main tools used are quotas, price discrimination, and increasing
block tariffs that are set and upheld by prohibiting the resale of water.1
Critics of this mechanism argue that allocation is subjective, politicized, and leads
to inefficiencies (Dinar et al., 1997; Holden and Thobani, 1996). Much of the criticism
centres on the agricultural sectors that have access to subsidized water. Farmers
appear to have historical, senior rights, and are shielded by a strong lobby. Therefore,
even when inefficiencies are detected, the political system finds it difficult to change
antiquated allotments. The result is inefficient use of water, whereby farmers grow
1For discussion on various countries, see review by OECD (2010), and by Diakité et al. (2009),
Ruijs (2008), Roseta-Palma and Monteiro (2008) and Hajispyrou et al. (2002).
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low-value and surplus crops, while non-agricultural water users struggle to develop
expensive new supplies (Colby, 1990; Plaut, 2000). In addition, a ’black’ water market
may form, which further indicates that water is misallocated (Lichtman, 2009).2
These arguments are partly justified, but as discussed by Just et al. (1997), the
goal behind an administrative allocation is to promote social objectives, such as wa-
ter and food security, or equitable consumption across income groups or climate
specific regions. Administrative mechanisms are also used to correct market-failures
in situations of public goods, where an amenity provides non-marketed services, e.g.,
agricultural landscape, tourism, and historical heritage. The multi-functionality of
agricultural activities may produce benefits over and above the market value of agri-
cultural production (Brunstad et al., 1999, 2005).
This chapter explores both positive and negative impacts of an administrative
water allocation using Israel as a case study. The following questions are addressed:
(1) Can the level of administrative misallocation be measured? (2) Who are the main
inefficient water users, and how can allocation be improved? (3) What value do the
amenities need to have in order to rationalize the current administrative allocation
as efficient? (4) Which is preferable, a market or an administrative mechanism?
To answer these questions, an applied general equilibrium model is developed and
calibrated to Israel from 1995 to 2006. In the initial case, a regulator decides on a
framework in which price discrimination, quotas, and increasing block tariffs are set,
and water trade is prohibited. Water users decide on the amount of water to buy
within this framework.
Subsequently, in the counter-factual experiments, water trade is enabled within
a secondary water market and prices adjust until markets clear. In the extension,
the model accounts for the non-economic value of amenities, whereby the agricultural
sectors internalize the benefit of producing amenities demanded by the households.
2Chapter 3.1 gives a more detailed contextualised discussion of water in Israel.
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If we consider the market allocation to be primarily efficient, the quantity of
water traded would indicate the level of administrative misallocation. For example,
a large secondary water market would indicate that the administrative mechanism is
inefficient, and that a market mechanism would put water to better use. If however
the social value provided by the administrative mechanism is also included, it is then
possible that the benefits from a water market could be smaller than the loss incurred
to social value, i.e., a net-social welfare loss.
Thus, two alternative allocation mechanisms can be compared in a context of er-
roneous policy choices. A type I error would be to replace the current administrative
mechanism with a market mechanism, given that the current administrative mech-
anism is true (the null hypothesis H0). In this case, the loss to social welfare, in
the form of agricultural amenities, is greater than the gain in efficiency from a water
market. A type II error would be not to replace the administrative mechanism with
a market mechanism, given that the market mechanism is the correct policy. In this
case, the efficiency lost from not introducing a water market is larger than the social
value preserved in the form of agricultural amenities.
At the parametrization stage of the model, the approach is to calibrate the model
with (plausible) conservative parameters that would favour a market mechanism. On
the one hand, the calibration would lead to the largest plausible administrative water
misallocation, so that the potential size of a secondary water market is therefore a
conservative upper bounds. This raises the type II error. On the other hand, the
value of the agricultural amenity is aimed at being an underestimate lower bounds,
which lowers the type I error.
Nevertheless, the results find that the potential size of a secondary water market
(i.e., the administrative misallocation) is rather small, and when the model is exten-
ded to impute agricultural amenities, the amenity value is large. In other words, it
is less likely that Israel is wrongly maintaining its current administrative allocation.
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The potential social loss from introducing a market mechanism might be significantly
higher than the added benefits of efficient water use.
Furthermore, in the current analysis, only agricultural amenities are imputed.
Therefore, had additional amenities been considered (e.g., those stemming from tour-
ism, historical heritage, irreversible destruction to nature) the infra-marginal losses
from introducing a water market could be higher still.
The chapter makes the following contributions. First, it adds a new perspective
to the discussion of water allocation efficiency in Israel. Contrary to most literature
on Israel, the paper supports the continued use of an administrative water allocation
mechanism. Second, it suggests a simple method, which can be used to evaluate and
improve water allocation decisions also in other countries. Finally, the paper imputes
the value of agricultural amenities in Israel, adding to the discussion by Fleischer and
Tsur (2009) and Kan et al. (2009) on the economic value of agricultural amenities.
Thus, the paper relates to two areas of research. It has relevance for natural resource
management that aims to improve the efficient use of a scarce resource, and it has
implications for political and social policy.
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 discusses how inefficient water
allocation arises from an administrative mechanism and introduces a simplified the-
oretical model to estimate it. Section 2.3 expands to a more realistic multi-sector
applied general equilibrium model for the Israeli economy. Section 2.4 discusses the
empirical results. Section 2.5 extends the model to impute the value of the agricul-
tural amenities and discusses the policy implications of the results. Finally, Section
2.6 concludes.
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2.2 The water model
Applied general equilibrium models have been developed to analyse different issues
within water management (see Dixon, 1990; Berck et al., 1991; Seung et al., 2000; Diao
et al., 2008). Diao and Roe (2003) have discussed administrative water allocation in
Morocco, and found that reducing protectionist agricultural policy without correcting
for distortions in irrigated agriculture pricing would lead to increased inefficient water
use. Creating a water market, however, could compensate for the decline in agricul-
tural profits and raise efficiency. Gómez et al. (2004) have demonstrated that having
a water market in the Balearic Islands, rather than an administrative mechanism,
would lead to economic gains that in turn would allow for delays in investment in
desalination plants. Becker (1995) focused on the Israeli agricultural sector. He used
a linear programming model to analyse the effects of introducing a market mechanism
on the shadow water prices for the various water basins, and reported the economic
gains from a water market.
The common theme in the above papers, is that a market mechanism leads to
economic gains. However, none of them include the social consequences of introducing
a water market. In this chapter, social gains adds an additional dimension to the
evaluation of the administrative mechanism.
The usual benefits of a market mechanism are illustrated in Figure 2.1. Assume
a closed economy with only two water users. The total water resource is quantity
W¯ , and a social planner allocates W gov to the household, and W¯ − W gov to the
farmer. Furthermore, water trade is prohibited. However, this allocation is clearly not
optimal, because the marginal values of water are not equalized, MVWh > MVWi.
When water trade is enabled, the household benefits from buying additional units
of water, while the farmer benefits from selling some of his water rights. The discrep-
ancy between the initial administrative allocation and the market allocation is the
horizontal distance |W gov −W ∗|, measured in cubic meters of water. In this paper,
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Figure 2.1: Water quotas with two agents
a
hMVW
b
o
Household Farmer
*P
hMVW
iMVW
*W
iMVW
Measured 
Inefficiency 
govW
Note: Total water W¯ is allocated by the government. Household is allocated water quantity W gov , while farmers
are allocated W¯ −W gov . Area aob is the dead weight loss from inefficient water allocation. The potential secondary
water market is the volume |W gov −W ∗|, a proxy for inefficiency.
the quantity traded within this secondary water market is used as a proxy to indicate
the level of inefficient allocation.3
2.2.1 A simplified trade model with water inputs
To describe the model that is used in this paper, consider a simplified closed economy.
Firm i ∈ N produces a single final good Yi ∈ y, using a differentiable constant returns
to scale production function fi (Li,Wi) that uses labor and water inputs, respectively.
Output prices and wages are pi, pL ∈ p, respectively.
A representative household h ∈ H has a rational and locally non-satiated prefer-
ence relation, with a continuous utility function U (y). It consumes final goods Yi,
and water Wh ∈ y, and is endowed with a fixed supply of labor L¯ and water W¯ .
The government, which is not explicitly modeled, holds the property rights of
water, and assigns a different increasing block tariff (IBT) for each type of water
3See further discussion in Chapter 3.3.
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user, i.e., firms and households pay pW,i, pW,h ∈ p, respectively. However, unlike in
the paper by Diao and Roe (2003), water users are not bound by the water quota
allotted to them. They can, in general, obtain as much water as they desire by paying
increasingly higher prices, within the IBT framework.
Following Mathiesen (1985) and Rutherford (1995, 1999), I set up an Arrow–Debreu
equilibrium as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP). A complementarity con-
straint enforces that two variables are complementary to each other, i.e., that the
following conditions hold for scalar variables x and y: x · y = 0, x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0. This
condition is compactly expressed as 0 ≤ x ⊥ y ≥ 0.4
Given the above, ∀i, the firm’s profit maximization problem is to choose labor
and water demands, Li and Wi, so as
Max
Li,Wi≥0
pii (Li,Wi) = pifi (Li,Wi)− pLLi − pW,iWi (2.1)
The disposable income a household is M = pLL¯ + pW,hW¯h +
∑N
i pW,iW¯i, which
includes income from wages, and water charge fees that are collected by the water
authority and transferred to the household. W¯i and W¯h denote the administrative
water allocation.5
The household’s utility maximization problem is to choose consumption of goods
and water, Yi and Wh, so as to
Max
Yi,Wh≥0
U (Yi, · · · , YN ,Wh) s.t. M ≥
N∑
i
piYi + pW,hWh (2.2)
Focusing on water, the first order conditions must be satisfied so that the marginal
4Intuitively, a complementarity constraint is a way to model a constraint that is combinatorial in
nature since, for example, the complementary conditions imply that either x or y must be 0 (both
may be 0 as well).
5Note that in the initial administrative allocation, Wh = W¯h, and could be netted out from both
the household’s income equation and utility maximization problem. However, they are intentionally
there for clarity because when water trade is enabled, it is possible that Wh 6= W¯h.
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value of water (MVW ) equals the real water price.
MVWi =
∂fi (·)
∂Wi
≤ pW,i
pi
⊥ Wi ≥ 0, ∀i (2.3)
MVWh =
∂U (·)
∂Wh
≤ pW,h
pU
⊥ Wh ≥ 0 (2.4)
There are three types of weak inequality conditions that must be satisfied in this
general equilibrium model: (i) zero profit, (ii) market clearance, and (iii) income
balance, each associated with three non-negative variables, i.e., y∗ ≥ 0, p∗ ≥ 0 and
M∗ ≥ 0, respectively.
I define the unit cost function as ci = Ci (pL, pW,i, Yi = 1), and the unit expenditure
function of the household as e = E (pi, pW,h, U = 1). Finally, using Shephard’s lemma,
the demands for inputs by the producers, and demand for final goods and water by
the household are summarised by the following weak inequalities, ∀i:
Zero profit conditions: 0 ≤ ci − pi ⊥ Yi ≥ 0 (2.5)
0 ≤ e− pU ⊥ U ≥ 0 (2.6)
Market clearing conditions: 0 ≤ Yi − ∂e
∂pi
· U ⊥ pi ≥ 0 (2.7)
0 ≤ W¯h − ∂e
∂pW,h
· U ⊥ pW,h ≥ 0 (2.8)
0 ≤ U − M
pU
⊥ pU ≥ 0 (2.9)
0 ≤ L¯−
N∑
i=1
∂ci
∂pL
· Yi ⊥ pL ≥ 0 (2.10)
0 ≤ W¯i − ∂ci
∂pW,i
· Yi ⊥ pW,i ≥ 0 (2.11)
Income balance: M = pLL¯+ pW,hW¯h +
N∑
i=1
pW,iW¯i ⊥ M ≥ 0 (2.12)
where price vector p∗ and activity levels y∗ constitute a competitive equilibrium.
18
2.2.2 Secondary water market
As described in Figure 2.1 and Equations (2.3) and (2.4), assume that at the initial
administrative allocation with restricted water trade, pW,i
pi
= MVWi < MVWh =
pW,h
pU
, i.e., the household has a higher marginal value of water than firm i. When
water trade is allowed, the household would prefer to buy water from firm i (and the
firm prefers to sell), up to a point where MVWi = MVWh.
More generally, water users can be buyers or sellers, and having M = N + H
water users leads to M2 trade configurations,6 with ψmn being the relative marginal
value. If user m ∈M is a buyer, and user n ∈M is a seller, a possible trade channel
is when MVWm
MVWn
= ψmn > 1; otherwise, it cannot be a possible trade channel. This is
summarise by
MVWm
MVWn
=

ψmn > 1 possible trade channel
ψmn ≤ 1 not possible
(2.13)
These conditions, therefore, limit the number of configurations to only T = M(M−1)2
possible trade channels, with t ∈ T being one specific channel. (Section 2.3.4 discusses
how the marginal values of water are estimated, and Table 2.3 provides a concrete
example for Israel.)
Thus, when water trade is enabled, the units of water, γt, that are transferred
between seller n and buyer m are measured by
0 ≤ γt ⊥ pW,n,t − (1− ) pW,m,t ≥ 0, ∀t (2.14)
with pW,n,t and pW,m,t being the water market prices for the seller and buyer, re-
spectively. For computational purposes, → 0 is a small number to ’help’ the solver
with slack activities, thus avoiding the problem of infinite solutions, i.e., a degenerate
6N firms and H households.
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model.7
There are various combinations (scenarios) of activating and deactivating water
trade channels, e.g., activating each channel separately, or all together. Therefore,
each of the t ∈ T channels has a binary action (designed by the scenario); active or
not-active, {A,NA} ∈ Action. There are {tA, tNA} ∈ T channels, {iA, iNA} ∈ N
firms, and {hA, hNA} ∈ H households, that are active or not-active, respectively.8
Finally, for a set of actions, the market clearing conditions (2.8) and (2.11) are
replaced with
0 ≤ W¯A − ∂eA
∂pW,hA
· UA +
∑
iA
∂ciA
∂pw,iA
· YiA ⊥ pW = pW,hA = pW,iA ≥ 0 (2.15)
0 ≤ W¯iNA −
∂ciNA
∂pW,iNA
· YiNA ⊥ pW,iNA ≥ 0 (2.16)
0 ≤ W¯hNA −
∂eNA
∂pW,hNA
· UNA ⊥ pW,hNA ≥ 0 (2.17)
Equation (2.15) states that the supply of traded water, W¯A, will equal the demand
for traded water, provided that water prices equalize within the secondary water
market. Equations (2.16) and (2.17) reflect cases in which some water users are
prohibited from trade, and have user-specific water prices and quotas.9
7To insures that when multiple t channels are opened (active), only net transfers of water is
considered. For example, a case of infinite solutions is when a first user sells to the second, the
second sells to the third, but the first also sells to the third. By adding , the solution is limited
to one (possible) case where, for example, the first sells to the second and to the third, while
deactivating the second selling to the third.
8In other words, a water user will not trade because it is either his own choice or it is blocked.
9Here, there is only one representative household. Equation (2.17) is a case where the household
is blocked from trading, and therefore ∂eA∂pW,hA ·UA = 0 in Equation (2.15). Extending the analysis to
multiple-households is a simple matter, e.g., updating Equations (2.2) and (2.12), but requires further
assumptions regarding water ownership in the applied model. Adding the government explicitly,
would probably be required.
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2.3 The applied general equilibrium model and the
data
In order to adequately represent the actual empirical Israeli economy, the general
equilibrium model that was discussed in the previous section is extended. The follow-
ing will describe the main features of the applied model and of the data used. The
full analytical model is discussed in more detail in Section 3.4.10
Table 2.1 presents key water figures for 2006. Roughly 68% of the total supply of
water in Israel is potable water, of which there are four main users. Approximately
39% of potable water is consumed by the agricultural sector, 6% by the manufacturing
sector, 16% by the service sector, and 39% by private households.11
The use of non-potable water, i.e., salinized, contaminated, sewage eﬄuents, flood,
brackish water, etc., has increased in the past two decades, due to growing pressures
on the supply of water, and improvements in technology and infrastructure. Approx-
imately 95% of it is used by the agricultural sector, and the rest by the manufacturing
sector.
The applied small open economy is aggregated into three main production sectors:
agricultural, manufacturing, and services, and one representative household. The
government is not explicitly modeled, but its actions are manifested through the
initial water allocation, i.e., quota and increasing block tariff (IBT) assignments to
water users.
10The model is programmed and simulated in GAMS using Rutherford (1999)’s MPSGE.
11Water consumption by private households and service sectors is regarded as residential water
consumption. Yearly data is reported by the Israeli Water and Sewage Authority by eleven sub-
groups. Approximately 55% of total potable water is consumed by residential users, of which 71% are
private homes, and the rest are service sector, i.e., commercial and public office buildings, swimming
pools, gardens, etc.
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Table 2.1: Key water figures in Israel (2006)
Potable Water Non-Potable Water
User Mil.
Cubic
Metersa
% of
Total
Expenditure
(mil. NIS)b
Marginal
Value
Waterc
Mil.
Cubic
Metersa
% of
Total
Expenditure
(mil. NIS)b
Agriculture 519 39 768 1.48 589 95 474
Manufacturing 84 6 209 2.49 30 5 24
Services 213 16 833 5.15
Household 524 39 1,889 4.85
Total 1,341 100% 619 100%
% Total Water 68% 32%
Source: a The Water and Sewage Authority, Israel. b Own Calculation: water quantity times relevant price band.
c From the Water Authority 2006 price plan, with assumptions discussed in Section 2.3.4.
2.3.1 Production
Each of the three production sectors uses the following five inputs: labor, capital,
intermediate goods, potable water, and non-potable water.12 The production function
is setup as a four-level nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) structure,
which simplifies the calibration procedure and captures the different substitution
elasticities for pairs of inputs. Some of the main assumptions are the following:
First, the model is calibrated for a short-to-medium time horizon, which affects the
assumptions that are made on factor mobility. Within a time frame of three to four
years, land inputs are relatively rigid because of soil type, location, infrastructure,
and legislative constraints (Hertel, 2002). Here, because capital includes land, capital
is also highly rigid, and is assigned as a sector specific input. This is especially true
for the agricultural sector.
Second, in order to capture the user specific characteristics of water, sector spe-
cific output-supply-price elasticities and water-demand-price elasticities are used to
calibrate for the unknown substitution elasticities. These are summarized in Table
2.2, which are the mid-values from empirical papers. The agricultural sector has
12Service sectors have zero expenditure on non-potable water.
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Table 2.2: Output-supply-price and demand-price elasticities
Output
Supply
Elasticitya
Water
Demand
Elasticitya
Potable/Non-
Potable
Substitutionb
Agricultural 0.8 -0.7 1.1
Manufacturing 3.0 -0.7 1.1
Services 3.0 -0.1
Household -0.1
Source: a Approximate mid-values reported in various papers. b Israel Water Authority
Note: The above values, together with the cost share from the social accounting matrix, calibrate the input substitution
elasticities for households and sectors. (See Section 3.4.)
a relatively inelastic supply price elasticity of 0.8, partly due to high land rigidity.
Non-agricultural sectors have an elastic supply price elasticity of 3.0. Furthermore,
both the agricultural and manufacturing sector have a water demand price elasticity
of -0.7, while the residential water demand price elasticity is -0.1, i.e., service sectors
and households.13 As in many applied models, intermediate inputs are assumed to
enter in fixed proportions (Leontief technology). Finally, the substitution elasticity
between potable and non-potable water is assumed to be 1.1.14
Third, labor inputs freely migrate between the various sectors, and have a global
wage level, pL. Finally, in the benchmark, water inputs are allotted to users and are
non-tradable, and water prices, pW,i, are sector specific. As discussed in Section 2.2.2,
when water-trade is allowed, water is reassigned as a global input, and trade occurs
until the market clears. Water prices change sufficiently to drive water marginal
values to equalize between users.
13Sections 3.5 and 3.6 provide a detailed description of the empirical literature and assumptions
behind these values, and explain the calibration method from the known elasticities and cost share
to the unknown substitution elasticities within the production and utility functions.
14Water Authority assumes a substitution ranging from 1 to 1.2 between potable and non-potable
water for agricultural use, depending on the water quality of non-potable water.
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2.3.2 Household
The small open economy has one representative household that is endowed with labor,
capital, and water resources, L¯, K¯, W¯ , respectively. Tax revenues are transferred to
the household, including positive (negative) transfers of income to cover balance of
payments, bop. Income is
M = PW,hW¯h +
n∑
i=1
(
PLL¯i + PK,iK¯i + PW,p,iW¯p,i + PW,np,iW¯np,i + τi + bopi
)
(2.18)
and utility is derived by consuming potable water and final goods, using a two-level
nest CES-Cobb Douglas function. Table 2.2 reports that the residential water demand
price elasticity is -0.1, which I use to calibrate the unknown substitution elasticity
between the demand for water and a bundle of final consumption goods.
2.3.3 General assumptions in the model
Two assumptions are made in the model. First, in order to properly compare the
welfare effects between the benchmark and the counter-factual scenarios, and because
this is a static model, the balance of payments (BOP) is fixed to the year specific
levels. Otherwise, it would not make sense to allow for policy experiments to increase
the trade deficit and thus increase welfare, at the expense of foreign borrowing. Such
a situation would be misleading because in a fully dynamic model, borrowing will
have to be paid back at some point.15
Second, having increasing block water tariffs usually means that higher block
tariff users subsidize lower block tariff users. Here, however, the model is simplified
by aggregating many different users to only four main groups, each having one water
price. Disaggregating users into further subgroups is possible, but would require a
more detailed social accounting matrix. In this model it is therefore assumed that all
15Practically, to fix the BOP to its benchmark level, household is endowed with a fixed amount
of bopi for each type of good i ∈ N .
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users within a group have the same size and preferences, or that they have already
traded water internally between themselves.
2.3.4 Data and marginal value of water
The data used in the model is obtained from the Use-Supply tables published by the
Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) for 1995, 2000, 2004, 2005 and 2006. (Sim-
ilar data for 2007 is not yet available.) The data include sector outputs and inputs,
household consumption and trade balance, as well as levels of taxes and subsidies.
From these, social accounting matrices (SAM) are constructed and used to calibrate
the model (Round, 2003). Labour inputs are obtained from the Compensation of
Employees by Industry tables from the Israeli CBS.
The Water Authority assigns increasing block tariff (IBT), whereby consumers pay
progressively higher water prices for each increasing quantity of water consumed.16
Each main user, i.e., agricultural, manufacturing, services, and households, has a
different IBT structure.17
CBS does not report the water sector separately from the electricity sector, and
does not distinguish between potable and non-potable water. Therefore, the ex-
penditure on water has to be estimated by other means, rather than directly from the
Use-Supply tables. Residential water expenditure, i.e., household and service sectors,
are estimated by summing the total water quantity times the relevant tariff band for
each type of residential user.18 Agricultural water expenditure is obtained by mul-
tiplying the quantity of total potable water supply by tariff block A. This method is
similarly used to estimate the expenditure on potable water for manufacturing, and
expenditure on non-potable water, which each have one main water price band.
16But not necessarily higher, e.g., manufacturing has a lower price for water use above the 100%
quota.
17Data obtained from the Water Authority and summarized in Section 3.7.2 of Chapter 3.
18Detailed data on eleven residential sub-groups is reported by the Water Authority, Residential
Water Consumption (an annual publication in Hebrew).
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Water users can obtain as much, or as little, water as they are willing to pay-
for. This means that their marginal value of water (MVW) is equal, or somewhere
below the next tariff block, of the last unit of water. Table 2.1 summarizes the total
monetary expenditure on water, and the estimated marginal value for 2006. Recall
that conservative values are preferred, and that this would increase water trade, e.g.,
by lowering the MVW for farmers and increasing it for households. The following are
the underlying assumptions for the marginal value of water:
Agricultural water quotas were revised in 1989 and the following tariff blocks were
introduced. Tariff A is charged up-to 50% of the quota, tariff B between 50-80%, and
tariff C between 80%-100%. There are two further bands above 100% with lower
prices.19 Since 1989, extensive cuts in potable water quotas have been made, and
most of agricultural users pay tariff A, which is thus assigned as their marginal value
for water.20
Manufacturing sectors have one main tariff up to 100% of the quota, and this is
assigned as the marginal value of water.21
Different service sectors are assigned different tariffs. For example, hospitals and
mikves22 fall under tariff A. Hotels fall under tariff B, while the rest of the service
sectors (e.g., commerce, education, sport, public) fall under tariff C. Public gardens
are charged tariff D. In the model, tariff C is used as the marginal value of water for
service sectors, because it captures 62% of the water used. Public gardens consume
around 25% of water in the service sector, but they do not account for GDP.
Finally, the household price scheme for 2006 includes four tariff blocks. Tariff B
captures around 61% of the total consumed water by households, and is therefore
19The two further blocks are: (1) up-to 10% above the quota, and (2) above 10% above the quota.
See Section 3.7.2 of Chapter 3 for further detail.
20From a discussion with the Water Authority. Agricultural water consumption is not published,
as it is done with residential consumption. Furthermore, the secondary water market would be
smaller if tariff B would have been chosen. When in doubt, the larger, more conservative, secondary
water market is preferred.
21There is also a lower water price above 100% of the quota. See Table 3.2 for further details.
22Jewish ritual bath.
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Table 2.3: Water trade channels: relative MVW for 2006
Buyer m ∈M
Agricultural Manufacturing Services Household
Agricultural 1 1.684 3.484 3.283
Seller n ∈M Manufacturing 0.594 1 2.069 1.949
Service 0.287 0.483 1 0.942
Household 0.305 0.513 1.061 1
Note: These are the ratio of seller/buyer water marginal value. Divide values from the fifth column in Table 2.1 and
numbers in bold are the possible water trade channels.
chosen as their estimated marginal value of water.23
Table 2.3 is an applied example of the discussion in Section 2.2.2. It shows that
having four main water users in Israel leads to sixteen water trade configurations.
In order to obtain the relative marginal value of water (MVW) for a buyer/seller
ψmn, as in Equation (2.13), divide the marginal values of water for each pair of users
reported in Table 2.1. Values greater than one indicate which water trade channels
are possible, and who would be the sellers and buyers. The six possible channels
are marked in bold in Table 2.3. The service sector, for example, values water by
approximately 3.484 times that of the agricultural sector, and therefore, would buy
from the agricultural sector (not sell).
2.4 Measuring the efficiency of an administrative
water allocation
In this section of the applied model, water is initially allotted administratively to
each of the four users, and water trade is forbidden. Then, in the counter-factual
experiments, trade is allowed and water inputs are re-shuﬄed until all users have the
same marginal value of water.
23In 1997, band B captured 70% of the total household water. Source: Israeli Water Authority,
Residential Water Consumption (in Hebrew). In 2010, the price bands were changed. However,
since the model’s data covers until 2006, the effects of this new price band is left for future research.
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Compared to a market allocation, a certain degree of administrative misalloca-
tion is expected. The question is, therefore, how large is the potential secondary
water market likely to be? A large misallocation could indicate a poor administrative
mechanism. It would suggest that a market mechanism may be superior, and that the
government is committing a type II error by maintaining the current administrative
allocation and not introducing a water market.
If, however, the misallocation is rather small, it is unclear which mechanism is
better. Section 2.5, therefore, extends the model and includes the non-marketed
social value. Together, this section and the next contribute to a better assessment of
the most preferable mechanism for Israel.
2.4.1 Results for 2006
The main results, which are: the size of the secondary potable water market, the
welfare gains, and their effect on the nominal water price, are reported in Table 2.4.
The most important outcome is the all-channel-trade scenario, in which the sec-
ondary potable water market is estimated at 80.8 million cubic meters (MCM). This
is approximately 6.0% of the total potable water consumption in Israel in 2006. The
agricultural sector sells 22.5 MCM of potable water to the manufacturing sector, 17.9
MCM to the service sector, and 40.3 MCM to households.
Because the Water Authority practices price discrimination, the secondary water
market clears when nominal water prices rise (or fall) sufficiently to allow the marginal
value of water to equalize for all users (reported in the right hand side of Table 2.4).
In the all-trade scenario, the agricultural water price rises by 22.6%, and falls for
manufacturing, services, and households by 27.2%, 64.8%, and 62.7%, respectively.
This means that in 2006, the market clearing nominal water price (shadow price)
would have been NIS/MC 1.81.
Being a general equilibrium model, water trade also affects other variables in
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Table 2.4: Model results (2006, % change)
% of Welfare % Change in water prices
Water* total gains Potable water Non-potable
Channel (seller to buyer) MCM potable NIS mill. Agri Indus Serv House water
1. Agriculture to Manufacturing 32.7 2.4 21.5 8.0 -35.9 1.1
2. Agriculture to Services 20.7 1.5 24.9 5.0 -69.8 1.2
3. Agriculture to Household 44.5 3.3 51.0 11.5 -66.0 2.6
4. Manufacturing to Services 9.5 0.7 5.7 17.5 -43.2 0.3
5. Manufacturing to Household 15.5 1.2 8.2 31.9 -32.3 0.6
6. Household to Services 0.7 0.1 0.1 -4.1 1.8 0.0
All Channel Trade 80.8 6.0 86.3 22.6 -27.2 -64.8 -62.7 4.4
(of which)
Manufacturing buys 22.5 1.7
Services buys 17.9 1.3
Household buys 40.3 3.0
Shadow Water Price (All Channel) NIS/CM 1.81
*Total potable consumed, in 2006, was 1340.5 Million Cubic Meters (MCM).
Note: Model’s results for 2006 data. The second column is the quantity of water traded within each channel of the
secondary water market. The third column is the percent of water traded of the total potable water supply in that
year. The fourth column are the welfare gains in New Israeli Shekels (NIS) Million. The right hand section is percent
change of nominal water price from the initial allocation.
the economy such as production levels, sector specific return to capital, wage level
and welfare. Table 2.5 reports the most important of them. These changes might
seem small, but are a result of potable water inputs being only 2% of total input
cost in the agricultural sector, and less than 0.1% for manufacturing and service
sectors. Household expenditure on potable water is only 0.2% of disposable income.24
Therefore, the household utility level (welfare) rises by only 0.01%. This is, however,
equivalent to a 2.3% increase in economic value relative to the size of the water sector,
and approximately 86.3 Million New Israeli Shekels (NIS) in 2006 prices (see fourth
column in Table 2.4). The intuition behind these results is that by allowing for water
trade, water inputs are put to better use, and the production possibility frontier of
24CBS Israel reports that household water consumption is approximately 1% of disposable income.
This, however, includes all elements of water such as sewage cost, recycling, etc. In this model, these
additional costs are attributed to capital inputs rather than water, because they are not directly
related to water trade.
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Table 2.5: Other key results (2006, % change)
Agriculture Manufacturing
Channel Prod. Price Return on
Capital
Prod. Price Return on
Capital
3. Agr sell to Hh -0.2 0.4 0.13 -0.024 0.14 0.13
All Trade -0.4 0.7 0.13 -0.04 0.15 0.14
Services Other Variables
Prod. Price Return on
Capital
Wage Water Sector
GDP
Price
Non-Potable
3. Agr sell to Hh -0.01 0.13 0.13 0.13 1.4 2.6
All Trade 0.02 0.10 0.13 0.27 2.3 4.4
Note: Model output for 2006 - continued from Table 2.4. Values are percent change from the initial allocation.
the economy moves outwards.
To better understand the mechanism within this general equilibrium model, it
is useful to focus, for example, on channel 3 in Table 2.4 and Table 2.5, where the
agricultural sector sells only to households. In this channel, which has the largest
impact on water trade, the size of the water transfer is around 44.5 MCM. Relative to
the initial administrative prices, market water prices rise by 11.5% for the agricultural
sector, and fall by 66% for households (see Table 2.4 channel 3).
As Table 2.5 reports, agricultural output falls by 0.2%, which raises the agricul-
tural price by 0.4% and raises agricultural return on capital by 0.13%. As mentioned
earlier, capital is a sector specific input, and will not have a direct effect on the rest of
the economy. However, when water inputs are transferred to households, this raises
demand for labour within the agricultural sector, and leads to a wage increase across
the whole economy. Indirectly, this raises the cost of production in the other two
sectors, even though they are not involved in the water market. Production levels,
therefore, fall in the manufacturing and service sectors, and output prices rise.
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Table 2.6: Values used for sensitivity analysis, 2006
Output Supply Elast. Water Demand Elast.
Sector Min Model Max Min Model Max
Agriculture 0.4 0.8 1.2 -0.1 -0.7 -2
Manufacturing 1 3 5 -0.1 -0.7 -2
Services 1 3 5 -0.01 -0.1 -1
Household -0.01 -0.1 -1
Note: Max. and min. range for supply-price and demand-price elasticities. Bold numbers are the benchmark values.
2.4.2 Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analysis was performed on each sector using minimum and maximum
parameters for the various output supply elasticities, and water demand elasticities
(summarized in Table 2.6). These parameters are well above and below the accepted
values that are reported and used in other studies. The results suggest that the model
is well-behaved, and that the main results are robust.
Output supply price elasticity has a negligible effect on the size of the water
market because, as previously mentioned, water accounts for a very small fraction of
the input cost in production. Furthermore, capital is a sector specific input, which
dampens the effect of parameter changes. Experimenting also with capital as a fully
tradable input does not change the size of the secondary water market by any measure
worth reporting.
A larger effect on the secondary water market comes from changing the water
demand elasticities. Using unlikely, extreme, values for both agriculture and manu-
facturing sectors, the potential secondary water market reaches a range of 3.6% to
7.8% of the total potable water supplied. Yet, the outcomes are not significantly
different from the main result of 6%. Changing the water demand elasticities for res-
idential users, i.e., service sectors and households, by an unlikely order of magnitude
of 10, changes the range from 4% to 18% of total potable water. Again, these are
unlikely elasticities, but do not change the overall message described previously.
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Finally, stretching the water demand elasticities so that the agricultural and man-
ufacturing sector are -1, and the service sector and households are -0.4, would increase
the secondary water market to 198 MCM, which is 14.8% of total potable water sup-
ply.
The model is also tested with different marginal values of water. Because the
agricultural sector is the main seller of water, raising its water marginal value to the
next price block, decreases the water market to 4.8% of total potable supply, and the
nominal water shadow price rises to 2.05 NIS/CM. This outcome is not surprising,
since the seller will sell less when his marginal value of water rises.25
Increasing the marginal value of water for the buyers, such as households and the
service sector, either separately or jointly, will also not change the overall result but
rather reallocate water differently between them. This is because at the top tariff
blocks, both users have the same prices. Furthermore, the marginal value chosen for
residential water users are already on the high-side, because the water price paid at
the ’city gates’ are lower than the actual price paid by final users. Thus, reducing
their marginal value of water would have only reduced the secondary water markets.
In conclusion, besides confirming the validity of the model, the sensitivity analysis
provides another important message. It shows that even when the deep parameters
are somewhat imprecise, the size of the secondary water market is in the vicinity of
6% of the total potable water supplied (80 MCM in 2006). This is a rather small
misallocation, and its significance will be discussed shortly. Furthermore, the results
are mostly sensitive to the choice of the marginal values of water, which are harder to
estimate. In this model, however, the idea was to capture the largest size of inefficiency
possible, under plausible assumptions. Thus, increasing the marginal value of water
for the agricultural sector (the seller) or lowering it for residential use (the buyer)
would only reduce the misallocation.
25Since manufacturing has one price block, no sensitivity test was conducted on its marginal value
of water.
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Table 2.7: Secondary water markets for 1995-2006
Potable Water (Million Cubic Meters, MCM) Non-Potable (MCM)
Year Total 2nd Water Market % of Total Total Nominal Price
Change (%)
1995 1574.7 79.2 5.0 406.5 3.5
2000 1481.4 98.2 6.6 442.3 4.6
2004 1359.0 84.3 6.2 595.3 5.0
2005 1344.1 79.8 5.9 617.3 4.1
2006 1340.5 80.8 6.0 618.5 4.4
Nominal Change in Potable Water Price (%) Shadow Water
Year Agriculture Manufacturing Services Households Price (NIS/CM)
1995 13.4 -20.0 -76.1 -74.3 0.88
2000 20.8 -29.4 -73.6 -71.6 1.13
2004 22.5 -29.4 -66.4 -64.2 1.61
2005 21.2 -28.4 -63.8 -61.5 1.77
2006 22.6 -27.2 -64.8 -62.7 1.81
Note: Top section of Table 2.7, columns three and four, show the (potential) quantity of a secondary potable water
market since 1995. Bottom section shows the percent change to potable water price from the initial allocation, and
sixth column is the shadow price of potable water in nominal New Israeli Shekels (NIS) per cubic meter.
2.4.3 Comparing results for 1995 through 2006
The applied model has also been calibrated for 1995 through 2006, for the years that
CBS Israel had available data. Marginal values for water are re-assigned according
to the relevant water prices chosen by the Water Authority at each year.26 Using the
year specific SAM, and the water demand-price elasticities and output-supply-price
elasticities as reported in Table 2.2, the substitution elasticities are re-calibrated as
discussed in Section 2.3.1. New water trade channels are set as in Section 2.3.4, i.e.,
each year has its own values for Table 2.3.
The main results are summarized in the top section of Table 2.7, and conclude
that the potential secondary potable-water market, for those years, would have been
consistently around 5% to 6% of the total supplied potable water. The bottom section
26The Water Authority updated water prices according to a water index or due to administrative
reform. The water index is based on the changes to the consumer price index, electricity prices and
average wage levels. (For further discussion, see Section 3.7.2.)
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Table 2.8: Potable water expenditure as % of total cost (net of tax)
Agriculture Manufacturing Services Households
1995 5.7 0.08 0.14 0.3
2000 2.5 0.031 0.12 0.2
2004 2.3 0.034 0.11 0.2
2005 2.2 0.034 0.11 0.2
2006 2.0 0.031 0.11 0.2
Note: from the social accounting matrix.
of Table 2.7 reports the changes to water price, relative to the initial administrative
allocation, and the shadow water price.
At first, two results seem counter-intuitive. First, for 1995, the model estimates
that the potential secondary potable water market would have been the smallest,
compared to the other years in the data (5.0% of total potable water). This is an
indication of a high efficient allocation. Curiously, in that year, the supplied potable
water was also the largest, 1575 MCM. Since the agricultural sector was portrayed as
inefficient, “water guzzler” in Israel, one would think that when the supply of potable
water is large, there is more room for waste. The question is then, why was 1995 the
most efficient year?
The reason is that in 1995, the infrastructure of non-potable water was at its
infancy, and the agricultural sector was unable to substitute with lower quality water.
Table 2.8 reports that the expenditure on potable water as a percent of total input
cost, was twice as high in 1995 as compared to later years. Therefore, potable water
was an essential input in those years.
The second counter-intuitive result is that the most inefficient allocation (at 6.6%
of total potable water) was measured in the year 2000, in the midst of a water crisis
in Israel. During the dry winters of 1998/9 through 2001/2, the Water Authority had
cumulatively reduced agricultural potable water by approximately 40%, which were
never returned in later years. Thus, by eliminating quotas, one should expect a more
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Figure 2.2: Potable water consumption by main users (MCM)
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Source: The Water Authority, Israel.
Note: During the drought between winters 1998/9 through 2001/2, agricultural water quantities were reduced by 40%.
This coincided with a rise in agricultural consumption of non-potable water. Water consumption by manufacturing
sectors and residential users (per-capita) were fairly consistent. Roughly with population growth, residential water
consumption rises by 2.3% per year (on average).
efficient allocation.
However, by 2000, new infrastructure and technologies that improved non-potable
quality, enabled the agricultural sector to substitute potable water consumption with
non-potable water, as illustrated in Figure 2.2. This meant that the expenditure on
potable water dropped from 5.7% to a 2.5% of total cost on inputs (see Table 2.8),
releasing excess potable water.
Furthermore, between 1995 and 2000, the Water Authority had reformed the water
pricing scheme, disfavouring the manufacturing sector. While residential nominal
water prices (households and the service sector) rose by approximately 16.5%, and
for the agricultural sector by 20.7%, the manufacturing sector had an increase of
45.7% in nominal water price.27 The model captures the fact that the manufacturing
sector would have liked to purchase more water from the agricultural sector, thus
enlarging the potential secondary water market. Overall, these examples demonstrate
27Source: Water Authority water price data. This type of pricing change was due to an adminis-
trative reform, rather than a change to the water price index. See Table 3.2 in Section 3.7.2.
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how water authorities could use this kind of model to improve allocation efficiency.
2.4.4 Policy implications
The policy implications of the model, as described so far, are the following: First,
water authorities across the world can use this method to estimate the level of alloca-
tion efficiency both within the current price-quota framework and for future proposed
reforms. For example, the major reforms in Israel, between 1998 and 2001, though
meant to deal with the serious water shortage of the time, were actually damaging
and led to even more inefficient allocation. Furthermore, the latest pricing reforms in
2010, were not sufficiently evaluated.
Second, recalling that the results are meant as conservative, upper-bound, es-
timates of the secondary water market, I find that the administrative misallocation
between 1995 to 2006 is on the average of 85 MCM; Israel incurs an economic loss
of around NIS 86 Million (in 2006 prices). Therefore, the likelihood of committing
a type II error (i.e., of not introducing a water market when it should have been
implemented) is rather low.
Finally, up until now, only the economic costs of an administrative mechanism
were considered. By imputing some of the social value generated by the social planner,
the next section infers the lost social value generated when a market mechanism is
implemented. It therefore would indicate the likelihood of committing a type I error
(i.e., introducing a market mechanism when the current administrative would have
been preferable).
2.5 Inferring the value of agricultural amenities
Typically, incomplete markets, or as in our case, no markets at all, are characterized
by distortions and welfare losses. However, when amenities are involved, it is possible
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to rationalize this distortion as a corrective measure for sectors that create positive
amenities, but are not valued economically. For example, in addition to producing
marketed goods, the agricultural sector also provides environmental amenities such
as agricultural landscape, clean air, tourism, heritage preservation and other cultural
elements that characterizes a country’s self-narrative.28 Furthermore, the agricultural
sector may also produce public “bads” such as non-point pollution. This, however, is
not analysed here because of the complexity of the issue and the additional assump-
tions it would require.
The positive effects of agricultural amenities have been studied by various authors,
e.g., Drake (1992); Bowker and Didychuk (1994); Bergstrom et al. (1985); Brunstad
et al. (1999); Fleischer and Tsur (2003, 2009) and Kan et al. (2009), who use micro-
level data to impute the value of agricultural amenities. This chapter, however, uses
the general equilibrium model, developed in the previous sections, to impute the
value of agriculture amenity under a multifunctional agricultural sector, more similar
to Peterson et al. (2002); Vatn (2002); Brunstad et al. (2005).
It is assumed that in addition to privately traded commodities, the agricultural
sector also provides amenities, which it is not rewarded for producing. A regulator,
however, recognizes this distortion and uses administrative water allocation to correct
for it. The imputed value, in this extension, characterizes the amenity value which
would rationalize the administrative water allocation as being efficient. Therefore,
assuming the amenity value would have been accounted for in the first place, even
with the possibility of water trade, water users would choose not to trade.
Algorithm 2.1 summarizes the method by which the amenity value is imputed.
28For example, in the case of Israel, the farming community is viewed as the forefathers of the
Zionist Movement and the State of Israel. This gives them an intrinsic cultural value in the mind of
the Israelis. A further example is a city, such as Nes Tziona. By maintaining a few orange groves
and planting numerous orange trees around its parks and streets, this city is trying to preserve its
heritage as being once a centre of orange production in Israel.
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Algorithm 2.1 Imputing the amenity value
1. An arbitrary amenity value is chosen and taxed at 100% tax.
2. As in Section 2.4, compute size of water trade in a secondary water market.
3. Reduce tax on amenity to 0%, and re-compute size of the secondary water
market.
4. Increase (decrease) amenity value and repeat (3) until the size of the secondary
water market is null.
Using a fixed proportion transformation function,
Yagr = min
{
Y cagr
a
,
Y ncagr
b
}
(2.19)
the agricultural sector is now assumed to jointly produce two types of goods; a
privately traded commodity Y cagr, e.g., apples, and a non-commodity Y ncagr, i.e. an
amenity such as landscape and heritage. Both goods are demanded by the represent-
ative household, but by initially setting a 100% tax rate on the non-commodity, and
transferring the tax revenue directly to the households, the household pays for the
commodity, but not for the non-commodity. In such a way, the household consume
the amenity free of charge, i.e., its price is zero. As long as the amenity tax rate is
maintained at 100%, any arbitrary amenity value used in the data-set has no bearing
on the water trade results, reported in the previous Section 2.4.
Next, the amenity tax rate is reduced to 0%, and the size of secondary water
market is re-computed. The model iteratively increases (decreases) the amenity value
until a value is found that leads to zero water trade, even when trade is possible.
Table 2.9 summarizes the imputed agricultural amenity value for the main chan-
nels, and for the all-trade channel scenario, for 2006. The conclusion is that it amounts
to approximately NIS 87.3 billion. This is roughly 2.27 times the value of the agricul-
tural economic output, and equivalent to 5.7% the total country’s economic output.
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Table 2.9: Agriculture amenity value (2006)
Channel Amenity
Valuea
As % of
Agriculture
outputb
As % of
total
outputb
Amenity value
lost from a
water marketa
Net-social welfare
lost from a water
marketa
(2006 Million NIS) (2006 Million NIS)
1. Manufacturing buy 26,000 68 1.7 -28.7 -68.4
2. Services buy 53,500 139 3.5 -61.8 -69.4
3. Households buy 87,250 227 5.7 -165.6 -104.7
6. All Channel Trade 87,250 227 5.7 -321.5 -215.0
*Source: a Model Result. b In 2006, agricultural economic output was NIS 38.5 billion, and total country output was
NIS 1,542.1 billion. Source: Israel CBS and used in the SAM.
Note: The second column is the amenity value that rationalizes an efficient administrative allocation. The third and
fourth columns are the size of the amenity value as a percent of the agricultural output and total output. The fifth
column is the direct amenity value lost, and column six is the overall net-social welfare lost from introducing a water
market with the imputed amenity value included in a re-calibrated SAM. The difference between them are the welfare
benefits from a water market.
Similarly, it is equivalent to 69% of the total agricultural social output, i.e., economic
output plus amenity.29
With a lack of information, the amenity enters a Cobb-Douglas utility consump-
tion bundle with other goods. Hanemann (1991), in a related paper, discussed cases
where public goods are readily substitutable for public goods, and others where they
are not. At an aggregate level, it seems less realistic that the former is true for Israel.
Therefore, reducing the substitution elasticity with other goods would only increase
the imputed amenity level (meaning that by using a Cobb-Douglas utility function,
the value of the agricultural amenity is rather a conservative underestimate).
To gauge whether the value of the imputed agricultural amenity is plausible within
an Israeli context, I compare with Kan et al. (2009), who impute the agricultural
landscape amenity by using micro-level Israeli data. Using a positive mathematical
programming (PMP) model based on Howitt (1995), they quantify the potential social
benefits of changing intra-agricultural land allocation among crops in the northern
29In 2006, agricultural economic output was NIS 38.5 billion. Total agricultural social output is
therefore NIS 125.7 billion, of which 69% is the value of agricultural amenity.
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region of Israel.
Similar to my approach, they use two stages. In the first stage, they calibrate the
model separately for each region such that it reproduces the land allocation under
optimal profit-maximization. In the second stage, they reformulate the objective func-
tion to incorporate both the profit function of farmers and the region specific amenity
value. This is based on estimates by Fleischer and Tsur (2009) of the households ’will-
ingness to pay’ for preserving various types of vegetative agricultural landscapes.
Kan et al. (2009) assume that once farmers internalize the landscape amenity that
they produce, they will shift away from a market-equilibrium allocation as long as
they are at least fully compensated from a consequential profit loss. They conclude
that in Israel, the agricultural landscape amenity value is roughly 33% of the total
agricultural social output (while here I impute a figure of 69%).30
Comparing their results to mine, the order of magnitude is rather similar, though
my results are twice as high. Our estimates are however not directly comparable for
the following reasons. First, Kan et al. (2009) focus on a subset of the agricultural
sector, i.e., vegetative agriculture that accounts for approximately 64% of total agri-
cultural output. They, therefore, only impute the agricultural landscape amenity. In
my approach, the imputed value includes all aspects of the agricultural amenity (e.g.,
including the value of culture and heritage) that Kan et al. (2009) cannot consider.
To impute the full agricultural amenity value, they would require estimates for
each specific type of “willingness to pay”, and not only those for preserving vegetative
landscapes. Underlying my analysis is a strong assumption that households live in a
free society, and that water allocation is a result of an open and public debate. The
argument is that households agree to continue with the current allocation, rather than
depose it completely, and this suggests that they have internalized the non-economic
value of agricultural production and are “willing to pay” for it.
30In Kan et al. (2009) Table 2, this is referred as social benefits to remind the reader that it
includes both the production profits and the amenity value, and I therefore do the same.
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A second reason for having a higher value is that Kan et al. (2009) analyse only
the northern regions of Israel. Vegetative agriculture is predominately located in
the wetter north of the country, and not in the arid south. In my paper, however,
agriculture is analysed country-wide. Since both northern and southern farmers pay
the same rates for water inputs, adding southern farming into the analysis would
increase the agricultural amenity value, as a whole.
Finally, it would be possible to compare more closely my results with theirs by
further disaggregating the agricultural sector into vegetative industry and others.
2.5.1 Policy implication and results
To quantify a situation where policy makers may erroneously introduce a water mar-
ket, the following steps are implemented. The social accounting matrix (SAM) is
re-calibrated to incorporate the value of the imputed amenity from Table 2.9, and
the analysis in Section 2.4 is then re-done.
In this case, all water market results are identical to those presented in Section
2.4, i.e., water quantities, water prices, and changes to production are the same.
Recall that as long as the tax on the amenity is 100%, sectors of production do not
internalize any benefits from producing an amenity, and its value, therefore, does not
matter.
What is however different is the analysis of welfare. In this re-calibrated SAM,
the household utility function also includes a demand for amenities. When a water
market is introduced, agricultural production falls, which leads to a loss of NIS 321.5
million of amenity value. Yet, as previously discussed, a water market improves the
use of water inputs and raises (economic) welfare by NIS 106.5 million. (This is
similar to the result reported in Table 2.4.)31 Overall, introducing a water market in
a case where an agricultural amenity is considered could result in a net-social welfare
31Without considering agricultural amenities, Table 2.4 reported that a water market raises (eco-
nomic) welfare by NIS 86.3 million.
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loss of NIS 215 million. (See Table 2.9.) The main policy implication of these results
is therefore that the Israeli society is likely to lose out if a water market is introduced,
i.e., likelihood of committing a type I error is high.
There are further additional points supporting the current Israeli administrative
allocation. First, if (as I find here) the average yearly misallocated water is approxim-
ately 85 MCM of water, this amounts to approximately half the yearly production of
a desalination plant.32 Einav (2009) reports that the investment cost is somewhere in
the range of half to one billion NIS. If the saved welfare loss from the administrative
mechanism is around NIS 215 million every three to four years, within less than a
decate, a desalination plant would be a better sustainable alternative to a market
mechanism.33
Second, assuming that the ratio of landscape amenity to agricultural output is
33% (rather than my 69%), as estimated by Kan et al. (2009), a very rough low-value
amenity could be NIS 18.9 billion (compared to my figure of NIS 87.3 billion).34 A
re-calibrated SAM using this value would result in an insignificant rise to net-social
welfare of NIS 15.9 million (not a fall). This however does not clearly support any
single allocation mechanisms as being superior; rather, its magnitude is close to zero.
As opposed to statistical methods that use inference to assess the reliability of
results, computable general equilibrium has no such equivalent. But recalling that
the parameters in the model are intended to overestimate the benefits from a water
market, and underestimate the value of the amenities, the value of NIS 15.9 million is
very small. This suggests that maintaining the administrative mechanism is probably
a safer approach.
Finally, this paper has only focused on agricultural amenities and does not include
32Or in the vicinity of importing water from Turkey, which was discussed between the two coun-
tries.
33Recall that 3 to 4 years is the short-to-medium run time-frame of the model.
34Divide the 2006 agricultural economic production level of NIS 38,497 million by (1-0.33)=0.69
(i.e., its proportion out of total social output as estimated by Kan et al. (2009),) and obtain NIS
57,458 million. This is therefore an amenity value of NIS 18,961 million.
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amenities created by other sectors, e.g., public and private gardens, world heritage
sites, irreversible destruction to nature.35 These are overlooked because the method
implemented here cannot be used to compute them. Residential users have higher
marginal value of water making them natural buyers of water. If it were possible
to reward them for producing the amenity, as was done with the agricultural sector,
they would have demanded even more water. In this case, Algorithm 2.1 has no
bound. Therefore, the infra-marginal social-welfare loss from introducing a water
market could be much higher than what has been found here. This further supports
the current administrative mechanism.
2.6 Conclusions
In Israel, parliamentary investigative committees and researchers from the natural and
social sciences have concluded that for decades, the administrative water allocation
mechanism has mismanaged water allocation. Over subsidising of the agricultural
sector, and underfunding of desalination plants, has led to a severe hydrological de-
ficit. Critics argue that a water market allocation could solve these issues. Yet, the
administrative allocation is crucial because it protects social value, which is both
difficult to evaluate economically and is not represented in a market mechanism.
By developing an applied general equilibrium model, this chapter compares two
water allocation mechanisms in Israel, in a context of two erroneous policy choices.
Israel could make a type I error by introducing a water market, which would come
at the expense of the environment and social value. Israel could also make a type II
error if they continue with the current administrative mechanism, and therefore, lose
35Recall from Section 2.3.4, that garden water consumption is around 25% of total residential.
Furthermore, the amenity value of world heritage sites are unknown. For example, since 2000,
the Jordan river has been dammed at the southern tip of the Sea of Galilee. The water trickling
downstream is recycled water for touristic purposes. No water from the Jordan river is reaching the
Dead Sea, which will eventually dry up. The irreversible environmental and historical implications
are not measured here.
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the efficient use of the scarce water inputs.
The model developed in this chapter simulates the introduction of a water market
with and without agricultural amenities. On the basis of the results, it concludes
that: (1) between 1995 to 2006, the upper-bound average of inefficient water use was
around 85 million cubic meters of potable water, approximately 5.5% of the total
potable water supply. This amounts to an economic loss of NIS 80 to 100 million (in
2006 prices); and (2) introducing a water market could lead to a lower-bound social
loss of around NIS 320 million. Therefore, weighing these two losses suggest that
a safer approach for Israel would be to continue with the administrative allocation
mechanism.
However, as Diao and Roe (2003) discuss, having a water market may, in the long-
run, make water similar to any other traded commodity. This could motivate agents
to search for better technology that increase water supply (e.g., private and govern-
ment collection of runoff water, desalination of seawater, and recycling sewage water)
for resale into the market for profit. My conclusions apply to the short-to-medium
run water situation, and the long-run potential gains from a market mechanism are,
therefore, not fully quantified. This would be an area for further research that could
help policy makers, not only in Israel, but also in other countries suffering from water
scarcity, to assess water allocations mechanisms in-conjunction with a green agenda.
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Chapter 3
Water policy in Israel and the
water model
In this chapter, the water allocation issues that were discussed in Chapter 2 are
contextualized by providing an extended description of the Israeli water situation.
Furthermore, the full analytical model that was used is presented. The chapter is
structured as follows: Section 3.1 outlines the historical development of water man-
agement since the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. Section 3.2 focuses more
specifically on the ongoing “water crisis” since the 1990s and the response by consec-
utive governments. Section 3.3 discusses the water market as an alternative alloca-
tion mechanism, and also illustrates the difficulty in changing allocation mechanisms.
Section 3.4 presents the full analytical water model that was used as a basis for the
analysis in Chapter 2. Finally, Section 3.5 through Section 3.7 present the calibration
methods that were used and the data collection.
3.1 The history of water management in Israel
Menahem (1998), Becker and Lavee (2002) and others, have extensively discussed the
historical development of Israeli water policy. They divide it into three periods: In the
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first period, 1948-67, water sources and institutional frameworks were developed. The
government pro-actively used administrative water allocation for social and political
goals, e.g., to supplement money transfers, to promote settlement and food-security
policies, and to subsidize the agricultural sector and various manufacturing industries.
A Water Law was enacted in 1959 to control and protect the Israeli water resource.
It states that all sources of water are public property and that a person’s land rights
do not confer rights to any water sources running through or under his land. Every
person is entitled to use water, as long as it does not cause the salination or depletion
of the water resource. For egalitarian reasons, all users pay the same water price
irrespective of the proximity to its source. Finally, the Water Law forbids the resale
of water quotas, which disconnects market forces from the pricing and allocation of
water.
In the second period, 1967-90, agricultural expansion was prioritized over water
resource conservation, and water management responded reactively to seasonal rain-
fall variations. For example, during droughts, water quotas were sharply reduced,
targeting first the agricultural sector, and returned to previous levels when rainfall
was plentiful again.
Finally, in the third period, from 1990 to the present, a gradual paradigm shift
has taken place from a reactive water management style, towards a more proactive
approach that considers both water demand needs, and aims to preserve the natural
resources. But changes have been slow, and over 40 years of excessive consumption
above the natural rate of replenishment, has led to severe hydrological deficits, which
permanently threatens water quality.
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Figure 3.1: National weighted rainfall as percent of the 20 year average
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Source: The Water Authority.
Note: Rainfall varies according to geographical location, i.e., the north of the country is generally
wetter than the south. The figure shows the national weighted variability compared to a 20 year
weighted average.
3.2 The recurrent water crisis in Israel
In every decade since the 1990s, Israel has experienced years of low rainfall, which
has on several occasions forced the government to consider drastic measures (see
Figure 3.1). Between the winters of 1995/6 to 1998/9, rainfall was below 1400 million
cubic meters (MCM). Consumption was, however, significantly higher than supply,
and by the end of that period, the Israeli government officially declared a “water
crisis.” Water quotas to farmers and to the manufacturing sector were reduced, and
households were required to cut back water use to the bare essentials, e.g., they were
required to dry up gardens. (See water consumption in Figure 2.2 of Chapter 2.)
The situation, furthermore, prompted the formation of the Arlozoroff Committee
in 1997. Its main objectives was to evaluate the overall water management in Israel,
and to suggest policy reforms that would deal with the ongoing water crisis. The
committee included various specialists, e.g., economists, engineers, and policy makers.
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Its role was advisory and it had no legal power.
Some of the main conclusions of the committee were that economic incentives
should be used to divert potable water from the agricultural sector towards residen-
tial consumption. Farmers, who as a result, would suffer losses should initially be
compensated. Agricultural water prices should be raised by 80% over a number of
years, under the assumption that an 8% increase in price would result in a reduction
of 4% to 5% of the quantity of agricultural water consumption. Finally, investment
in desalination plants should begin immediately (Davidovich, 2008). These conclu-
sions set the tone for future debates, even though they were never fully accepted nor
implemented.
The prolonged draught that started in Winter 1995/6 continued, and peaked by
Winter 2001/2. Increasing pressure on the Israeli Government to resolve the problem
lead to the formation of the 2001 Parliamentary Inquiry Committee. Its aim was to
investigate the causes of the ongoing water crisis, and suggest key reforms.
The main findings of the committee were presented in 2002 and some of its key
recommendations were: to establish an independent professional Water Authority;
to encourage and attract water professionals, such as water engineers, hydrologists,
economists, and other water resource management professionals to enter the water
sector; to reduce bureaucracy and enhance the development of reclamation plants.
Finally, similar to the Arlozoroff Committee, it was recommended to invest in desal-
ination plants so that by 2005, the natural resources would return to levels above the
hydraulic “Red Line.”1 Thereafter, it was advised to continue increasing the water
supply, through desalination or imports, so that sustainable water management would
1The Sea of Galilee is the largest body of potable water storage in Israel. It supplys approximately
30% of the yearly potable water supply. Hydrologists had set a scale, to manage water supply
according to three lines: (1) Upper Red Line (-208.8 meters below sea level): above this line,
authorities open the dams and allow water to flow freely down the Jordan River; (2) Lower Red
Line (-213): below this line, the ecological system of the Sea of Galilee is in danger, and (3) Black
Line (-214.87): below it, water extraction is not allowed. (December 2001, was the lowest ever
recorded level at -214.87).
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be maintained (Drayzin, 2002; Magen, 2002).
In the period between Winter 2007/8 and Winter 2010/11, another cluster of
low yearly rainfall lead the government to announce a water crisis once again. Wa-
ter allotments to the agricultural sector and several manufacturing industries were
reduced, and public awareness programs urged residential users to conserve water.
Non-essential household water use was limited, and overuse penalized, e.g., watering
gardens was severely limited. Once again, the administrative framework of water
pricing and quotas was re-considered, and in 2010 revised.
In 2008, a report from the State Comptroller Committee assessed the reasons
for this new crisis, and the degree to which the recommendations from previous
committees had been implemented. This report warned that the available water
supply continued to be in deficit, and that many of the important recommendations
from the 2002 Parliamentary Inquiry Committee had not actually been implemented,
e.g., the construction of desalination plants had been delayed by approximately five
years because the plentiful rainfall of Winter 2002/3 had enabled policy makers to
divert attention to more urgent budgetary needs (Davidovich, 2008; Tal, 2008).
In each of these periods, the public and political debate about water management
is rekindled. Some of the debate has focused on issues of pride and blame, and other
on the practical level of water management. Questions which often arise are: (1)
Why is a country that prides itself as being modern, continuously struggles with
water shortages? (2) Who is to blame for this situation? (3) Where should water
cuts be made? and (4) What measures should be taken to amend the problem and
halt the irreversible destruction to water resources?
In a critical discussion of Israel’s administrative mechanism, Plaut (2000) argues
that this mechanism is harmful, and produces waste and misallocation. Water supply
and demand do not balance, and the administrative mechanism is unable to adjust
water allocation efficiently and quickly. He adds that the current system motivates
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farmers to use all the yearly allotted water, in order to justify and preserve their
water quotas for the next year, even if it means dumping it.2 This type of behaviour
resembles other settings, e.g., government ministries and bodies, or sub-divisions
within large firms that exhaust all resources before the budgetary-year ends. Licht-
man (2009) investigates and reports illegal, shady, and inequitable water activities in
Israel’s farming sector, and estimates that a black water market operates at around
10 million cubic meters (MCM) yearly, i.e., equivalent to a small desalination plant.
This black market has been similarly reported by Globes Newpaper (1999); Rivlin
(2010) and others.
3.3 A water market as an alternative to the ad-
ministrative mechanism
One can argue that the on-going water crisis in Israel is a result of mismanagement.
Alternative water allocation mechanisms have been discussed by several researchers
in Israel and abroad. Dinar et al. (1997), Holden and Thobani (1996) and Livingston
(1995) give a general review of the theoretical advantages and disadvantages of al-
ternative mechanisms. Becker and Zeitouni (1998a), Fishelson (1994), Moore (1994)
and Zeitouni et al. (1994) discuss alternative mechanisms within the Israeli context,
and Bielsa and Duarte (2001), Calatrava and Garrido (2005), Garrido (2007), Pujol
et al. (2006), and Simon and Anderson (1990) discuss this in other countries.
One popular alternative to an administrative mechanism is a water market, be-
cause use tradable permits would enable market forces to internalize the true value
of the resource. Both sellers and buyers would gain from trade, regardless of whether
the permits were auctioned or allocated free-of-charge (Becker, 1995; Holden and
2There are cases where water users are grossly negligent and literally dump water. In other cases,
farmers are sold water at prices far below its resource value, which they use to grow low value crops
on desert fields, which critics bluntly call this dumping.
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Thobani, 1996). As discussed and summarised in case studies by Bhatia et al. (1995);
Holden and Thobani (1996); Dinar et al. (1997); Grafton et al. (2010), water markets
are relatively new in some regions such as Chile, Australia, and the USA. In other
regions, such as Spain and India, water markets have been functioning for many years.
There are four approaches to initialise a water market: (1) Random access (or
lotteries); (2) Administrative rules based upon eligibility criteria; (3) Auctions; and
(4) Historical allotments. Random access is more common in allocating permits
among residents, while auctions are more common for allocating permits to non-
residents. The most widely used method for initializing a new water market has
been the historical approach, which is also known as the “first-come, first served” or
“grandfathered” (Tietenberg, 2002).
Historical permits are widely used for several reasons: First, incumbent water
users are not made worse-off, and are therefore less likely to oppose the adoption of a
new mechanism. (This is further discussed below.) This, therefore, facilitates policy
makers to navigate through the political process and implement change. Second,
historical allotment recognizes the fact that previous water consumers have invested
in resource extraction and infrastructure, and serves to protect those investments.
Finally, empirical evidence suggests that using historical allocation leads to a smaller
financial burden on water users. Permit expenditure, which is the auction revenue
collected by the government, is typically higher than the extraction costs, which are
the real production costs for water. Where an auction method could create opposition
to change, historical allocation is more likely to be accepted (Lyon, 1982; Tietenberg,
2002).
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Figure 3.2: Water quotas with two agents
a
1MV
b
c o
d
f
e
1user 2user
*P
1P
2P
2MV
g
h
Measured 
Inefficiency 
*WgovW
Note: Total water W¯ is allocated by the government. User 1 is allocated water quantityW gov , while user 2 is allocated
W¯ −W gov . Area bod is the dead weight loss from inefficient water allocation. The potential secondary water market
is the volume |W ∗ −W gov |, a proxy for inefficiency.
An illustrative example
Figure 3.2 is used as an illustrative example, and is an extension of the discussion
from Section 2.2 of Chapter 2.3
Assume a closed economy with only two water users. The total water resource is
quantity W¯ , and the social planner allocates W gov to user 1, and the rest W¯ −W gov
to user 2. Furthermore, water trade is prohibited. However, this allocation is clearly
not optimal, because the marginal values of water are not equalized between users.
User 1 would benefit from buying some of user 2’s water rights, while user 2 would
also benefit from selling-off some of his water rights. Overall, the economy suffers a
dead weight loss equal to area bod.
In addition, the social planner also sets water prices. When prices are set below
the market price, two possibilities arise: At level P1, user 1 has an excess demand for
water, and user 2 has an excess supply. At level P2, both users have excess demands.
3Becker (1995) uses a similar example.
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In Chapter 2,misallocation was defined as the absolute horizontal distance |W ∗ −W gov|
measured in cubic meters of water. Allocation inefficiency rises when the discrepancy
between the initial allocation and the market allocation rises. Focusing on price P2,
when a water authority aims to reduce the inefficiency, it should raise the water price
from P2 to P ∗, and adjust water quotas to point W ∗. Overall, the economy gains.
However, without compensation, some incumbent water users are made worse-off,
which would motivate them to block this change, even if it improves overall welfare.
For example, consumer surplus of user 1 is area abeP2, and consumer surplus of user
2 is area fdeh. When price and quotas are readjusted to the optimal P ∗ and Y ∗,
the consumer surplus of user 1 changes to area aoP ∗, which may (or may-not) be an
improvement, depending on whether additional area boc is greater (or smaller) than
the reduction in area P ∗cep2. On the other hand, the consumer surplus of user 2 is
unambiguously reduced to area fog. Thus, efficiency is increased, but at the cost to
some.
Furthermore, the process of adopting a new, more efficient, allocation mechanism
may be too costly and unwarranted because the total non-recoverable value which
was used to block the change may be greater than the economic gains of area bod.
For example, user 2 will be willing to spend area godeh to block the adoption of a
new mechanism. Without compensation, she will loss this area anyway if a change
occurs. Regarding user 1, this is ambiguous.
Finally, as Figure 3.2 shows, initialising a water market using historical allot-
ments is more favourable for both incumbent users. If the government first allocates
the allotments and then allows water trade, user 2 would sell the water quantity
|W ∗ −W gov| to user 1 and in return receive the area coW ∗W gov. This area would be
greater than the reduction in production profit of area oW ∗W govd. Similarly, User
1 also benefits because his production profit from area boW ∗W gov is larger that the
payment of coW ∗W gov.
53
The tension between various pressure groups (between those who want to maintain
versus those who demand change) usually intensifies during severe water shortages
and subsequent water quota cuts (Plaut, 2000; and as reported in the Israeli media).
Policy makers are required to evaluate the current allocation mechanism, and if ne-
cessary, to implement policy reforms. When it is infeasible to experiment on real
economies, models can be used to simulate various policy alternatives.
Chapter 2 has evaluated the benefits of a market mechanism versus the current
administrative mechanism using Israel as a case study. In the following sections, the
full analytical model, which was used as the basis for my analysis, is presented.
3.4 A full description of the applied water model
Following Section 2.2.1 in Chapter 2, the applied model is extended in the following
way. The water model is a static general equilibrium model. For the specific Israeli
case, production is aggregated into three main sectors: agricultural, manufacturing,
and service sectors. Each of them uses labour, capital, potable and non-potable water,
and intermediate goods as inputs in production. There is one representative house-
hold, which derives utility by consuming water and final goods. Finally, government
is not explicitly modelled, but its actions are manifested through the initial water
allocation. Tax revenue from production is directly transferred to the representative
household.
Water is initially allotted to each of the four users, and water trade is not possible.
Then, when trade is allowed, water inputs are re-shuﬄed until all users have the same
marginal water value.
Following Mathiesen (1985); Rutherford (1995, 1999), I set-up an Arrow–Debreu
equilibrium as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP). In a general equilibrium
setting, three types of weak inequality conditions must be satisfied: (i) zero profit, (ii)
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market clearance, and (iii) income balance, each associated with three non-negative
variables, i.e., y∗ ≥ 0, p∗ ≥ 0 and M∗ ≥ 0, respectively.4
3.4.1 Production structure
Production has a four-level structure, which simplifies the calibration procedure and
captures the different substitution elasticities for pairs of factor inputs. The inputs
of production include an intermediate good, and four primary inputs, i.e., capital, la-
bour, potable-water and non-potable-water. The following are the main assumptions
that were made for the production functions.
First, the time frame of the general equilibrium model affects the assumptions that
we have on factor mobility, and the interpretation of the results. Hertel (2002), who
has written extensively on this issues, regards three to four years as the medium-run,
which he believes is a sufficient amount of time for adjustment to take place. In the
short-run, however, agricultural production has limited buffer stock, which makes it
especially vulnerable to supply shocks and leads to wide fluctuations in commodity
prices. In the long-run, the importance of stock diminishes and production has time
to adjust.
Furthermore, land supply rigidity depends on many factors, such as the availability
of suitable land, the potential to convert land from one type of crop to another, or
to another sector, e.g., agriculture to manufacturing. Furthermore, the existence of
legislative or policy constraints can impede the transfer of land and make it immobile.
Therefore, a lower land supply elasticity reflects higher immobility. For example, in
the centre of Israel, former farmlands are standing idle and ex-farmers are waiting for
authorization to convert land into lucrative housing developments or office space. This
4Recall that a complementarity constraint enforces that two variables are complementary to each
other; i.e., that the following conditions hold for scalar variables x and y: x ·y = 0, x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0.
This condition is compactly expressed as 0 ≤ x ⊥ y ≥ 0. Intuitively, a complementarity constraint
is a way to model a constraint that is combinatorial in nature since, for example, either x or y must
be 0 (or both may be 0 as well).
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Figure 3.3: The production function
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Note: Production is a four level nested function. The lowest level combines potable and non-potable water into an
aggregate water. The third level combines the aggregated water and labor inputs. In the second level, interme-
diate goods are combined with the water-labor aggregate. Finally, in the top level, capital is aggregated with the
intermediate goods-water-labor aggregate.
stands in contract to manufacturing and service sectors, which have lower barriers.
Thus, for the reasons outlined above, and because land is incorporated into capital
inputs, I assign capital as a sector-specific input.
As Figure 3.3 illustrates, capital is placed in the top level of the production func-
tion because it makes the derivation of the calibration function for rigid inputs, easier
to solve. The output supply elasticities, which are found in empirical papers, are
used to calibrate for the substitution elasticity between factor inputs. (The calibra-
tion method is discussed in further detail in Section 3.5.)
The second assumption for the production function relates to the water inputs. In
the initial allocation, potable-water inputs are allotted to users and are non-tradable.
They are, therefore, sector-specific with pW,i as their water prices. However, when
water trade is allowed, potable-water is reassigned as a global input. Trade continues
until the market clears, and water prices change sufficiently to drive water marginal
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values to equalize between users. Non-potable water, however, is assumed to be fully
mobile.
In the production function, an aggregate water bundle is composed of potable and
non-potable in the third level. This allows me to calibrate substitution elasticities
using water demand elasticities, which are readily available in empirical papers. Fi-
nally, it is assumed that labour inputs freely migrate between the various sectors, and
have a global wage level, pL.
Figure 3.3 illustrates production Yi for i ∈ z final goods, and with j as i’s alias. The
four-level nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) structure has the following
form. In the lowest level, potable water, Wp,i, and non-potable water, Wnp,i, are
combined to form a water aggregator Wi. In the third level, water Wi and labor Li
inputs are combined to form an aggregator WLi. In the second level, intermediate
inputs INj,i∈z are combined with the aggregator WLi to form the aggregator NWLi.
Finally in the top level, capital Ki is combined with NWLi to form the output Yi.
Beginning with the top level, the implicit function theorem equates profit max-
imization with cost minimization, which takes the form:
min
Ki,NWLi
pK,iKi + pNWL,iNWLi
s.t. Yi = A1,i
[
αiK
ρ1,i
i + (1− αi)NWLρ1,ii
] 1
ρ1,i
σ1,i is the substitution elasticity within the CES production function. pK,i is the
return on capital, pNWL,i is the price index for the aggregator. αi defines the CES
share parameters, and ρi is the CES exponent. Note that it is related to the substi-
tution elasticity via σi = 11−ρi where σi ≥ 0. Finally, Ai,1 is the level of technology.
Solving the minimization problem, and for simplification, reassigning the share
parameters to incorporate the substitution elasticity using the relationship, aK,i =
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(αi)σ1,i and aNWL,i = (1− αi)σ1,i , yields the following input demand equations:
0 ≤ pK,i ⊥ Ki ≥ aK,i
A
1−σ1,i
1,i
[
(1− τi) pconsY,i
pK,i
]σ1,i
Yi
0 ≤ pNWL,i ⊥ NWLi ≥ aNWL,i
A
1−σ1,i
1,i
[
(1− τi) pconsY,i
pNWL,i
]σ1,i
Yi
with zero profit conditions denoting pY,i and pconsY,i as the producer and consumer price
indexes for sector i, respectively.
pconsY,i ≤
1
Ai (1− τi)
[
αK,ip
1−σ1,i
K,i + αNWL,ip
1−σ1,i
NWL,i
] 1
1−σ1,i ⊥ Yi ≥ 0
pY,i = (1− τi) pconsY,i
At the second level, we assume the aggregate NWLi has a fixed proportions
share of intermediate goods INji, and a water-labor sub-aggregate WLi. The follow-
ing is the optimization problem:
min
WLi,Nji
pWL,iWLi +
z∑
j=1
pY,ijINji
s.t. NWLi = min
[
WLi
aWL,i
,
INji
aIN,ji
, . . . ,
INzi
aIN,zi
]
Solving this minimization problem yields the following demand equations and
price index
0 ≤ pWL,i ⊥ WLi ≥ aWL,iNWLi
0 ≤ pY,i ⊥ INji ≥ aIN,jiNWLi
with price index
pNWL,i ≤ aNWL,ipWL,i +
n∑
j=1
aIN,jipY,i ⊥ NWLi ≥ 0
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At the third level, a water aggregator Wi and labor Li inputs are aggregated
into WLi, where σ3,i is the substitution elasticity. The optimization problem is to
min
Wi,Li
pW,iWi + pLLi
s.t. WLi = A3,i
[
αWL,iW
ρ3,i
i + (1− αWL,i)Lρ3,ii
] 1
ρ3,i
and the solution yields the following equations:
0 ≤ pW,i ⊥ Wi ≥ aW,i
A
1−σ3,i
3,i
[
pWL,i
pW,i
]σ3,i
WLi
0 ≤ pL ⊥ Li ≥ aL,i
A
1−σ3,i
3,i
[
pWL,i
pL
]σ3,i
WLi
with price index
pWL,i ≤ 1
A3,i
[
αW,ip
1−σ3,i
W,i + αL,ip
1−σ3,i
L
] 1
1−σ3,i ⊥ WLi ≥ 0
Note that labor can migrate freely between all production sectors, and therefore
has an economy-wide wage rate.
At the fourth level, potable water, Wp,i and non-potable water Wp,i inputs are
aggregated intoW i, where σ4,i is the substitution elasticity. The optimization problem
is:
min
Wp,i,Wnp,i
pW,,p,iWp,i + pW,np,iWnp,i
s.t. W i = A4,i
[
αW,p,iW
ρ4,i
i + (1− αW,p,i)Lρ4,ii
] 1
ρ4,i
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and the solution yields the following equations:
0 ≤ pW,p,i ⊥ Wp,i ≥ aW,p,i
A
1−σ4,i
4,i
[
pW,i
pW,p,i
]σ4,i
W i
0 ≤ pW,np ⊥ Wnp,i ≥ aW,np,i
A
1−σ4,i
4,i
[
pW,i
pW,np
]σ3,i
W i
pW,i ≤ 1
A4,i
[
αW,p,ip
1−σ4,i
W,p,i + αW,np,ip
1−σ4,i
W,np,i
] 1
1−σ4,i ⊥ Wi ≥ 0
Note that non-potable water can migrate freely between all production sectors,
and therefore has an economy-wide price. At the margin, this increases the size of
the secondary water market for potable water.
3.4.2 Household utility structure
The small open economy has one representative household, h ∈ H, that is endowed
with labor, capital, and water resources. It receives tax revenue, and transfers pos-
itive (negative) value of income to cover balance of payments. Thus, the disposable
household income is:
M = PW,hWh +
z∑
i=1
(
PLLi + PK,iKi + PW,p,iWp,i + PW,np,iWnp,i + pconsY,i τi + bopi
)
Extending this model for multiple households is a simple matter, but would then
require assumptions regarding water ownership. In such a case, the above income
equation would need to be revised. However, it would seem better to add a govern-
ment agent that owns the water endowments.
Figure 3.4 illustrates the household utility function, as a two level maximization
problem. The lowest level combines all final goods into an aggregator, while the top
level combines water inputs with the aggregator.
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Figure 3.4: Household utility
iX
hW
hU
C
1,h
2, 1h 
zX
CES
Cobb-
Douglas
Note: Utility is a two level nested function. The lowest level combines all final goods into an aggregate. In the top
level, water input is combined with the final goods aggregate.
The top level maximization problem is of the following form:
max
Wh,C
U = H
[
βW
ρ1,h
h + (1− β)Cρ1,h
] 1
ρ1,h
s.t. M ≥ pW,hWh + pCC
Wh is household water consumption, with pW,h its consumer water price. C is an
aggregated quantity of final goods consumed, with pC its consumer price index. H is
a shift parameter, and σ1,h = 11−ρ1,h is the substitution elasticity.
I re-parametrize bW = βσ1,h and bC = (1− β)σ1,h , and solve the maximization
problem. This yields the following demands and unit utility cost:
0 ≤ pW,h ⊥ Wh ≥ bW
[
PU
pW,h
]σ1,h
M
0 ≤ pC ⊥ C ≥ bC
[
PU
pC
]σ1,h
M
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PU ≤
[
βW (pW,h)1−σ1,h + βC (pC)1−σ1,h
] 1
1−σ1,h ⊥ U ≥ 0
In the second-level, the aggregated goods consumed is assumed to have a Cobb-
Douglas structure with the following maximization problem,
max
Xi
C = Φ · Πzi=1 {Xγii }
s.t. I ≥
z∑
i=1
pconsY,i Xi (3.1)
and note that ∑zi=1 γi = 1, I = M − pW,hWh and Φ is a shift parameter.
Solving the maximization problem yields the demand for each final good, Xi,
0 ≤ pconsY,i ⊥ Xi ≥
γiI
pconsY,i
and pconsY,i as its consumer unit price
pC ≤ Φ · Πzi=1
{(
pconsY,i
)γi} ⊥ C ≥ 0
3.4.3 Balance of payments and market clearing conditions
Economies are dynamic and can run trade imbalances at any period by buying or
selling assets. However, since this is a static model, I fix the balance of payments
(BOP) in all counter-factual scenarios to the initial value. Otherwise, it would be
difficult to interpret welfare effects. For example, if a policy experiment leads to
an increase in the trade deficit, welfare will increase due to foreign borrowing. This
is misleading because at some point, borrowing will have to be paid back. Thus,
household is assigned an endogenous endowment bopi, which fixes the trade surplus
(deficit) for each good to its initial value.
As previously mentioned, it is assumed that in the short-to-medium run, capital
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Ki, is a rigid input, with a sector specific return on capital. Labour, Li, and non-
potable water, Wnp,i, are fully flexible across all sectors with a uniform wage rate
and non-potable water price. The market clearing conditions for these three primary
inputs are:
Ls =
z∑
i=1
Li
W dnp =
z∑
i=1
Wnp,i
Ksi = Kdi
All goods in the economy are fully consumed, either as household final goods, as
intermediate inputs for production, or as net exports, defined by:
Yi = Xi +Nji +NXi
The market clearing condition for potable-water is discussed in the next section.
3.4.4 Secondary potable water market
Being the main feature of this paper, the following section is added for completeness,
even though it follows relatively closely with Section 2.2.2. It furthermore expands
on some aspects of water trade, which were not mentioned previously.
Having i ∈ N firms (with j alias for i) and h ∈ H households water users, let
M = N + H be the total number of water users. As discussed in Section 2.2.2 of
Chapter 2, and depicted in Figure 3.2, each user is allocated a different potable water
quota with a different water price. As long as water trade is prohibited, the market
clearing condition for potable water is
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W si = W di
W sh = W dh
pW,i 6= pW,j 6= pW,h
(3.2)
and because water users choose the amount of water to consume, the water price of
the last unit is also the marginal water value. Each user has, therefore, a different
marginal value of water (MVW) such that
MVWi 6= MVWj 6= MVWh
When a secondary water market is enabled, water inputs are transferred to those
users valuing them most. The market clears once a uniform real water price is reached.
Water users can be buyers or sellers, and having M water users leads to M2 trade
configurations, with ψmn being the relative marginal value. If user m ∈M is a buyer,
and user n ∈ M is a seller, a possible trade channel is when MVWm
MVWn
= ψmn > 1;
otherwise, it cannot be a possible trade channel. This is summarised by
MVWm
MVWn
=

ψmn > 1 possible trade channel
ψmn ≤ 1 not possible
These conditions, therefore, limit the number of configurations to only T = M(M−1)2
possible trade channels, with t ∈ T being a specific channel. (Table 2.3 had provided
a concrete example of this.) Thus, when water trade is enabled, the units of water,
γt, that are transferred between seller n and buyer m are obtained by
0 ≤ γt ⊥ pW,n,t − (1− ) pW,m,t ≥ 0, ∀t (3.3)
with pW,n,t and pW,m,t being the water market prices for the seller and buyer, respect-
ively. For computational purposes, → 0 is a small number to “help” the solver with
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slack activities, thus avoiding the problem of infinite solutions (a degenerate model).
This insures that when multiple t channels are opened (active), only net transfers of
water is considered. For example, a case of infinite solutions is when a first user sells
to the second, the second sells to the third, but the first also sells to the third. By
adding , the solutions is limited to one (possible) case where, for example, the first
sells to the second and to the third, while deactivating the second selling to the third.
There are various combinations (scenarios) of activating and deactivating water
trade channels, e.g., activating each channel separately, or all together. Therefore,
each of the t ∈ T channels has a binary action (designed by the scenario); active or
not-active, {A,NA} ∈ Action. There are {tA, tNA} ∈ T active/non-active channels,
{iA, iNA} ∈ N active/non-active firms, and {hA, hNA} ∈ H active/non-active house-
holds, respectively. In other words, a water user will not trade because: it is either a
choice, or it is blocked.
Thus, when Equation (3.3) is enabled, ∀tA, water units, γtA > 0, are exchanged
between users up to the point where sellers and buyers have equalised water prices,
pW,n,t = (1− ) pW,m,t. If, however, the unit water price of a seller is higher than the
unit price of a buyer, pW,n,tA > (1− ) pW,m,tA (a strict inequality), the activity goes
slack, γtA = 0, i.e., there is no trade.
Enabling water trade for various water trade channels and actions, ∀i and ∀h, the
market clearance condition of Equation (3.2) is updated by the following:
W shA +
∑
iAW
s
iA = W
d
hA +
∑
iAW
d
iA
pW,iA = pW,jA = pW,hA
W siNA = W
d
iNA
W shNA = W
d
hNA
pW,iNA 6= pW,jNA 6= pW,hNA
(3.4)
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3.4.5 Agricultural amenity
This section extends on the basic water market model, and imputes the value of the
agricultural amenity. To do so, the representative agricultural producer, agr ∈ z, is
now assumed to jointly produce two types of goods; a privately traded commodity,
Y cagr, e.g., apples, and a non-commodity, Y ncagr, i.e. an amenity good such as landscape
and heritage. To clarify notation, note that when the amenity is added, the agricul-
tural output and consumer price, previously defined as Yagr, pconsY,agr, are split into two
variables: Y cagr, pcY,agr and Y ncagr, pncY,agr. For all other goods, nothing changes.
The household utility function is re-defined to include the demand for both goods,
i.e., agricultural commodity and non-commodity. However, by initially setting the
non-commodity tax rate to τnc = 100%, and transferring the tax revenue directly
to the households, the household pays for the commodity, but not for the non-
commodity. Therefore, the household consumes any level of amenity available, i.e.,
its price is zero. As long as the tax rate on the amenity is maintained at 100%, any
arbitrary amenity value used in the benchmark data-set, and has no bearing on the
water trade results. (Still, it does affect the level of utility.)
The level of amenity is imputed by reducing the tax rate to τnc = 0, which allows
agricultural firms to internalize the amenity they produce. The model, then, searches
for an imputed amenity level that would lead to zero water trade, even when trade is
possible. (See Section 2.5 of Chapter 2 for further discussion.)
Changes to production
Assuming a fixed proportion transformation function, the new profit-maximization
problem of the agricultural sector, which now includes both a commodity good and
a non-commodity, is:
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maximize
Yagr,Y
c
agr,Y
nc
agr
piagr = (1− τagr) pcY,agrY cagr + (1− τnc) pncagrY ncagr − pY,agrYagr
s.t. Yagr ≥ min
{
Y cagr
a
,
Y ncagr
b
}
with τagr and pY,agr defined previously, as the agricultural production tax rate and
the producer price, respectively. τnc is the tax rate on the non-commodity.
Solving the maximization problem, we obtain the following supply functions for
commodity and non-commodity goods:
0 ≤ pcagr ⊥ Y cagr ≥ aYagr
0 ≤ pncagr ⊥ Y ncagr ≥ bYagr
The zero profit conditions leads to the unit cost of production.
p
Y,agr
≤ a · (1− τagr) pcagr + b · (1− τnc) pncagr ⊥ Yagr ≥ 0
Changes to household utility
The non-commodity (the amenity) enters a Cobb-Douglas utility function with other
commodity goods in Equation 3.1, i.e., the amenity is added to the bundle of con-
sumption goods as amenity ∈ z. The significance is that the substitution elasticity
between the non-commodity and commodity goods is, therefore, assume to be 1.5
This seems to be a rather high substitution elasticity parameter, which reduces the
amenity value in the solution, and makes it a conservative estimate.
The relevant empirical research relating to amenities is extremely limited because
5This is a well-known property of a Cobb-Douglas function.
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being a non-commodity, an amenity has no market price. If, however, better inform-
ation was available, it would then be possible to calibrate the substitution elasticity
between the amenity and other goods. For example, by using a similar approach as
applied to other inputs in this paper, such as water in the utility function, and input
factors in the production function. What is required, therefore, is the demand price
elasticity of the agricultural amenity.
3.5 Calibrating substitution elasticities in production
Well-documented water demand elasticities and output supply elasticities are col-
lected from previous studies, and are used to capture the specific characteristics of
the water sector. This section explains how these parameters are integrated into the
model, and are used to calibrate the substitution elasticity between input factors in
the production function.
Many empirical studies have estimated the supply price elasticity for the agricul-
tural sector at around 0.8. (See Askari and Cummings (1977), Peterson (1988), Rao
(1989) for a good review of the findings.) For manufacturing and service sectors, a
great deal of literature focuses on supply price elasticities of single sectors, e.g., trans-
port, housing, energy, but to my knowledge, there are no aggregate level estimate.
Generally, however, supply price elasticities are elastic.6
The left-hand side of Table 3.1 summarises the sector-specific elasticities that
are used in this paper, which are mid-values from the literature review. The table
shows that the agricultural sector has a relatively inelastic supply price elasticity of
ηagr = 0.8, which is partly due to the rigidity of land (as discussed previously). Since
the non-agricultural sectors are generally elastic, I use a supply price elasticity of
ηi 6=agr = 3 for both manufacturing and service.
6For example, literature that report for single sectors are Blackley (1999); Green et al. (2005);
Malpezzi and Maclennan (2001) that find elastic values for the housing market, as high as 20. Dahl
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Table 3.1: Calibrating the substitution elasticities, SAM 2006
Exogenous Endogenous
Output
Supply
Elasticitya
Water
Demand
Elasticitya
Potable/
Non-Potable
Elasticityb
SAM Cost Shares(2006, %)c Calibrated
Substitution
Elasticity
ηi W,i σ4,i θK,i θW,1,i θW,2,i θW,3,i σ1,i σ2,i σ3,i
Agriculture 0.8 -0.7 1.1 46.5 3.3 6.2 19.0 0.70 0 0.84
Manufact. 3.0 -0.7 1.1 56.0 0.03 0.1 0.4 3.81 0 0.7
Services 3.0 -0.1 19.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.70 0 0.1
W,h θW,h σ1,h
Household -0.1 0.21 0.1
Source: a Approximate mid-values reported in various papers. b Israel Water Authority. c Cost shares are from the
Social accounting Matrix. Source: Central Bureau of Statistics Israel and own calculation.
Note: Calibrating substitution elasticities is done by combining the supply and demand elasticities with the cost
shares.
These exogenous parameters (left section of Table 3.1) are combined with the cost
shares from the social accounting matrix (middle section), to provide the calibrated
substitution elasticities, σlevel,i, (right section of the table) as follows:
Consider the four level production structure, which was discussed in Section 3.4.1
and Figure 3.3. In the top-level, a perfectly elastic aggregator NWLi is combined
with the immobile capital input. The substitution elasticity σ1,i is calibrated by
σ1,i =
ηiθK,i
1− θK,i (3.5)
which assumes that one of the inputs is immobile (see Rutherford, 2002, p.20). θK,i
is the benchmark value cost share of capital, which is immobile, is obtained from
the social accounting matrix (SAM). ηi is the supply price elasticity obtained from
empirical studies.
In the second-level, it is common practice to aggregate intermediate inputs and
sub-aggregates in fixed-proportions, σ2,i = 0.
Finally, in the third-level, water and labour inputs are combined, and their sub-
and Duggan (1996) reports a supply price elasticity of 1.27 in the U.S. energy market.
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stitution elasticity σ3,i is calibrated by
σ3,i =
W,i + σ2,iθW,3,i − (σ2,i − σ1,i) θW,2,i − σ1,iθW,1,i
(θW,3,i − 1) (3.6)
with σ1,i and σ2,i being the elasticities from the upper levels. θW,1,i, θW,2,i, θW,3,i are the
water cost-shares relative to each nest, for the various sectors i, which are obtained
from the SAM. (Section 3.5.1 explicitly shows how Equation (3.6) is obtained.)
W,i is the water demand price elasticity reported in many empirical studies, and
summarised in Table 3.1. For the agricultural sector in various countries, Bernardo
et al. (1987), Booker and Young (1994), Moore and Hedges (1963), Nieswiadomy
(1985), Scheierling et al. (2004) find values for W,i ranging from -0.14 to -1. For
the Israeli agriculture sector, -0.7 is an accepted figure by researchers. For example,
Eckstein (2001) estimates the agricultural demand price elasticities in Israel to be
between -0.5 to -0.8, while Becker and Lavee (2002) state that it is close to -1.
For the manufacturing sector, Williams and Suh (1986) and Wang and Lall (2002)
estimate the water demand price elasticities to be between -0.7 to -1, while I use -0.7.
For service sector, which are mainly office buildings within residential areas, I use
surveys for residential water demand price elasticities. Fishelson (1994) estimates
the residential water demand in Israel at -0.1, which is used in this paper. Hansen
(1996), Arbués et al. (2003), Dalhuisen et al. (2003) and others report that residential
water demand price elasticities are low, ranging between -0.1 and -0.3.7 (A similar
parameter is used for the households who are also residential water consumers.)
Finally, recall that the substitution elasticity between potable and non-potable
water, in the fourth-level, is assumed to be 1.1, which is based on research by the
Water Authority in Israel.
7Sensitivity analysis was reported Section 2.4.2.
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3.5.1 Calibrating third-level substitution elasticity
The following explains how to obtain σ3,i in Equation (3.6), which is based on Ruther-
ford (2002). I use a three-level nested production function similar to Section 3.4.1, but
apply it to a general CES case rather than the Leontief structure in the second-level.
Furthermore, the fourth-level is aggregated into the third.8
If we construct the cost function from a calibrated benchmark in which input prices
and total cost are unity, we can scale the benchmark values of the sub-aggregate cost
as unity and express the demand for water as
W = [pW ]−σ3 pσ3−σ2WL pσ2−σ1NWL [pY ]
σ1 W¯
The derivative of the the demand for water with respect to the input price of
water, at the initial allocation point where all prices are unity is
∂W
∂pW
|p=1=
[
−σ3 + (σ3 − σ2) ∂pWL
∂pW
+ (σ2 − σ1) ∂pNWL
∂pW
+ σ1
∂pY
∂pW
]
W¯ (3.7)
By Shephard’s Lemma, the derivative of the unit cost function with respect to
input prices, leads to the share of inputs at the benchmark calibration, as follows
∂pWL
∂pW
= pW W¯
pW W¯ + pLL¯
= θW,3
∂pNWL
∂pW
= pW W¯
pW W¯ + pLL¯+ pNN¯
= θW,2
∂pY
∂pW
= pW W¯
pW W¯ + pLL¯+ pNN¯ + pKK¯
= pW W¯
pY Y¯
= θW,1
8It is well-known that a Leontief function is a special case of a CES function, that assumes a
substitution elasticity of zero. Furthermore, their is no need to calibrate the fourth-level elasticity
because it is already known.
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where an over-bar, ¯, indicates values at the benchmark.
Combining the above with Equation (3.7), obtain
∂W
∂pW
|p=1= [−σ3 + (σ3 − σ2) θW,3 + (σ2 − σ1) θW,2 + σ1θW,1] W¯
Define the elasticity of demand as W |p=1= ∂W∂pW
pW
W¯
, and therefore
W |p=1= [−σ3 + (σ3 − σ2) θW,3 + (σ2 − σ1) θW,2 + σ1θW,1]
Finally, solving for for σ3 yields
σ3 =
W + σ2θW,3 − (σ2 − σ1) θW,2 − σ1θW,1
(θW,3 − 1) 
3.6 Calibrating substitution elasticity in household
utility
Section 3.4.2 describes the household’s utility structure as a two level CES-Coub
Douglas function. Using water demand price elasticities, w,h, I calibrate the first-
level substitution elasticity, σ1,h, between water and the consumption bundle using
the following equation:
σ1,h =
w,h
θw,h − 1 (3.8)
The cost share of water, θw,h, is obtained from the SAM. Household water demand
price elasticity, w,h, is estimated at –0.1, as I did for service sectors. Interestingly,
because the water cost share is nearly zero, the substitution elasticity equals minus
the demand elasticity of water (see right-hand side of Table 3.1). Finally, in the
second-level, final goods are aggregated using a Cobb-Douglas function with σ2,h = 1,
which is standard practice in many applied general equilibrium models.
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Calibration method
Similar to Section 3.5.1, the household substitution elasticity is calibrated using water
demand price elasticities. At the calibrated benchmark, in which input prices and
total expenditure are unity, we can scale the benchmark values of the sub-aggregate
expenditure as unity and express the demand for household water as
Wh = W¯hp
−σ1,h
W,h p
σ1,h
U
where pU is defined as the expenditure function for a unit utility.
Differentiate the above with respect to household water expenditure, and obtain
∂Wh
∂pW,h
= W¯h
[
−σ1,hp−σ1,h−1W,h + σ1,hpσ1,h−1U
∂pU
∂pW,h
]
(3.9)
Again by Shephard’s Lemma, the derivative of the unit expenditure function with
respect to input prices will lead to the share of inputs at the benchmark calibration.
∂pU
∂pW,h
= pW,hW¯h
pW,hW¯h + pCC¯
= θW,h
Recalling that all prices are unity at benchmark, rearrange 3.9 as:
∂Wh
∂pW,h
|p=1 = W¯h [−σ1,h + σ1,hθW,h]
Finally, defining the own-price elasticity of household water demand as W,h, and
solving for σ1,h, obtain
σ1,h =
W,h
θW,h − 1 
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3.7 Data collection and building the SAM
This section briefly summarizes the data collection process and assumptions made in
the calibration of the model.
3.7.1 Social accounting matrix
Careful attention was placed on the construction of the social accounting matrices
(SAM), which are based on Use and Supply tables published by the Israeli Central
Bureau of Statistics (CBS). Note that the Use and Supply tables for years 2000, 2004,
2005, 2006 were reported in purchaser prices so that aggregates matched. However,
data for 1995 were not directly comparable, because Use data was reported in current
output prices, while Supply data was reported in purchaser’s prices. As a result,
aggregates did not match, and additional assumptions had to be made in order to
balance the SAM. Double checking the weights of inputs in production with later
years, I assume the 1995 SAM to be sufficiently accurate to be used for comparison
with the other years.
Water expenditure for each sector is estimated via other means, and not directly
through the Use-Supply tables. This is because CBS does not report water separately
from the electricity sector for two reason. First, due to national security reasons, CBS
does not reveal sources and dependents. Second, electricity consumption is the largest
input into water production, and it is natural for CBS to aggregate them together.
As Plaut (2000) reports, electricity is approximately 28% of Mekorot’s input costs,
which amounts to approximately 6% of Israel’s total electricity consumption.9
The Water Authority publishes potable and non-potable water consumption for
agricultural and manufacturing use, and residential use, i.e., services and household.
9This high energy requirement is due to having water pumped from the Sea of Galilee, an elevation
of about 210 meters below sea level into the National Water Carrier, which has an elevation of 152
meter above sea level. From there, gravity continues to transport the water towards the centre of
Israel.
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Residential use is reported for eleven sub-groups: housing, education, sport, public
gardens, public buildings, health, hotels, commerce and trade, security and transport,
construction, and service. Data for 2000, 2004, 2005, 2006 is available, while data for
1995 was estimated using the proportions of consumption from the available data of
1996.
Thus, water expenditure in households and service sector is the sum water quantity
times the relevant tariff band, as reported by the Water Authority. Agricultural water
expenditure is obtained by multiplying the quantity of total potable water supply by
the first price block. Likewise for manufacturing, the quantity of water is multiplied by
the main water tariff block. Finally, Labour inputs obtained from the Compensation
of Employees by Industry tables, were provided by CBS.
3.7.2 Water consumption by user and water prices
Water price data was received from the Water Authority from January 1996 to Decem-
ber 2009. Prices update according to changes in the water-index, which is based on
changes to the consumer price index, electricity prices, and average wage levels, or as
an administrative decision with governmental approval. In order to obtain a yearly
water price, I average prices (if they were changed more than once during the year).
Water prices are calculated by the cost of extraction, and by additional costs which
are supposed to capture distribution and environmental sustainability.
The Water Authority uses a complex increasing block tariff (IBT) for each type of
consumer. As Table 3.2 illustrates, the agricultural sector pays a different price from
the residential users, with a different IBT structure. Within residential users, different
price are also charged. The Water Authority has changed its pricing structure in 2010,
aiming to simplify this structure (See Water Authority (2010)).
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Table 3.2: Water price by user (yearly average)
Yeara Quantity 1996 2000 2004 2005 2006 2009
Household First 8 CM 2.32 2.69 3.19 3.31 3.52 4.17
Next 7 CM 3.42 3.99 4.49 4.61 4.85 5.75
Any additional CM 4.97 5.78 6.28 6.40 6.69 7.93
Hospitals and mikve 3.68 4.28 2.26 2.38 3.43 2.77
Hotels 1.27 1.69 2.19 2.30 2.48 4.23
Public Buildings, Stores,
Business, etc.
3.68 4.28 4.78 4.90 5.15 6.04
Public Gardens 4.97 5.78 6.28 6.40 6.69 7.68
Manufacturing (Potable) In allocation limits 1.10 1.60 2.28 2.48 2.49 3.19
Excess Up to 10% over allocation 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36
Excess Above 10% over allocation 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
Agriculture (Potable) Quantity A 0.78 0.94 1.31 1.46 1.48 1.63
Quantity B 0.89 1.08 1.54 1.69 1.70 1.87
Quantity C 1.11 1.38 1.98 2.13 2.15 2.36
Excess Up to 10% over allocation 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36
Excess Above 10% over allocation 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
Recycled (Shafdan) 0.52 0.62 0.79 0.79 0.80 0.86
Eﬄuents 0.38 0.45 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.64
Source: Israeli Water Authority
aIn 2010, the price bands were changed. However, since the data of the model covers until 2006, I do not investigate
the effects of this new price band.
3.8 Conclusion
Chapter 2 uses a CGE model to compare two alternative water allocation mech-
anisms, with Israel as a case study. The outcome of the study is that the current
administrative allocation in Israel is likely to be more socially beneficial than a market
mechanism. The aim of Chapter 3 is to expand on and contextualize the Israeli water
situation, and give a full description of the CGE model and the calibration methods
that were used.
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Part II Malaria prevention
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Chapter 4
Estimating the macro-economic
impact of malaria:
a case study of Ghana (with P. Hunt and S. Hoorens)
4.1 Introduction
The scale of malaria infection in Africa is widespread. In 2010 it was estimated that
there were 216 million episodes of the disease, of which 81% were in the African
region. Moreover, of the approximately 0.655 million deaths estimated, 91% were in
Africa. Children are the most vulnerable, and approximately 86% of malaria deaths
globally involve children under-five (< 5) years of age (WHO, 2011).
Besides the obvious toll on human life, this has considerable economic consequences
for developing countries. Research on the correlation between malaria and economic
growth find that it harms efforts to stimulate growth in low-income countries. This is
specifically highlighted in the seminal work of Gallup and Sachs (2001), who estimate
that malaria elimination in sub-Saharan Africa could increase per capita growth by
as much as 2.6% a year. Other literature using cross-country regressions generally
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supports these findings (McCarthy et al., 2000; Sachs, 2003).
However, the nature and extent of the link between health and economic growth
remains contended. Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), for example, criticise the above-
mentioned types of cross-country regressions, because they neglect the general equilib-
rium effects of diminishing returns to effective units of labour. Low-income countries
are disadvantaged in a number of ways and these studies might be capturing omitted
variables rather than health, particularly when health improvements are accompanied
by population increases.
This debate, however, is neither practical, nor useful to policy makers of malaria-
burdened countries and donors. They require more detailed information to assist them
in assessing the optimal health provision policy and investment, and for performing
distributional analysis. Consequently, Mills et al. (2008) review literature on the
economic value of malaria reduction, and call for further macroeconomic modelling
to inform policy makers of the efficient provision of treatment.
This research responds to this call by applying a modelling approach - a dynamic
computable general equilibrium modelling (DCGE), which has gained ground recently
in health economics in application to HIV/AIDS, anti-microbial resistance, pandemic
influenza and non-communicable disease (Kambou et al., 1992; Dixon et al., 2004;
Smith et al., 2005, 2009; Thurlow, 2007; Rutten and Reed, 2009). However, it remains
a new field within health economics, and specifically in application to malaria.
The aim of this chapter is to impute the economic value of malaria prevention
on an endemic country. Its contribution is not only in linking health and economic
growth, as is discussed mainly in the literature, but also as a useful approach for
policy analysis.
There are various avenues by which malaria affects economic growth. Here, the
focuses is on the link between malaria prevention and the labour resources, mainly
because labour is a fundamental component to economic production and development.
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Other potential connections are left out in order to maintain a clearer assessment of
the impact. Furthermore, the analysis centres on the effect that malaria prevention
would have on children < 5 years of age, who are the most vulnerable to the disease,
but do not contribute to economic production in the short-run. This provides an
interesting long-term perspective into malaria prevention, because it considers the
future development of a country’s labour resources.
Finally, because the preventative interventions are assumed to be administered
“free of charge,” the results show the benefits of various scenarios. This is particularly
useful to policy makers, who wish to compare the costs of alternative interventions
with their expected benefits. Such traditional cost-benefit analysis methods, however,
are not common to health policy.
As a case study, the model is calibrated to data from Ghana, an African country
with endemic malaria. The following questions are addressed: (1) What are the
economic benefits of malaria prevention per covered child? (2) Does treatment lead
to poverty reduction? (3) Would a different allocation of limited treatment resources
lead to higher benefits per capita?
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 reviews malaria and its social and
economic consequences in order to establish the context used to frame the economic
model. Section 4.3 focuses on Ghana, as a case study, and describes the overall malaria
condition, including the epidemiological heterogeneity across the country. Section 4.4
describes the multi-sector multi-agent DCGE model used for the Ghanaian economy.
Section 4.5 explains the cohort-component demographics model; Section 4.6 describes
the labour efficiency index model; with Section 4.7 highlighting some limitations.
Finally, Section 4.8 reports results, and Section 4.9 concludes.
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4.2 Malaria and its social and economic consequences
Malaria is caused by a family of macroparasites, transmitted by certain species of the
anopheline mosquito. When infecting humans, the parasites invade red blood cells
that causes them to rupture synchronously, thus producing symptoms of fever and
chills, along with headaches, vomiting, and diarrhoea. Infection may also cause long-
term anaemia, liver damage, neurological damage. and even death. Malaria reduces,
therefore, economic production both in the short and long-run.
In order to reduce and eliminate malaria infection, countries employ a variety of
preventative methods, such as insecticide treated nets (ITN), intermittent preventive
treatment for pregnant women (IPTP), indoor residual spraying (IRS), reducing the
breeding sites of mosquitoes, and administering various anti-malarial drugs, with
varying degrees of success to prevent infection. At present, there are no vaccines for
malaria, but candidate vaccines are currently under development (Agnandji et al.,
2011; Garcia-Basteiro et al., 2012).
It is generally accepted that a mentally and physically healthier population is asso-
ciated with a healthier economy (Schultz, 2010). The negative effects of poor health
on productivity and economic development in most sub-Saharan African countries
have been widely documented (McCarthy et al., 2000; Bhargava et al., 2001; Schultz,
2010), including the specific effects of malaria (Sachs and Malaney, 2002; Bleakley,
2003, 2010). Control of malaria is therefore expected to predominantly affect the
economy through improvements to the quantity and quality of human capital, which
is defined as the stock of skills, education, physical abilities, competencies and other
productivity-enhancing characteristics embedded in labour (Acemoglu, 2009). In this
paper, it represents the efficiency units of labour embedded in raw labour days.
There are further channels by which malaria may affect the economy, such as
health care spending, tourism spending, foreign investment and migration (Sachs and
Malaney, 2002). In order to keep a focused analysis, these are not considered here.
90
Therefore, the economic benefits observed in the model are lower bounds, and would
only be larger if these other effects were included.
The workforce is a fundamental part of a the resources of a country, and the future
demographic condition has an important influence on the potential economic growth.
Regional variation in labour skill-supply, and the national and international demand
for various skills sets, furthermore affect economic growth potentials.
Many studies use life expectancy as a proxy for health, and link the health status
of a population with economic growth potential and the level of productivity of the
country (Sachs and Malaney, 2002; Weil, 2010). A review of thirteen related studies
finds that increases in life expectancy increases the long-run level of output (Bloom
et al., 2004). Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) have, however, a critical opposing view
to this, and find no evidence that the large increases in life expectancy raised income
per capita.
The potential effects that malaria has on human capital are summarized in a
typology of four factors (illustrated in Figure 4.1). First, demographic changes are a
result of improved malaria control which reduces mortality rates, particularly those
of children. This raises the life expectancy, and changes the population size and age
structure. Second, when adult workers are healthier, they have less days off work
(defined as absenteeism), which directly increases production. When workers are
present at work, but less-ill (defined as presenteeism), productivity also improves.
Third, when children of adult workers are healthier, parents (carers) will loose less
days off work from caring for ill children. Finally, when the adult workers were
healthier as children, they benefit later in life, by having missed less school days, and
having less health complications. This improves their mental and physical capacity,
and allows them to generate more production and productivity as adults (Barlow,
1967; Weil, 2010).
This typology is grouped into two health components: (1) a demographics com-
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Figure 4.1: A typology of the effects that malaria has on economic growth
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ponent for the size of the labour force; and (2) a labour effectiveness component
that accounts for the impact of the three malaria health statuses on production and
productivity. The following sections review the context behind this typology, collect
data, and set the stage for developing the two health models that are linked with the
DCGE model.
4.2.1 Demographic changes and mortality (first component)
There is a wealth of evidence for the direct link between preventative interventions
with malaria morbidity and mortality (e.g., D’Alessandro et al., 1995; Nevill et al.,
1996; Nyarango et al., 2006; Bhattarai et al., 2007). The future potential labour
resources of a country (i.e., working age population) is related to demographic con-
ditions and to regional variations in malaria epidemiology. Other things being equal,
an increase in the proportion of the working age population will increase the income
per capita levels.
Changes to malaria prevalence affect the size, growth rate, and age structure
of the population over time. In the short to medium term, a reduction in malaria
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may lead to an increase in the fertility rate due to pregnant women suffering less
miscarriages, and an increased vitality of both men and women, which leads to higher
levels of conception (Barlow, 1967). Additionally, the mortality rate falls overall, but
proportionately more among children. This raises the population growth and shifts
the age structure towards dependent children. In the long term, fertility rates are
expected to fall because families do not need to compensate for the risks of high
mortality with higher fertility rates. Therefore, the age structure gradually shifts
towards a greater weight on the working-age adults (Weil, 2010). Section 4.5 discusses
the population projection model that is used to estimate the link between malaria
and the demography of Ghana.
4.2.2 Labour effectiveness (second component)
As previously mentioned, changes to malaria affect production and productivity
through the absenteeism and presenteeism of adult workers. The following liter-
ature review collects the number of days lost and productivity lost, per year, due to
malaria. These values are then used to develop a model for the labour effectiveness
index in Section 4.6.
Malaria status of adult workers and their children
An example offered by Weil (2010) describes how “a person who is lying in bed
suffering an acute bout of malaria is unable to supply any productive labour at all.
... People suffering disease can work fewer hours to those who are healthy, may work
at a slower pace, and may be mentally less acute.” Capturing these three elements
- hours of work, pace of work effort, and mental acuteness, Table 4.1 summarizes
the lost number of days from work or lower productivity across various countries of
Africa. Generally, an adult is absent from work for one to four days per episode of
malaria, and has lower output when at work equivalent to approximately two days.
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Table 4.1: Adult worker lost production days and productivity due to malaria illness
Authors Country Days lost
per incident
Absenteeism
Days lost
from
Presenteeism
Productivity
loss from
Presenteeism
(indexed to 1)
Cropper et al. (2000) Ethiopia 18 (per year)
Ettling and Shepard (1991) Rwanda 3
Ettling et al. (1994) Malawi 2.7
Guiguemdé et al. (1997) Burkina Faso 4
Leighton and Foster (1993) Kenya 2-4 2
Leighton and Foster (1993) Nigeria 1-3 2
Sauerborn et al. (1991) Burkina Faso 3.5
Sauerborn et al. (1995) Burkina Faso 5 1
Hong (2011) US 0.89
Hanlon et al. (2012) Ghana 0.75 (inc. mort)
Asante et al. (2005)* Ghana 9.35 (per year)
Gollin and Zimmermann
(2008)
Not explicit 0.9
Murray and Lopez (1996)** Not explicit 0.9
Ashraf et al. (2009)*** Not explicit 0.864
Average 3 days 2 days 0.9
*Males only; **Disability weight; *** Disability weight rescaled
Gollin and Zimmermann (2008) use an estimate for effective unit of labour of an
individual with malaria as 0.9, where a malaria-free person as 1.0. Ashraf et al. (2009)
develop disability weights and find that on a scale where perfect health is zero and
death one, malaria episodes reduce the abilities of a person by 13.6%.1 This means
that a person with malaria is only 0.864 as effective as a healthy individual.
Improvements in health treatment may reduce the amount of time that healthy
adult workers need to stay out of work to take care of sick children or other family
members. Table 4.2 summarises that workers lose approximately one to two working
days to care for someone with malaria.
1For example, the disability weights are: blindness (0.600), severe iron deficiency anaemia (0.093),
HIV (0.136), AIDS (0.505), tuberculosis seronegative for HIV (0.264), malaria episodes (0.136), and
neurological sequelae of malaria (0.473) (Ashraf et al., 2009).
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Table 4.2: Days lost due to caring for children with malaria
Authors Country Days lost to caring
Aikins (1995) The Gambia 2.16 hours per day per child for 4 days
Cropper et al. (2000) Ethiopia 11 (per year)
Ettling and Shepard (1991) Rwanda 1
Ettling et al. (1994) Malawi 1.2
Guiguemdé et al. (1997) Burkina Faso Assumed to be 1.2
Leighton and Foster (1993) Kenya 2-4
Leighton and Foster (1993) Nigeria 1-3
Sauerborn et al. (1991) Burkina Faso 2.7
Sauerborn et al. (1995) Burkina Faso 1/3 of adult illness time
Asante et al. (2005)* Ghana 5.0 (per year)
Average 1-2 days
*Males only.
Malaria history of adults workers as children
Malaria can negatively affect the development of human capital by reducing educa-
tional outcomes and achievement. This in turn lowers productivity when children
reach the working age. In particular, children with repeated bouts of malaria miss
more schooling days, and therefore have lower performance (Weil, 2010; Baird et al.,
2011).
Studies for Sri Lanka and Kenya find that due to malaria, children miss approx-
imately five to six school days per episode, and 20-30 days overall. These repeated
cases lowered school performance by approximately 15%. Students that were given
preventative interventions for malaria performed 26% better compared to a control
group (Leighton and Foster, 1993; Fernando et al., 2003a,b, 2006).
Malaria may also affect the quality of education that students receive, as teachers
miss school days due to acquiring malaria or to care for family members, who have
acquired malaria. Leighton and Foster (1993) find that primary teachers in Nigeria
miss on average six days per year because of malaria, which reduces the number of
days that students receive instruction from their regular teachers.
When children are carers, the amount of education they earn is reduced. The
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Table 4.3: Impact of malaria as a child for labour productivity later in life
Authors Country Efficiency units due to illness
as a child, using wages as proxy
Bleakley (2003) US 0.85
Cutler et al. (2010) India 0.83-0.97
Bleakley (2010) US, Brazil, Colombia,
Mexico
0.5
On Average 0.75
education of girls may be inordinately affected by malaria because when parents
cannot stay home to care for sick children, they often turn to their daughters to care
for their siblings. The girls therefore may miss more school days than boys, while
tending to sick siblings (Fernando et al., 2006).
Malaria can also cause cognitive declines through negative effects on health, such
as anaemia, malnutrition, or neurological injury, leading to learning disabilities or
psychological difficulties (Holding and Snow, 2001; Chima et al., 2003). In Kenya,
school children who are hospitalised with cerebral malaria are 4.5 times more likely to
have learning difficulties (Holding et al., 1999). Malaria during pregnancy raises the
risk of low birth weight babies, which in turn raises the risk of neurosensory, cognitive
and behavioural development problems in children. Low birth weight babies are found
to be two to four times more likely to fail grades in school (Taylor, 1984; McCormick
et al., 1992; Sachs and Malaney, 2002).
Bleakley (2003, 2010) demonstrates that individuals with malaria as children earn
15 to 50% less in adulthood than those who were malaria-free. Cutler et al. (2010)
also confirms this for India, but with less severity. These wage deviations partly
indicate the differences in worker productivity, which were caused by malaria.
In summary, malaria has both direct and indirect effects on education, and on
the potential of children to engage actively and productively in the labour force later
in life. As reported in Table 4.3, the average reduction in productivity caused by
malaria is estimated at 20-30%.
96
Table 4.4: Key statistics on malaria in Ghana, 2009
Annual number of cases of clinical malaria reported 2002-2009 3.1-3.8 million
All Ages
Malaria as cause of admission (of total admissions) 32.9%
Malaria as case of death (of total deaths) 13.4%
< 5 years of age
Malaria as cause of admission (of total admissions) 58.1%
Malaria as cause of death (of total deaths) 20.2%
Source: Ghana Health Service (GHS, 2009; GSS, 2009).
4.3 Ghana case study
Ghana is a sub-Saharan African country with a population of 24 million. The coun-
try has recently experienced economic growth and development towards becoming a
middle-income country. However, life expectancy of Ghanaian women and men was
59 and 58, respectively (Agyeman-Duah et al., 2006), compared to 81 and 75 in the
EU, in 2005 (Eurostat, 2012).
Furthermore, malaria in Ghana is still endemic, and is a major public health
concern.2 It is the single largest cause of morbidity and a significant cause of mortality.
30-40% of deaths in < 5 year old Ghanian children are attributed to malaria. Whilst
there are public health programmes to deliver malaria prevention and manage cases,
malaria prevalence3 has changed little since the early 2000s.
A number of attempts have been made to address the malaria problem in the
country. For example, household ownership of an insecticide treated net (ITN) has
risen from 3% in 2003 to 33% in 2008 (GSS, 2009). However, as reported by Ghana
Demographic and Health Survey (see Table 4.4), more than three million cases of
clinical malaria are reported to public health facilities each year. In 2009, it was
the top single cause of hospital admission for children aged < 5 (58.1%), and their
2Endemic areas are defined as areas with significant annual transmission, be it seasonal or per-
ennial (Snow et al., 1999).
3Prevalence is defined as the number of malaria cases per population. This could be stratified by
age group, region, etc.
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Figure 4.2: Malaria prevalence in Ghana
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main cause of death (20.2%). This suggests that there is a great deal of room for
improvement in terms of malaria prevention and case management - particularly for
children.
The entire Ghanaian population is at risk of malaria, but there are variations
across the zones by prevalence, annual duration of transmission, and the type of
malaria parasite. (See Figure 4.2 for prevalence by zone.) To consider the geographical
epidemiological variation within the economy, and to link between health and the
labour force, we divide Ghana into five malaria epidemiological zones: (1) the tropical
rainforest; (2) Accra; (3) the coastal savannah and mangrove swamps; (4) the northern
savannah and (5) the southern savannah. These zones reflect four different ecological
zones in Ghana and one metropolitan Accra.
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Figure 4.3: Mapping administrative districts to ecological zones
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Note: Social Accounting Matrix from Breisinger et al. (2009, 2011).
Broadly speaking, Ghana has ten administrative regions, which were mapped onto
the five epidemiological zones as summarized in Figure 4.3. The Coastal zone covers
the Eastern and Volta regions; the Forest zone includes the Ashanti, Western, and
Central regions; the Southern Savannah includes Brong Afaso and part of Volta; and
the Northern Savannah includes the Upper West, Upper East, and Northern regions.
The reasons for this demarcation are the following: First, the zones are used to cap-
ture some of the heterogeneity in malaria endemicity (see Figure 4.2). Data on malaria
prevalence across regions and age groups of Ghana (2002), is available from the Map-
ping Malaria in Africa/Atlas du Risque de la Malaria en Afrique (MARA/ARMA).
High prevalence rates of malaria are concentrated in the Northern district (North
Savannah) and in Ashanti (Forest), where Malaria prevalence ranges from 23 to 63%
for < 1 years old across the zones, as reported in Table 4.5. For the > 15 population,
prevalence ranges from 23.5 to 54%.
Second, the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) used in this paper is based on previ-
ous studies by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) (Breisinger
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Table 4.5: Malaria prevalence (%) by region and age groups of Ghana, 2002
Agro-ecological
zones
Administrative
region
Age groups
0 1 to 4 5 to 9 10 to 14 15 plus
Forest
Ashanti region 63.12 n/a 65.65 62.62 23.53
Western region n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Central region n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Southern Savannah Brong Ahafo n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Volta region* 34.99 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Coastal Eastern region 46.76 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Northern Savannah
Upper East region 56.28 83.8 79.79 77.38 54.14
Upper West
region
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Northern region n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Accra Greater Accra 23.25 n/a 30.05 n/a 24.9
Note: Prevalence is defined as the total number of cases in the population at a given moment as a
percentage of the total population. * Half of Volta is in the Coastal region. n/a is not available.
Source: MARALite.
et al., 2009, 2011). Their focus has been to capture economic activity variation at the
sub-national level due to agricultural production patterns and technologies. IFPRI
had referred to zones as (agri-) ecological zones, while we overlay them on (malaria)
epidemiological zones.
Social accounting matrix
Our economic dataset is based on a highly disaggregated social accounting matrix
(SAM) for Ghana, which contains the revenues and expenditures for commodities
and agents. The SAM is developed by Breisinger et al. (2009, 2011) and represents
the Ghanaian economy in 2007.4 It is constructed from a wide range of data: Using
2005/2006 Ghana Living Standards Survey (GSS, 2008), the SAM includes 90 house-
holds that are differentiated by the ten Ghanaian administrative regions, urban-rural
characteristics, income and consumption. With data from the Ministry of Food and
Agriculture (MOFA) and Industrial Census (GSS), 142 activities and 70 commodities
4The SAM was generously provided by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
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were estimated. It also includes accounts for the government, investment and savings,
and the rest of the world.
For our particular study, the SAM was re-aggregated and stratified by the five
malaria epidemiological zones, urban-rural location, and five income level quintiles.
The exception is Greater Accra which is assumed to be fully urban.5 Therefore, the
re-aggregated SAM, and the DCGE model, characterise nine epidemiological urban-
rural regions, which have overall 45 heterogeneous representative households.6
Finally, production sectors are not the main focus of this research, and will not
directly effect economic growth. Therefore, the large number of activities and com-
modities in the original SAM were aggregated into four main ecological agricultural
sectors, an industry sector, and a services sector.
4.4 A dynamic general equilibrium model for Ghana
To explore the effects of malaria on the labour force, we developed a dynamic, multi-
sector, multi-agent, computable general equilibrium (DCGE) model, which integrates
two health components: (1) a demographics model; and (2) a model for the labour
effectiveness index.
The DCGE model does not attempt to make precise predictions about the fu-
ture development of the Ghanaian economy. Its purpose, however, is to measure
how additional malaria health prevention would affect the economy-wide growth and
poverty reduction, compared to a baseline scenario of no additional intervention. The
model is also different from traditional DCGE models, which usually focus on the na-
tional level. Here, the focus is on the regional heterogeneity in health between many
households.
5We follow the original SAM, and therefore Greater Accra is fully urban.
6To be completely explicit, there are four epidemiological zones with an urban rural divide, and
therefore, eight regions. Greater Accra is fully urban. This leads to nine regions, each having five
income level quintiles, and therefore, to 45 separate households.
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Table 4.6: Coverage of the preventative malaria intervention in the baseline and three
alternative scenarios
Scenario Description
Baseline: Coverage is 0%
Scenario 1: Coverage rises to 65% nationally in year 1 onwards for under-fives
Scenario 2: Scenario 1 coverage from year 1 until year 10, then increases to
85% nationally
Scenario 3: Scenario 1 coverage from year 1 until year 10, then increase to
100% for two high malaria prevalence zones
In the baseline scenario, the model projects economic growth for a case where
there is no additional malaria intervention above the current situation. In the three
counterfactual scenarios, we simulate cases where additional malaria treatments are
given “free of charge,” e.g., by administering additional insecticide treated nets or
other prophylaxis. Each scenario assumes that the efficacy of the intervention is
50%, but differ by the level of coverage and targeting of zones. Furthermore, the
intervention is given only to children < 5, and then taken away as their cohort moves
to ages > 5. Finally, the model begins at year 0, and malaria intervention at year 1,
which thereafter continues throughout the simulated period.
As summarized in Table 4.6, Scenario 1 assumes that a malaria intervention is
rolled-out nationally, covering 65% of the < 5 population. This scenario is considered
feasible in the short-run. In Scenarios 2 and 3, we assume that the hard-to-reach
population can gain access to the intervention, in the medium to long-run. Therefore,
in Scenario 2, coverage increases after 10 years to 85% nationally. In Scenario 3,
coverage rises to 100%, for the two high prevalence zones, while remains at 65% for
the rest of the zones. Figure 4.4 reports the number of children covered for each of
the simulated scenarios.
The next section gives a summary of the DCGE model that is developed for this
research. Chapter 5 provides a full analytical description of the model, its assump-
tions, and the parameters that it uses.
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Figure 4.4: Number of under five year covered (millions)
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4.4.1 A description of the model
We follow Mathiesen (1985) and Rutherford (1995, 1999) and set up an Arrow–Debreu
equilibrium as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP). Three types of weak in-
equality conditions are satisfied simultaneously: (1) zero profit, (2) market clearance,
and (3) income balance, each associated with a non-negative variable.
We design a multi-sector, multi-agent, recursive dynamic CGE model,7 and use
the social accounting matrix (SAM) by Breisinger et al. (2009, 2011) to calibrate the
model for Ghana. As mentioned previously, the SAM is re-aggregated so that it
characterises five epidemiological malaria zones, two urban-location (urban, rural),
and five income levels. This leads to 45 representative households, h ∈ H.
Each household is endowed with capital, land, and three occupational categories
of labour, Llh. We define the set of labour skill-types by
{self-employed, skilled, unskilled} ∈ l
7Coded in GAMS using Rutherford (1995, 1999)’s MPSGE. This allows handling of CGE models
in a consistent and compact format with mixed complementarity.
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Households accumulate capital (depreciated capital plus investment), transfer (re-
ceive) funds from the government and the rest of the world, and also pay tax to the
government, thus forming the disposable income of households.
Households are assumed to be rational, with a locally non-satiated preference re-
lation,8 and a continuous, multi-level, extended linear expenditure system (ELES)
utility function (Howe, 1975). In the first-level, a representative household maxim-
izes a utility function comprising of a consumption bundle and private savings, in
fixed shares, subject to the disposable income. In the second-level, the household
maximizes a Stone-Geary utility function that accounts for the minimum subsistence
requirements, and allows income elasticities to be different than one. The maximiza-
tion problem is constrained by the residual disposable income.
The government receives income from collecting taxes and tariffs, and also receives
(transfers) funds from domestic households and the rest of the world. It provides a
public service by purchasing commodities, and saves a fixed proportion of income.
Firms produce a single good using a multi-level, differentiable, constant return to
scale (CRS) production function that combines the factor inputs with intermediate
goods. Similar to Rutherford et al. (2002) and Hosoe et al. (2010), a constant elasti-
city of transformation function is used to split production into export and domestic
consumption. Then, domestic consumption and imports are aggregated to form the
Armington final good, which is finally demanded by private and public consumption,
investment, and/or as an intermediate good (Armington, 1969).9
Ghana is assumed to be a small open economy (SOE), which cannot affect world
prices. Export and import prices quoted in foreign currency are exogenously given. It
has unrestricted borrowing (lending), and international capital can freely flow between
the domestic and foreign economies.
8For any bundle of goods there is always another bundle of goods arbitrarily close that is preferred.
9Armington composite goods are used to account for cross hauling (two-way trading) in the same
good, i.e., goods are both imported and exported.
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Being a SOE, the domestic rental rate of capital is therefore fixed to world prices
through the level of the foreign exchange rate. This is characterised by introducing
two mutually exclusive functions that convert units of capital in (out) of the domestic
economy to the ROW. For example, whenever the rental rate of capital is higher
(lower) compared to that in the ROW, reflecting higher (lower) demand for capital
compared to other non-transferable domestic inputs (i.e., labour and land), capital
will flow in (out) through the capital account. This, therefore, imposes capital price
equalization. Furthermore, it affects the level of demand for investment, e.g., too
much capital will dampen the demand for investment.
The rest of the world (ROW) is modelled as a simple agent that demands foreign
savings (in the domestic economy). Its budget is equal to ownership of domestic
capital (if any), net remittances, and demand for net imports.10
Finally, a virtual investment firm builds new capital stock for the next period.
Its budget is comprised of the private, public and foreign savings, and it demands
(Armington) final consumption goods in fixed proportion, as inputs for investment.
4.4.2 Recursive dynamics
The model uses a recursive dynamics approach, where agents are assumed to be
myopic rather than forward-looking. This means that they do not change saving-
consumption behaviour in the present, due to knowledge of future expectations. The
model is solved sequentially for 30 years, where stock variables are updated exogen-
ously, at each period, based on the health models, and other assumptions that are
described in detail in Chapter 5. The exception is capital accumulation, which occurs
through endogenous linkages with previous-period investment.
There are four reasons for using a recursive model (rather than a forward-looking):
First, the main purpose of our simulation is to link the role of health on the labour re-
10A net export, from the perspective of the domestic economy.
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source, and thus on the economy. Having households increase consumption today, due
to their forward-looking expectations that they will have a healthier labour resource
in the future, seems questionable.
Second, there is doubt whether developing countries, such as Ghana, can be char-
acterised as forward-looking. Empirical observations suggest that low income agents
are most often myopic, mainly because they are credit constrained (Deaton, 1991,
1992; Foster, 1995; Morduch, 1995). Therefore, they are unable to allocate resources
optimally across time, which negates the, theoretically elegant, permanent income
hypothesis.
Third, Babiker et al. (2009) compare the recursive versus forward-looking models
and conclude that the recursive produces similar behaviour, but also provides greater
flexibility in the details of the system that can be represented compared to a forward-
looking approach.
Finally, given the complexity of the model in terms of the large numbers of pro-
duction sectors and households, a fully forward looking dynamic model cannot be
solved computationally.11 Breisinger et al. (2009, 2011) report the same problem.
We therefore set up a capital accumulation assumption that resemble those mod-
elled by Springer (2002), Klepper et al. (2003) and Thurlow (2007), whereby a virtual
investment firm, as described previously, characterizes a competitive capital market.
This assumption means that the purchasing price of one unit of new capital equals the
rental earnings of that unit, plus the value of the remaining capital sold in the sub-
sequent period, i.e., zero profit condition.12 An agent decides between consumption
and investment, and the model resembles a Solow-type model, with savings propor-
tional to household income. However, it also differs because the small open economy
11A forward looking model was initially implemented, but became unfeasible when presented with
more than three households.
12Kinnunen (2007); Breisinger et al. (2009, 2011); Diao (2009) use a different approach, whereby
newly invested capital is influenced by each sector’s initial share of gross surplus, and the final
allocation depends on depreciation and sector specific profit-rate differentials.
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Figure 4.5: A diagrammatic representation of the DCGE model
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(SOE) assumption fixes the rental rate of capital to world prices, as described previ-
ously.
Figure 4.5 illustrates the general structure of the economic model, and the way
in which Malaria impacts the economy through the factor markets. This is further
discussed in the next section.
4.4.3 Integrating health into the DCGE model
The stock of labour, L¯h,l,t, is assumed to be fully employed, and mobile across sectors
with flexible real wages. It is disaggregated across 45 households, and three occupa-
tional categories, i.e., self-employed, skilled, low skilled. The DCGE model integrates
the effects that malaria has on labour by (1) projecting the stock of labour forward;
and (2) estimating the labour effectiveness index, for each epidemiological zone.
Production is labour-augmenting, whereby total labour supply is the stock of
household labour L¯hlt multiplied by its effectiveness level, Ehlt. The labour augment-
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ing supply, Lhlt, is therefore
Lhlt = L¯hlt · Ehlt (4.1)
and updated yearly by
Lhl,t+1 = L¯hl0 · (1 + ghlt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
workforce size
·Ehl0 · (1 + ehlt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
effectiveness
(4.2)
with L¯hl0 defined as the stock of labour in the base year, and labour effectiveness in
the base year as Ehl0 = 1. Inputs into the DCGE model are (1) the household-specific
labour growth ghlt, which come from the demographic model; (2) changes to labour
effectiveness ehlt, which come from the labour efficiency model. The next two sections
explain the health models in further detail.
4.5 Population projection model
The main purpose of the population projections component is to estimate the size
of the workforce in Ghana, and the changes that would follow from malaria preven-
tion. Because the core of the research is the link between health, labour efficiency,
and economic outcomes, we require a simplified, yet realistic and uncontroversial ap-
proach to estimating the mortality impact of malaria prevention. We have, therefore,
deliberately selected a widely used platform for linking maternal and child survival
interventions with health interventions and demographic projections.
This platform, called Spectrum, which includes various modules (Stover et al.,
2010). DemProj, being the core module, projects the population using a cohort-
component method that is a commonly used approach to project population size,
composition, and structure (Stover and Kirmeyer, 2008). A second module, Lives
Saved Tool (LiST ), is used when malaria interventions are introduced in the counter-
factual scenarios (Winfrey et al., 2011). DemProj and LiST interact simultaneously
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to estimate the number of < 5 deaths that can be averted by interventions of eleven
different diseases, with malaria being one of them.
Spectrum contains a database that provides instant access to population estim-
ates and projections for Ghana at country level, as well as for 192 other countries and
regions from the United Nations Population Division.13 In this Ghana case study,
we ‘borrow’ the basic structure of Spectrum, but introduce the regional specific in-
formation that correspond to the previously mentioned epidemiological zones. The
following sections describe the main methodology and the assumptions.
4.5.1 Baseline projections using a cohort-component method
The cohort-component model requires assumptions for life expectancy at birth, total
fertility rates, age distribution of fertility, sex ratio at birth, and the number and
distribution by age and sex of international migrants. DemProj uses a Coal-Demeny
North model life table with age and sex specific patterns of mortality. Using the base
year age structure, age cohorts incrementally move forward in time, and amend ac-
cording to a set of age-specific fertility rates, age-specific survival rates, and migration
rates, by rural urban location (Pearl and Reed, 1920; Bowley, 1924; Dorn, 1950).
The population for each age cohort i ∈ N , region r ∈ R, for time t ∈ T is expressed
by
Popi,r,t = Popi,r,t−1 +Bi,r,t−1 −Di,r,t−1 +Mi,r,t−1 (4.3)
with Popi,r,t−1 being the stock of population in the previous year, which will rise
(fall) by the flows of Bi,r,t−1, Di,r,t−1,Mi,r,t−1, which are the births, deaths, and net
migration, respectively. The total regional population is, therefore, popr,t =
∑
i popi,r,t.
For each region, we use the national average migration values for Ghana, which are
given in the DemProj database. Fertility, mortality, and urbanization are estimated
13Spectrum and its modules and manuals can be downloaded from:
http://www.healthpolicyInitiative.com.
109
Table 4.7: Total fertility rates for epidemiological zones for selected year
Coastal Forest Southern
Savannah
Northern
Savannah
Accra
1970 7.0 7.2 7.6 5.9 5.9
1979/80 6.6 6.5 6.7 N/A 5.1
1988 6.3 6.3 7.5 6.9 4.7
1993 5.1 5.3 4.9 6.0 3.4
1998 4.4 4.7 4.9 5.9 2.7
2003 4.3 4.3 4.7 6.1 2.9
2008 3.7 4.0 4.0 5.8 2.5
Note: Total fertility rates in the administrative regions from the Ghana Demographic and Health
Surveys (GDHS). N/A = not available.
separately, for each epidemiological zone, and are applied to Equation (4.3) with the
following assumptions:
Regional fertility
For regional fertility, we use a statistical software package in the R statistical language
that is based on a Bayesian hierarchical model (Raftery et al., 2009; Alkema et al.,
2011; Sevcikova et al., 2011).
Empirical data from the Ghana Demographic and Health Surveys (GDHS), going
back to 1970, is used to estimate the total fertility rates (TFR). Table 4.7 presents the
TFRs for the epidemiological zones for specific years. Further details on the method
and its application are explained by Raftery et al. (2009).
Due to the lack of better data, we assume that each epidemiological zone in
Ghana uses the national age distribution of fertility, and that the sex ratio was held
constant at 105 males per 100 females. These data were taken from the UN Population
Prospects (UN, 2010).
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Regional mortality
Mortality requires assumptions for male and female life expectancy over the course of
the modelling period. We use life expectancy for districts from the Ghana Statistical
Service (Agyeman-Duah et al., 2006) and the projection of life expectancy for Ghana
as a whole until 2035 from the UN World Population Prospects (United Nations,
2010). We then assume that the relative annual increase in life expectancy for each
region is equivalent to the percentage increase of national life expectancy. This is a
simple assumption, but given the lack of regional projections, as well as the lack of
sufficient historical time series, it is infeasible to project region-specific life expectancy
trends.
Regional urban and rural population
Using the DemProj module, we also project urban and rural populations for each of
the epidemiological zones (Coastal, Forest, Northern Savannah and Southern Savan-
nah), with the exception of Accra, which is assumed to be entirely urban.
With Ur,t defined as the urban population of a region, Rr,t the rural population,
Popr,t the total regional population, and ∆λ as the difference in the urban and rural
growth rates, the urban population is projected by
Ur,t = Ur,t−1 · (Popr,t +4λ ·Rr,t−1)
Popr,t−1
(4.4)
For a further detailed description, see the DemProj Manual (Stover and Kirmeyer,
2008).
The data for the base-year population per district were taken from Ghana Statist-
ical Service (GSS, 2010) and the age distribution per region for the rural and urban
population by sex from the Ghana Demographic and Health Survey (GSS, 2009).
The product of these provides estimates for the rural and urban population by age
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and sex per district. Furthermore, lacking better data, the rate of urbanization,∆λ,
is assumed to be the same across all epidemiological zones, and follows the national
trend.
4.5.2 Malaria prevention scenarios for children under 5 years
We use the LiST module that interacts with the cohort-component model, DemProj,
to estimate the impact of a malaria intervention on children < 5 years old.
At the beginning of each projection year, DemProj provides LiST with the number
of deaths for children aged 0, 1, 2, 3 and 4 years. LiST disaggregates those deaths into
age bands: 0-1, 1-5, 6-11, 12-23 and 24-59 months by fitting a double log function to
the neonatal, infant, and < 5 mortality rates. The equation has the following form:
ln (u) = a+ b ln (age) + c · ageln(age) (4.5)
where u is the cumulative mortality at the corresponding age (Stover et al., 2010).
A hypothetical intervention of malaria prevention is introduced through changes
to the efficacy of the intervention in reducing mortality, adjusted for the impact of
coverage. The following sets are defined: prevention scenario sc ∈ SC, region r ∈ R,
age bands by months for < 5 year old a ∈ [0-1, 1-5, 6-11, 12-23, 24-59 months], and
time t ∈ T .
Following Winfrey et al. (2011) the proportional reduction PRsc,r,a,t in malaria
mortality is a function of the efficacy of the intervention Esc,a, the increase in the
coverage of intervention (Csc,r,a,t − Csc,r,a,0) and the affected fraction AFsc,a,14 adjus-
ted for the unrealized potential impact (1− Esc,a,0 · Csc,r,a,0) and is defined as
PRsc,a,t =
Esc,a · (Csc,r,a,t − Csc,r,a,0) · AFsc,a
1− Esc,a,0 · Csc,r,a,0 (4.6)
Based on the cohort-component method, the DemProj module calculates the num-
14Affected fraction is the percent of death directly caused by malaria.
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ber of births each year from the number of women 15-49 years old, the total fertility
rate, and the age distribution of fertility. New births are subject to the estimated
mortality rates as they age each year. Simultaneously, the LiST module estimates
the impact that the malaria prevention has on the mortality rates of children, which
is used by the cohort-component module. Together, LiST and DemProj estimate the
number of children saved by the intervention at each year.
As previously described in Section 4.4, we assume that the efficacy of the hy-
pothetical malaria prevention is 50%, and that the coverage for each counterfactual
intervention scenario varies over time, as summarized in Table 4.6. Projections are
made for each zone, separately, under the different scenario conditions.
Malaria mortality assumptions
LiST furthermore requires a distribution of < 5 mortality by cause, where malaria
is one of eleven possible causes. To do so, we multiply the < 5 average case fatality
rate of 2.6%, (i.e., the probability of dying from an episode of malaria,)15 with the
regional average of < 5 yearly incidence rate (GSS, 2004; GHS, 2007), to estimate
the < 5 yearly probability of dying from malaria per epidemiological zone. This is
then divided by the total < 5 mortality rate for that zone, to estimate the percentage
of deaths caused by malaria per zone. The remaining percentage is then distributed
among the other causes of death by keeping their original respective ratios constant.
Figure 4.6 depicts the resulting proportions of death causes for < 5 mortality, which
were used for the base year in LiST.
Using a fixed malaria case fatality rate, 2.6%, for Ghana as a whole, does not
consider any regional variability. However, given the lack of reliable empirical data
on the number of malaria incidences and deaths by region, this provides the best
available assumption.
15Ghana Health Survey (GHS, 2007) reports malaria case fatality was 2.8%, 2.7%, and 2.4% for
the years 2005,2006 and 2007, respectively.
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Figure 4.6: Proportion of death by cause by zone
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4.6 Labour efficiency model
Based on the discussion in Section 4.2 (illustrated in Figure 4.1), we review three
potential effects that contribute to workforce efficiency: (a) malaria status of an adult
worker, (b) malaria status of the child of an adult worker, and (c) malaria history of
an adult worker as a child. Each of these contributes to the loss of production, i.e.,
the amount of output lost from days off work (absenteeism), and loss to productivity,
i.e., the amount of output lost per day at work (presenteeism).
We refer to status as the number of malaria incidences per year, x ∈ [0, 9], for
three agents [a,c,a25] ∈ i, i.e., adult, child, and adult’s status 25 years previous,
respectively. For each rural-urban location ru ∈ RU , at time t ∈ T , the labour
efficiency loss li,ru,t (x) is a function of x incidents of malaria that have a Poisson
distribution P (x, µi,ru) with mean incidents µi,ru.16 Presenteeism and absenteeism is
differentiated by j ∈ [presenteeism, absenteeism].
Suppressing the rural-urban location index (for simplicity), the labour efficiency
16As an example, if x = 0 then l = 0.
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index is defined as:
Et =
(
1−
∑
j
∑
x
pa (xa) lj,t (xa)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Malaria status of an adult worker
(
1−
∑
j
∑
x
pc (xc) · lj,t (xc)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Malaria status of the child
of an adult worker
(
1−
∑
x
pac25 (xac25) · lt (xac25)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Malaria history of an adult worker
(4.7)
Each internal component represents the weighted average loss, normalized to la-
bour output per year. Furthermore, the efficiency loss from the malaria history of
an adult worker as a child, 25 years previous, is only affected by having two or more
incidents per year as a child. Therefore,
lac25 (xac25) =
 lac25= 0 if 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
lac25> 0 if 2 ≤ x ≤ 9

The components within Equation 4.7 are assumed to be independent, i.e., an
intervention in children would affect the probability to acquire malaria in children
independently to that in adults. Given that only the < 5 are treated, this simplified
assumption seems reasonable for the following reasons: the parasite reservoir relies on
the adult population, rather than the children. A recent study by the Swiss Tropical
Institute finds that administering a vaccine to < 5 will have no impact on adults when
delivered through an expanded programme on immunisation (EPI) process (Amek
et al., 2011). Another study finds that the impact of insecticide treated net (ITN)
distribution to the < 5, also has a limited, or no impact on transmission to adults
(Unpublished computation based on Killeen and Smith (2007)). Most studies on
eradication recommend targeting the whole population to clear parasites at regular
intervals, including vaccination (Griffin et al., 2010; Maire et al., 2011). Targeting
adults, rather than children, would probably have the largest impact on transmission.
Table 4.8 summarises the key parameters previously identified that are used to
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Table 4.8: Key assumptions and parameter values of the labour effectiveness index
Assumptions Value
Number of working days 235
Range of number of incidents per person-year with a Poisson distribution 0-9
Lost days per malaria episode
For Absenteeism
Adult is ill 3
Child is ill, and adult absent from work to take care of child 2
For Presenteeism
Adult is at work but ill 2
Productivity factor (as proportion of output compared to malaria-free)
Adult at work, but ill 90%
Having a year with 2 or more malaria episodes as a child 90%
Having 3 or more malaria episodes as a child 75%
Malaria case fatality for < 5 (probability of death given having a malaria episode) 2.6%
Years delay for improved productivity of adults due to incidences as children 25
derive the efficiency index: (1) production days lost by adults that have taken off work
due to being ill with malaria, or for caring for a child with malaria, i.e., absenteeism.
(2) The productivity lost from being ill, but working, i.e., presenteeism, and (3) the
change in labour efficiency for adults that have had malaria as children, 25 years
previous.
4.7 Limitations and discussion
As with every modelling approach, the method used here has a number of limitations,
and is only a simplified version of reality. There are, therefore, aspects regarding
malaria and its effect on production and economic growth, which have not been
included in the analysis. First, the model does not incorporate contagion assumptions
because the medical literature has an ambiguous consensus about the epidemiological
consequences of malaria prevention. After careful deliberation, we decided not to
enter the medical debate.
Second, both the malaria yearly duration and transmission varies across geo-
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graphical zones, and agricultural production varies by type of sector, season, and
geography. As discussed by Weil (2010), the effect of malaria and malaria prevention
on production, therefore, depends on whether the height of agricultural production
is pro-cyclical (or counter-cyclical) with the height of the malaria season.
Third, agricultural production tends to be a communal activity, in which extended
families may reside together and pool resources. If any one worker needs to stay home
with an illness, another person in the home may replace him or her. This reduces the
effect that improving malaria prevalence has on the overall household production.
Fourth, childcare is often shared among extended family in Ghana; therefore,
when children get malaria, they may stay home with someone who is already taking
care of younger children and/or other ill children. This similarly reduces the impact
that improving malaria prevalence may have on agricultural production.
Finally, the informal economies tend to constitute a relatively large proportion of
the overall economy in developing countries. In this research, the SAM considers the
informal economy, but is probably incomplete due to lack of reliable data. Therefore,
the results of the model are likely to underestimate the economic benefits of malaria
intervention in areas that exhibit a high proportion of the informal sector, especially
in rural areas.
Scenarios revisited
Many possible preventative strategies could be assessed to evaluate the impact of
malaria reduction on the labour force. In this paper, we simulate cases where children
< 5 years receive a malaria preventative intervention. This leads to two issues that
need clarification. First, because adults are not included in the intervention, the
immediate economic benefit that could have been gained from healthier adults is
not measured, i.e., the first component in Equation (4.7), “Malaria status of an adult
worker,” is omitted. Therefore, economic benefits are only gained through the reduced
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Table 4.9: Additional value compared to baseline, year 1-30
Indicator Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Additional annual GDP growth rate 0.067% 0.070% 0.070%
Additional income (cumulative, million 2007 US$) 8,382 8,926 8,874
Annual additional income (average, million 2007 US$) 279 298 296
Source: Authors’ own calculations
days in caring for children, and through changes to the units of effective labour when
treated children become adults later in life.
Second, because prevention is “taken away” when children reach an age > 5,
the hypothetical preventative scenarios are short-lasting prophylaxis, similar to in-
secticide treated nets or anti-malarial preventative drugs, rather than a long-lasting
vaccine. The scenarios alter the probability of the < 5 deaths from malaria, but do
not change malaria endemicity overall. A hypothetical vaccine to children, for ex-
ample, would have had a compounding effect on the economy because the prevention
would continue even after the children are > 5. This would resemble some of the ef-
fects if adults were added into the intervention. However, a hypothetical vaccine was
not tested mainly because it is not yet known how long the new candidate-vaccine
protects against malaria.
4.8 Results
The results overall show that even under a limited intervention to only < 5 years old,
economic growth and income inequality improve. Furthermore, malaria prevention is
best viewed as a long-run investment strategy. As Table 4.9 reports for the hypothet-
ical scenarios of this research, annual GDP growth rate would rise by approximately
0.7% (above baseline). This is an additional cumulative income to the Ghanaian
households of approximately $8.3 to $9.9 billion (2007 US$) over a 30 year period.
Equivalently, this is an additional yearly average income of US$ 279 to 298 million.
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In the first 10 years of the intervention, however, the dependency ratio rises and
income per capita falls. This process is halted when the first cohort of healthier
children reaches the working age population, approximately at age > 15. As they
reach their prime working age, of approximately > 25 years, the economy gains the
full benefit of the prevention, which raises income per capita (as illustrated in Figure
4.7).17 Therefore, 25 years later, the economy reaches a new long-run path of income
per capita above baseline.
In the baseline scenario (with no intervention), the model projects a rise in income
inequality for the top 20% richest to the lowest 20% poorest households. In the
counterfactual simulations, this rise in income inequality slows down, as illustrated in
Figure 4.8, which compares the income inequality ratio relative to that in the baseline.
Similar to income per capita, the first 10 years of the intervention actually leads to a
minimal rise in income inequality due to the increase in dependency ratio. But as the
healthier children reach working age, they enter the work force with more valuable,
productive, labour resources. Therefore, even with a limited malaria preventative
strategy to the < 5, income inequality ratio falls by approximately 1.3% after 30
years.
Using a DCGE model, rather than econometric approaches, enables us to incorpor-
ate diminishing returns. For example, given a stock of land and capital, improvement
in labour size and labour efficiency will initially raise welfare. But, as “more lives
are saved,” competition within the labour market reduces their marginal labour pro-
ductivity, and hence, erodes the marginal rise in income. The interaction of these
opposing forces gives a truer picture of the economic value of an intervention. This is
illustrated in Figure 4.7, in which income per capita is lower for the “comprehensive”
intervention scenarios, compared to the “basic” intervention.
17A cohort includes children ages 0-5. We have assumed that the full effective units of labour is
reached at the age of 25. Therefore, a proportion of the < 5 will reach this age 20 years after the
intervention first began.
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Figure 4.7: Income per capita relative to baseline (% change)
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Figure 4.8: Richest 20/poorest 20 income relative to baseline (% change)
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Furthermore, and related to the above, not all zones benefit in the same way from
malaria intervention. Forest, which is a high prevalence zone, receives the largest
economic benefits from malaria intervention (illustrated in Figure 4.9). The labourers
in Forest have the same potential to produce and earn income as other zones, but
malaria disadvantages them. The intervention, therefore, raises the value of the
labour resource, which improves their income per capita, and even more so for the
“comprehensive” scenario 3.
This rather intuitive result is, however, not necessarily true for all regions. For
example, North Savannah, which is also a high prevalence zone, gains less from the
comprehensive scenario 3, compared to the basic scenario 1 (see Figure 4.9). The key
driver of welfare variation between households, in this model, is the heterogeneity in
labour skill-type endowments and their overlap with the epidemiological zones. From
a purely economic point of view, when households reside in high malaria prevalence
zones, which coincides with having a high proportion of skill-types that are less in
demand as inputs of production, they are expected to suffer from malaria intervention.
The reason is that lives saved by malaria intervention might not be matched with the
increase in demand for their labour resource. Poverty is exacerbated if the dependency
ratio rises, while income rises less than sufficiently.
This situation also occurs in the rural households in Ghana, who benefit econom-
ically less from malaria intervention (as shown in Figure 4.10), especially with the
higher coverage scenarios. However, as discussed in the model limitations (Section
4.7), the value of the informal sector is higher in rural areas in developing countries,
and the benefits of malaria intervention in those regions are most likely an underes-
timate. Furthermore, we do not consider the social value of malaria prevention in
this model.
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Figure 4.9: Annual average income per capita relative to baseline (% change)
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Figure 4.10: Income per capita relative to baseline, by zone and urbanity
(average over 30 years)
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Figure 4.11: Income-benefit per covered individual, 2007 US$
Indicator Sc 1 Sc 2 Sc 3 
Year 1 7 7 7 
Year 5 11 11 11 
Year 10 16 16 16 
Year 15 28 26 25 
Year 20 56 50 47 
Year 25 347 277 268 
Year 30 499 403 389 
Average y1-y30 124 102 98 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
y0 y5 y10 y15 y20 y25 y30
Scenario 1
Scenario 2
Scenario 3
30 year average (across all senarios)
Source: Authors’ own calculations
4.8.1 The benefit of treatment per individual covered
The economic benefit of a treatment given to individual children is reported in Figure
4.11, which is in terms of income per < 5 covered. The main results are that the
benefit of a treatment rises from US$ 7 (2007 prices) to approximately US$ 16 per
child covered, in the first 10 years. These welfare gains (per child) are mainly a result
of the reduction of lost working days that parents have to make for taking care of sick
children.
In later years, the benefits per covered child rises considerably higher, as the chil-
dren mature and enter the work force as healthier and more productive, individuals.
In other words, because they were treated as children, they will directly benefit as
adults. The 30 year annual average benefit per covered child is between US$ 98 to
US$ 124 (depending on the scenario).
Furthermore, as reported in Figure 4.11, the benefit per covered child is highest
for the “basic coverage” Scenario 1, which again is precisely the result of diminishing
returns to effective units of labour.
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Table 4.10: Regional benefit per treated individual (2007 US$, average of year 1-30)
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Urban
Accra 131 111 125
Coast 135 111 130
Forest 176 143 128
North Savannah 101 82 75
South Savannah 120 101 115
Rural
Accra n/a n/a n/a
Coast 18 15 17
Forest 143 116 102
North Savannah 64 52 46
South Savannah 68 56 68
Region Total
Accra 131 111 125
Coast 74 61 72
Forest 162 131 117
North Savannah 76 62 55
South Savannah 94 78 91
National Average 124 102 98
4.8.2 Variation in benefit by epidemiological zone
Table 4.10 reports the 30 year average regional benefits per covered child, and indic-
ates which zones stand to gain most from the treatment. It shows, for example, that
individuals in the Forest zone benefit the most; while individuals in North Savannah
gain the least.
From a purely economic point of view, an optimal provision would be to increase
coverage to those children in zones that benefit the most from prevention, while reduce
coverage to the areas below average. Health provision is maximized when all children
have the same benefits across all zones.
However, this is of course an unacceptably narrow approach because it only
provides a partial view of the optimal provision, as it does not consider aspects that
have intrinsic non-economic value, e.g., moral, social, and equity implications. A bet-
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ter method to rank policy would be to include a social agenda within the provision,
and evaluate it within this predefined framework; for example, assessing an optimal
provision strategy within a pro-poor health subsidization policy.
4.8.3 Sensitivity analysis
To test the sensitivity of results, many robustness checks were conducted on the key
parameters of the economic model. We applied low and high values of the income
elasticities and Frisch parameters, which may influence results of the scenarios com-
pared to the baseline. These are described in Table 4.11, and are well above/below
the accepted values within the literature.
Overall, the results are very close to the main results, and suggest that the model
is well behaved. For example, the values presented in Figure 4.11 for the income-
benefit per covered individual vary by approximately US$ 2, for the low sensitivity
values, but are nearly the same for the high values. The percentage difference of GDP
above baseline (compared to the main model result) is approximately 0.01 percentage
points until year 25, when it increases to a 0.05 percentage point difference. The
results for high values are even more similar to the main results, and would alter our
results from 25 years onwards by less than 0.015 percentage points. These provide
some confidence that changing the deep parameters of the DCGE model do not alter
the overall conclusions.
The model is, however, sensitive to some of the labour unit efficiency parameters
that were summarized in Table 4.8. For example, increasing the loss to adult pro-
ductivity from 90% to 75%, which had two bouts of malaria as a child, would raise
the benefits per child covered in the final year by approximately US$ 150 (but not in
the first 25 years). This raises the average benefit per covered child. Our results are,
therefore, the conservative estimates.
Finally, sensitivity analysis was preformed on the demographic model and its
125
Table 4.11: Sensitivity analysis
Parameters used in model
Low Urban Rural High
Income elasticity of demand
Agriculture 0.3 0.66 0.68 1
Manufacturing 0.45 0.91 0.86 1
Services 1 1.52 1.30 2
Frisch Parameter -2 -3 -5 (respectively) -5,-6
interaction with the DCGE model. However, the overall effect that malaria has on
the general demographic trends is relatively small. Therefore, the major economic
effects are a result of the labour efficiency index, and not the demographic model.
4.9 Conclusion
The analysis of malaria and its link with economic growth using econometric ap-
proaches has, so far, been too broad and not particularly useful for policy analysis.
To fill the gap, we developed a recursively dynamic computable general equilibrium
(DCGE), and used Ghana as a case study. We find that malaria prevention clearly
adds to economic growth and reduces income inequality, even under a limited inter-
vention where only the under-five years old are treated. Our results are conservative
estimates because health is only linked to labour resources, while leaving out the
other possible effects. Furthermore, immediate economic benefits would be obtained
had the intervention included adults.
Public, private, and third-sector organisations require a more detailed picture of
how malaria influences various households and production sectors over time. On the
same token, pharmaceutical firms, who are negotiating with government and donors
on the provision of drugs and vaccines, have an interest in understanding market
demands and communicate opinions.
The scenarios developed here were hypothetical, but in the “real world,” policy
126
makers decide on the most appropriate health provision within a framework of a
limited budget and social goals. Our approach is useful for policy makers to assess
the expected benefits, and target towards a certain desired level of return on (health)
investment, because framing the results as a cost-benefit analysis is rather straight
froward. All that is needed is to compare the results with the cost of the various
provisions. Moreover, designing complex health provision policies, e.g., pro-poor
health subsidies, require assessing the treatment benefits per individual covered, which
is an natural outcome of out approach.
This methodology is a step forward in the a priori impact assessments of al-
ternative malaria interventions. Malaria intervention has a key role in the economic
development of endemic countries. However, it is a long-term investment, and gov-
ernments and donors must view it as such.
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Chapter 5
The malaria model
In the previous Chapter 4, the economic value of malaria reduction was imputed by
synthesising a dynamic general equilibrium (DCGE) model with two health models.
However, the DCGE model was discussed in only general terms. The aim of this
chapter, therefore, is to make the modelling process fully transparent. It will present
the complete analytical DCGE model, its main assumptions, and deep parameters.
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.1 introduces the model and the
set of variables. Section 5.2 and Section 5.3 describe the production function, and
the Armington assumption. Section 5.4 through Section 5.7 describe the agents in
the model (i.e., the government, households and the rest of the world,) and the small
open economy assumptions. Section 5.8 and Section 5.9 discuss investment and the
recursive dynamics in this model. Section 5.10 summarises the parameters used in
the model, and the literature review behind them. Finally, Section 5.11 concludes.
5.1 The model
Amulti-sector multi-agent recursive dynamic CGE model is developed. I follow Math-
iesen (1985) and Rutherford (1995, 1999), and setup an Arrow–Debreu equilibrium as
a mixed complementarity problem (MCP). Therefore, three types of weak inequality
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conditions must be satisfied: (1) zero profits, (2) market clearance, and (3) income
balance, each associated with three non-negative variables, i.e., y∗ ≥ 0, p∗ ≥ 0 and
M∗ ≥ 0, respectively.
The model is coded in GAMS using MPSGE, which allows handling of CGE mod-
els in a consistent and compact format (Rutherford, 1995, 1999). It is furthermore
calibrated to the 2007 Ghanaian Social Accounting Matrix (SAM),1 and characterises
six activities Yj: four agricultural, which represent the main agro-ecological Ghanaian
zones, industrial, and services. These six activities are aggregated into three main
commodities, Yi: agricultural, industrial, and services. A portion of the commodities
are used domestically and the rest exported. An Armington final good, Ai, is as-
sembled by combining the domestically used commodities with imports (Armington,
1969).
Final consumption is then demanded by a virtual investment-firm, as intermediate
inputs, and/or by three type of agents: households, government, and the rest of
the world (ROW). Each agent has a utility function {Uh, Ugov, Urow} ∈ U , which is
rational, locally non-satiated, and continuous.
The model has 45 households, which were identified by five income level quintiles,
and nine epidemiological urban-rural regions. Households are endowed with factor
resources: capital, land and labour, {Kjt, Lndjt, Lljt} ∈ Fj, of which there are three
labour skill-types, i.e., {self-employed, skilled, unskilled} ∈ l.
Finally, I use a recursive dynamics approach to project the model sequentially
forward for 30 years. Stock variables are updated exogenously, at each period, based
on the health models and other assumptions. The exception is capital, which accumu-
lates through endogenous linkages with previous-period investment and international
capital flow. Ghana is assumed to be a small open economy (SOE) that cannot affect
world prices.
1The original SAM was developed by Breisinger et al. (2009, 2011).
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The following is a summary of the main sets used in the model,
h ∈ H (45 households)
{self-employed, skilled, unskilled} ∈ l (3 labour)
{Kjt, Lndjt, Lljt} ∈ F (5 factors)
j ∈ M (6 activities)
i ∈ N (3 commodities)
t ∈ T (30 time periods)
In the next sections, the model is described in further detail.
5.2 Production
We use the Armington assumption, similar to Rutherford and Light (2001) and Hosoe
et al. (2010), which is diagrammatically illustrated in Figure 5.1.
5.2.1 Domestic production
Activities are produced using a two-level nested Leontief-Cobb Douglas technology,
∀t. Both are homogenous of degree one and thus characterised as constant returns
to scale (CRS). In the top-nest, value-added and intermediate inputs are aggregated
into an activity. Firm j’s profit-maximisation problem is
maximise
Yj,V AiAji
piYjt = pY,jtYjt −
(
pV A,jtV Ajt +
∑
i
pitAijt
)
s.t. Yjt ≥ min
{
V Ajt
aV Ajt
,
Aijt
aAijt
, · · · , ANjt
aANjt
}
, ∀j (5.1)
In the bottom-nest, the maximisation problem of the value added is obtained by
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Figure 5.1: The production function
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Note: Activity production inputs have a two level nested function. The lowest level combines capital, labour, and
land into an aggregate value added, V Ajt. The second level combines intermediate goods, Ait, with the value added
to form output, Yjt. Production output is then transformed into Export, Eit, and domestic consumption, Dit.
Finally, domestic consumption and imports, Mit, are aggregated to form the Armington final good. This good is then
demanded for private and public consumption, investment, or as an intermediate good.
aggregating capital, labour, and land inputs, by
maximise
V Aj,Kj,Lndj,Llj
piV Aj = pV A,jV Aj −
(
rKKjt + pLndLndj +
3∑
l=1
wltLljt
)
s.t. V Aj ≥ θV Aj KαKjt LndαLndjt
(
ΠlLαlljt
)
, ∀j,∀l (5.2)
Notations are:
piYj : profit of the j’th firm producing gross domestic output Yj in the top nest,
piV Aj : profit of the j’th firm producing composite factor V Aj in the second nest,
Yj: activity output of the j’th firm,
Aij: intermediate input of the i’th Argmington good used by the j’th activity
firm,
V Aj: value added composite of capital, land, and labour inputs,
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{Kj, Lndj, Llj} ∈ Fj: input factors: capital, land and labor, with
[self-employed,skilled,unskilled] ∈ l,
pYj : price of the activity output,
pV Aj : price of the value added composite,
wlj ∈ pf : labour wage rates (with subscript f meaning a factor),
pLndj ∈ pf : rental price of land,
rKj ∈ pf : rental price of capital,
aV Aj , a
A
ij: input requirement coefficients for the j’th activity,
αjf : share coefficient in the value added function, with constant returns to
scale implying that αk + αLnd +
∑
l αl = 1,
θV Aj : scaling coefficient.
The explicit definition of the complementarity constraint is that for two scalar vari-
ables x and y, their is a solution such that x · y = 0, x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0. This will be
compactly expressed as 0 ≤ x ⊥ y ≥ 0.
Recall that index j refers to a set of activities, while index i refers to a set of
commodities. Solving these two maximisation problems ∀t, ∀j, and ∀i leads to the
following demand for inputs:
0 ≤ pV Ajt ⊥ V Ajt ≥ aV Ajt Yjt (5.3)
0 ≤ pAjt ⊥ Aijt ≥ aAijtYjt (5.4)
0 ≤ pft ⊥ Fjt ≥
αfp
Y
jt
pft
Yjt ∀F (5.5)
Zero profit conditions lead to the price indexes:
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pYjt ≤
(
aV Ajt p
V A
jt +
N∑
i=1
aAijtp
A
ijt
)
⊥ Yjt ≥ 0 (5.6)
pV Ajt ≤ θV Aj Π
f
{(
pfj
)αjf} ⊥ V Aj ≥ 0 (5.7)
These equations, as do the other equations in the the next sections, express the
complementarity problem in the following way: using Equation (5.4) as an example
for a market clearing condition, if 0 < pAj , then supply equals demand, Aij = aAijYj.
Otherwise, if 0 = pAj , it would mean that the supply of good Aij is infinitely larger
than demand, Aij > aAijYj, which has driven the price down to zero.
Similarly, the complementarity problem for the zero profit condition is exemplified
in Equation (5.6). If Yj > 0, the unit revenue equals the unit cost of production, pYjt =
aV Ajt p
V A
jt +
∑A
i=1 a
A
ijtp
A
ijt, and therefore, the firm makes zero profits. However, if Yj = 0,
the unit cost of production is greater than revenue, pYjt < aV Ajt pV Ajt +
∑A
i=1 a
A
ijtp
A
ijt, and
the firm does not produce because of the losses it would have had incurred.
5.2.2 Transformation between domestic use and exports
The decision of producers to supply to the domestic market, Di, or foreign markets,
Ei, is governed by a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function. The profit-
maximisation problem for the i’th commodity is divided into two parts:
In the first-stage, activities j are assembled into a commodity i using a Leontief
function by2
2Recall that in this model, there are four agricultural activities, which are assembled into one ag-
gregate agricultural commodity. Furthermore, the industrial and service commodities are equivalent
to the activities.
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maximise
Yi,Yj
piYit = pYitYit −
M∑
j
pYjtYjt
s.t. Yit ≥ min
{
Yjt
aYjt
, · · · , YMt
aYMt
}
(5.8)
In the second-stage, the CET function splits the commodities into domestic use
and exports by
maximise
Yit,Dit,Eit
piit =
(
pDitDit +
(
1− τEi
)
pEitEit
)
− pYitYit
s.t. Yit ≥ g (Dit, Eit) = θit
(
γYi D
φ
it +
(
1− γYi
)
Eφit
) 1
φ (5.9)
Notations are:
pii: profit for commodity i,
Yj: gross domestic output of the j’th good,
Di: domestic supply (use) of good i,
Ei: export supply of good i,
pDi : price of the i’th gross domestic output,
pEi : price of the i’th exported good in terms of domestic currency, with pEi =
pfx,i
(
1− τEi
)
,
τEi : export tax,
θi: scaling coefficient,
aYj : share coefficients for activity j, calibrated from the SAM,
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γYi : share coefficients for commodity i’s transformation, calibrated from SAM,
φ: parameter defined by the transformation elasticity η, expressed as φ =
1 + 1
η
.3
Solving the maximisation problem leads to the following supply functions for exports
and domestic goods:
0 ≤ pYit ⊥ Yit ≥ aYjtYjt (5.10)
0 ≤ pEi ⊥ Eit ≥
(
θitγ
Y
it
pYit
(1− τEi ) pEi
) 1
1−φ
Yit (5.11)
0 ≤ pDi ⊥ Dit ≥
(
θit
(
1− γYit
) pYit
pDi
) 1
1−φ
Yit (5.12)
The zero profit conditions lead to the unit cost of production,
pYit ≤
∑
j∈agr
aYjtp
Y
jt ⊥ Yit ≥ 0 (5.13)
pY
it
≤
(
γYi
(
pD
it
)1+η
+
(
1− γYi
) (
pE
it
)1+η) 11+η ⊥ Yit ≥ 0 (5.14)
where Equation (5.10) and Equation (5.13) are redundant with regards to the indus-
trial and service sectors, i.e., aYj = 1.
5.3 The Armington assumption
In order to model exports and imports of the same good, known as cross-hauling,
we assume that imports and domestically produced goods are imperfect substitutes,
and are combined by a virtual firm, i.e., an Armington aggregate good (Armington,
1969). This final good is consumed domestically by private or public agents, invested
3The transformation elasticity is defined by η = d(Di/E)(Di/E) /
d(pDi /pEi )
(pDi /pEi )
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to produce new capital stock, and/or used as an intermediate input in domestic
activity production (as previously described in Section 5.2.1). This allows to model
import competition and export opportunities that reflect the ability by producers and
consumers to shift between domestic and foreign markets depending on changes in
the relative prices of imports, exports and domestic goods.
The optimisation problem for the i’th final good is to
maximise
Ait,Mit,Dit
piAit =
(
1− τSi
)
pAitAit −
(
1 + τMi
)
pMit Mit − pDitDit
s.t. Ait ≥ g (Mit, Dit) = θAit
(
γAi M
ηAi
it +
(
1− γAi
)
D
ηAi
it
) 1
ηA
i (5.15)
Notations are:
piAi : profit of the virtual firm producing the i’th Armington composite good,
Ai: the i’th Armington composite good,
Mi: the imported good,
Di: the domestic good,
pAi : consumer price of the Armington composite good. Producer price is there-
fore pA,pi =
(
1− τSi
)
pAi ,
pMi : price of the imported good in terms of domestic currency,
pDi : price of the domestic good,
τSi : sales tax on good i,
τMi : import tariff on the i’th commodity,
θAi : scaling coefficient,
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γAi : input share coefficients calibrated from SAM,
ηAi : parameter defined by the substitution elasticity σAi , having ηAi = 1− 1σAi .
The first-order conditions for the optimality of the above problem ∀t leads to the
following demand functions for imports and domestic goods:
0 ≤ pMit ⊥ Mit ≥
[
θAi
]σAi −1γAi
(
1− τSi
)
pAit
(1 + τMi ) pMit
σ
A
i
Ait (5.16)
0 ≤ pDi ⊥ Dit ≥
[
θAi
]σAi −1(1− γAi )
(
1− τSi
)
pAit
pDit
σ
A
i
Ait (5.17)
pAit ≤
(
γAi
[(
1 + τMi
)
pMit
]1−σAi + (1− γAi ) (pDit)1−σAi )
1
1−σA
i ⊥ Yit ≥ 0 (5.18)
.
5.4 Government behavior
The government receives income from collecting direct tax, τD, and sales tax, τS,
including import and export tariffs, τM , τE (respectively). It also transfers (receives)
funds from domestic households and the rest of the world. The government purchases
commodities, and saves the remaining income.
In order to compare scenarios and properly assess welfare, it is assumed that
the government’s budget is always balanced. If it is was not balanced, it would
be impossible to distinguish between a change in household welfare, which is due to
efficiency improvements, or one which arises solely because the government is running
a deficit. In the long-run, the government budget has to be balanced, and only in that
setting does the model provide consistent welfare estimates that can be compared.
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To account for this, tax revenues and the proportion of real government con-
sumption expenditures is assumed to be fixed, but rises proportionately with the
population growth rate to maintain a fix level of government services per capita.
Furthermore, in order to keep a budget-balance, households transfer (receive) an
endogenous lump-sum fund, govdef , so that fiscal surplus adjusts to ensure that rev-
enues equal expenditure on goods and public investment, i.e. a balanced budget.
The size of the transfer (receipt) that each household makes is set by the share of
household consumption from total private consumption, Φht, with
∑
h Φh = 1, i.e.,
households with higher consumption contribute more to cover the government budget
deficit. (The household is discussed further in Section 5.5.)
Government income, ∀t, is
GOV INCt =
∑
i
T Sit +
∑
i
TMit +
∑
j
TEjt + pfxt · (GRt −RGt)
+ pgt ·
(∑
h
TDht +
∑
h
(GHht −HGht) + govdeft
)
∀i,∀j(5.19)
with tax collected by
T Si = τSi pAitciht ∀i (5.20)
TMi = τMi pMi Mi ∀i (5.21)
TEj = τEj pEj Ej ∀j (5.22)
The government spends a fixed proportion of income on consumption and savings,
maximise
GSVt,cgit
Gt = min
{
GSVt
sg
,
cgit
agi
, · · · , c
g
Ngt
agN
,
}
s.t. GOV INCt = pInvt GSVt +
∑
i
pAitc
g
it (5.23)
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with 0 ≤ sg, agi ≤ 1 and sg +
∑
i a
g
i = 1, characterizing a CRS function.
The notations are:
TD, T Si , T
M
i , T
E
i : Revenue from direct tax, sales tax, import and export tariff (re-
spectively),
τSi , τ
M
i , τ
E
i : sales tax, import tariffs and export tariffs,
GOV INC: government income,
G, pg: level of government services and unit cost of government services,
(GHht −HGht): net government receipts from households,
(GRt −RGt): net government receipts from the rest of the world,
govdef : total household transfers to cover government deficit,
cgi , a
g
i : government demand for final good, and the share coefficient,
GSV, pInv, sg: government savings, unit cost of investment, and savings rate.
The solution to this problem, ∀t, leads to the government demand for the i’th good
and savings:
0 ≤ pAit ⊥ cgit ≥ agi
GOV EXPt
pAit
∀i (5.24)
0 ≤ pInvt ⊥ GSVt ≥ sg
GOV EXPt
pInvt
(5.25)
and the unit cost of government services is
pgt ≤ sgpInvt +
N∑
i=1
aigtp
A
it ⊥ Gt ≥ 0 (5.26)
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5.5 Household behaviour
There are h households, each endowed with capital, labour and land resources. They
accumulate capital, transfer or receive funds from the government and the rest of the
world, and pay taxes.
As mentioned previously (in Section 5.4), it is assumed that in each period, the
household transfers (receives) an endogenous fraction of income to cover any gov-
ernment deficits (surplus), with the proportion defined as the share of household’s
consumption of total private consumption
Φht =
Cht∑
hCht
, with
∑
h
Φ = 1 (5.27)
Household h’s disposable income, ∀t, is
Zht = rKt Kht + pLndt Lndht +
3∑
l=1
wltLlht + pfxt · (HRht −RHht)
+ pgov,t
(
(HGht −GHht) + Φht · govdeft − T dht
)
−∑
i
pAit c¯iht (5.28)
and note that income is net of the minimum subsistence expenditure, pAi c¯ih (also
called the survival requirement level).
The household demand structure has two levels, and uses an extended linear
expenditure system (ELES).4 In the top-level, a household consumes a composite
consumption bundle, Ch, and saves a fixed share of disposable income, PSVh. The
problem is to
maximise
Sht,Cht
Ut = min
{
PSVht
sph
,
Cht
1− sph
}
, with 0 ≤ sh ≤ 1
s.t. Zht ≥ pInvt Sht + pch,tCh, t ∈ T (5.29)
4This method is equivalent to Howe (1975), who had formalized savings into the Stone-Geary
utility function. Here, a Leontief function is used in the top level.
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In the second-level, the household maximises a Stone-Geary utility function, which
allows income elasticities to be different than one. The residual disposable income is
equal to the disposable income net of savings, Mht = Zht − pinv,tSht. The problem is
to
maximise
ciht
Cht (ciht · · · cnht) =
n∏
i=1
(ciht − c¯ih)βih where ∑ni=1 βih = 1
s.t. Mht ≥
n∑
i=1
pAitciht (5.30)
The notations are:
TDht: Direct tax by household h,
PSVh, p
Inv: household h’s private savings and unit cost of investment,
Ch, pch: demand for composite consumption by household h, with price index,
Zh: disposable income, net subsistence level,
Lndh, p
Lnd: land endowments by household h, unit rental price,
Llh, wl: labour endowments and wage rates for {self, skilled, unskilled} ∈ l,
Kht, r
K
t : capital and rental price of capital,
(HGht −GHht): net household receipts from the government,
(HRht −RHht): net household receipts from the rest of world (ROW),
Φh · govdef : endogenous transfer to cover government deficit, with 0 ≤ Φh ≤ 1,
τ salesi : sales tax,
cih, p
A
i : demand for good i by household h, and commodity i consumer price,
c¯i, p
A
i : subsistence level, and commodity i consumer price,
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Mh: residual disposable income, i.e. net of taxes, transfers, and savings,
βhi: household h’s share parameter for good i, with 0 ≤ βi ≤ 1 and ∑i βi = 1,
pUht: unit cost of household utility.
Solving the problem of the household, ∀t, the first-level demands for private savings
and consumption bundle are:
0 ≤ pch,t ⊥ Cht ≥ (1− sph)
Zht
pch,t
(5.31)
0 ≤ pinv,t ⊥ PSVt ≥ sph
Zht
pUht
(5.32)
with households utility price index of
pUht ≤ sphpInvt + (1− sph) pch,t ⊥ Uht ≥ 0 (5.33)
In the second-level, the demand function for good i is
0 ≤ pit ⊥ ciht ≥ c¯ih + βih
[
Mht −∑nj=1 pjtc¯jh]
pit
(5.34)
with household’s consumption price index of
pcht ≤ ΦhΠNi=1
{(
pAit
)βhi} ⊥ Cht ≥ 0 (5.35)
Note thatMht−∑ni pitc¯i is the supernumerary income, which is the residual income
net of subsistence expenditure, and ciht−c¯ih is the supernumerary consumption, which
is the residual consumption net of subsistence level.
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5.5.1 Recalibrating the SAM with subsistence level
In order to account for the subsistence level, c¯ih, the SAM is recalibrated in the
following steps:
1. In the original SAM, ∑ni=1 pAi cih = Mh. Therefore, the average budget share is
si =
pAi cih
Mh
(5.36)
2. Good i income elasticity of demand is defined as Mi,h = ∂cih∂Mh
Mh
cih
. Differentiating
the consumption demand Equation (5.34) with respect to disposable income,
obtain ∂cih
∂Mh
= βih
pi
, and therefore, Mi,h = βihpi
Mh
cih
. Finally, combine with the average
budget share, Equation (5.36), and rearrange to estimate the marginal budget
share by
βih = si · Mi,h (5.37)
where we use values for Mi,h from previous econometric studies, and si is given
from the SAM.
3. To calibrate a minimum subsistence requirement c¯i, the values for the Frisch
parameter are used from previous studies of African countries. The Frisch
parameter is defined as
φh =
−Mh
Mh −∑nj=1 pj c¯jh (5.38)
and reflects the marginal utility of total income with respect to income (Frisch,
1959; Howe, 1975; De Melo and Tarr, 1992; Creedy, 1998), which tends to
become smaller in absolute value as income rises. It measures the willingness
of consumers to substitute between consumption of essential and non-essential
goods.
4. Placing the Frisch Equation (5.38) into Equation (5.34) rearranging to solve for
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c¯ih, obtain the calibrated subsistence level
c¯ih = cih +
βih
pi
· Mh
φh
(5.39)
5. Finally, the benchmark social accounting matrix is revised so that a consumer
is initially “endowed” with c¯i, and the second-level composite utility function
Ci is a Cobb-Douglas function with inputs of cih− c¯ih, with βi re-scaled so that
that ∑ βi = 1.
5.6 Market clearing conditions
The market clearing conditions, ∀t, are
Ait = ciht + cgit + cInvi +
∑
j
Aij ∀i, ∀j,∀h (5.40)∑
j
Lljt =
∑
h
Lslht ∀l,∀h (5.41)∑
j
Kjt =
∑
h
Ksht +Ksgov,t +KsROW,t ∀j,∀h (5.42)∑
j
Lndjt =
∑
h
Lndsht ∀j,∀h (5.43)
5.7 Rest of the world (ROW), international trade,
and capital flow
This model assumes a small open economy with unrestricted borrowing (lending),
characterized by equalization of the domestic and international interest rates. This
also means that the country cannot affect world prices, and that export and import
prices quoted in foreign currency are exogenously given.
The rest of the world (ROW) is modelled as a simple agent that demands foreign
savings in the domestic economy. Its income is determined by
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ROWINCt = rKt Krow,t + pfxt ·
[∑
h
(RHht −HRht) + (RGt −GRt)
]
−NXbaset
(5.44)
and the simple maximisation problem is
maximise FSVt (5.45)
s.t. ROWINCt ≥ pinv,tFSVt (5.46)
The notations are:
ROWINC: rest of the world (ROW) income,
∑
h (RHht −HRht): net total remittances from households,
(RGt −GRt): net remittances from the government,
FSV : foreign savings,
NXbase: initially endowed net imports (a net exports from the perspective of do-
mestic economy),
Krow, r
K : domestic capital owned by foreign agents and rental rate of capital.
Therefore, demand function for foreign savings is given by Equation (5.47), with unit
cost given by Equation (5.48),
0 ≤ prow,t ⊥ FSVt ≥ ROWINCt
prow,t
(5.47)
prow,t ≤ pinv,t ⊥ FSV ≥ 0 (5.48)
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5.7.1 International trade
Export and import prices quoted in foreign currency are also exogenously given in
this small economy. The following two equations link foreign prices with domestic
prices ∀t. First, converting a unit of a foreign good, denominated in foreign exchange,
into domestic prices is
0 ≤Mit ⊥ εt · pfxt − pMit ≥ 0, ∀i (5.49)
where Mi is the units of imported good i, pMi the unit price of the foreign good in
domestic currency and pfx is the unit price of the good in foreign currency. Note
that ε is the nominal exchange rate (domestic currency in terms of foreign currency),
which is always assumed to be fixed (e.g. ∀t, εt = 1) and hence redundant.
Second, a unit of domestic good is exchanged (exported) for a unit of foreign
currency by
0 ≤ Eit ⊥ pEit − εt · pfxt ≥ 0, ∀i (5.50)
Notations are:
Ei,Mi: exports and imports,
pfx: unit price of a good in foreign currency,
pEi , p
M
i : export and import prices in terms of domestic currency,
ε: exchange rate (domestic/foreign),
5.7.2 Capital flow and net foreign assets
Capital is assumed to move freely between, and within, the domestic economy and
the rest of the world (ROW). Therefore, the domestic rental price of capital is “pinned
down” to the world prices via the foreign exchange rate. To characterize this, two
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mutually exclusive equations are introduced, which convert γ units of domestic capital
into γ units of foreign exchange (and vise versa), ∀t.
Capital inflow into Ghana is represented by
0 ≤ γint ⊥ pfxt −
(
rKt − 
)
≥ 0 (5.51)
where pfx is the cost of a unit of exchange rate, rK is the rental price of a unit
of capital, and γ is the number of units exchanged (a slack activity). Note that for
computational purposes, → 0 is a small number used to differentiate between inflows
and outflows, and avoid a problem of infinite solutions (a degenerate model).
As an example, capital inflow from the ROW to Ghana occurs when pfxt −(
rKt − 
)
= 0 with γin > 0,5 but cease when pfxt−
(
rKt − 
)
> 0 (a strict inequality)
with a slack activity level γin = 0. At this point, capital inflow does not occur,
Equation (5.51) is slack and Equation (5.52) is activated.
Therefore, capital outflow is represented by
0 ≤ γoutt ⊥ rKt − (pfxt − ) ≥ 0 (5.52)
If rKt − (pfxt − ) = 0 and γout > 0, domestic capital is converted into foreign
exchange.6 But if rKt − (pfxt − ) > 0 (strict inequality), the activity goes slack,
γout = 0, and capital outflow does not occur, Equation (5.52) goes slack, and Equation
(5.51) is reactivated.
Whenever the rental rate of capital is higher (lower) than in the rest of the world,
reflecting higher (lower) demand for capital compared to other domestic inputs of
production, (i.e., land and labour,) capital flows in (out) of the domestic economy.
This maintains a fixed capital-labour ratio in production. In other words, when the
5This is considered to be foreign direct investment (FDI) into Ghana
6This is considered to be domestic direct investment (DDI), i.e., the domestic economy invests
abroad.
147
marginal productivity of capital is too high, the ROW invests in domestic capital
in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI). Foreign exchange is converted into
domestic capital, which raises the supply of capital, and reduces its rate of return.
These net foreign asset flows pin down the domestic capital price with that of the
ROW.
5.7.3 Trade balance and the current account
In the benchmark of 2007, Ghana is a net exporter to the rest of the world (ROW).
In the long-run, however, trade must balance, though the timing is unknown. Fur-
thermore, the assumption is that changes in malaria do not directly affect trade.
Therefore, without additional foresight for the medium-run of 30 years, the closure
rule for both the baseline and counterfactual scenarios is to raise the level of NXbase
by the same growth rate as the ROW 15-65 population, who are assumed to demand
Ghanaian goods.
However, the current account, which is the sum of net export and factor income,
is endogenous because the flows of net foreign capital are endogenous as discussed
previously in Section 5.7.2.
5.8 Investment and savings in the capital market
A virtual firm is assumed to invest in new capital in fixed proportion. The level of
savings for the government and households are determined by Equations (5.25) and
(5.32). The level of foreign savings, in domestic currency, is determined by Equation
(5.47). Therefore, ∀t, total savings is
TSVt = PSVt +GSVt + FSVt (5.53)
We assume that the virtual investment firm builds new capital stock with fixed
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proportion of final (Armington) consumption goods. The problem is to
maximise
cinv
it
It = min
{
cInvit
aInvit
, · · · , c
Inv
Nt
aInvNt
}
s.t. TSVt ≥
∑
i
pAitc
Inv
it (5.54)
Notations are:
PSV,GSV, FSV : Private, government and foreign savings,
I: investment level,
cInvi : demand for investment of the i’th Armington good,
pAi : price of the i’th Armington good,
pInvt : unit cost of the investment good,
aInvi : expenditure share of the i’th good in total investment, with 0 ≤ aInvi ≤ 1,∑
i a
Inv
i = 1
Similar to the solution for the government, ∀t, demand for investment is obtained by,
0 ≤ pAit ⊥ cInvit ≥ aInvit
(PSVt +GSVt + FSVt)
pAit
(5.55)
pInvt ≤
∑
i
aInvit p
A
it ⊥ It ≥ 0 (5.56)
5.9 Recursive dynamics
Several researches have argued that developing countries are not forward-looking (e.g.,
Breisinger et al. (2008b) for Ghana). When agents are assumed rational and forward-
looking, they can change their consumption/savings behaviours as new knowledge
of the future becomes available in the present. But myopic agents are unable to
account for future expectations in their current optimal decisions. This assumption
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seems consistent with empirical observations that suggest that low income agents
are “borrowing constrained,” and that a large fraction of their consumption is based
entirely on current income (Deaton, 1991, 1992; Foster, 1995; Morduch, 1995). As
a result, low income agents are unable to allocate resources optimally across time,
which negates the theoretically elegant permanent income hypothesis.
The main purpose of this simulation is to link the role of health on the labour re-
source, and thus on the economy. Having households increase consumption today, due
to their forward-looking expectations that they will have a healthier labour resource
in the future, seems questionable. Furthermore, the dynamic evolution of capital
accumulation is not directly relevant for poor countries if most households are poor
and rely on low-skilled labour or public transfers as their main source of income. The
use of a forward-looking optimization framework might not actually yield an accurate
description of the evolution of capital in a developing country.
Practically, a forward-looking model would need to be calibrated on a balanced
growth path, with endpoint conditions imposed on the finite horizon, so that agents
can form expectation that approximate the infinite horizon. But a balanced growth
path assumption for developing countries seems questionable when households have
varying incomes, borrowing constraints, and health conditions. Approaching a steady-
state long run growth is a process of at least a century, while our aim is to describe
the impacts of malaria in a shorter time frame of 30 years. This model accounts
for empirical facts that include a separate health model, which specifies exogenous
population growth for each household that are associated with five epidemiological
zones. Households, therefore, are mostly likely not on a steady state growth path in
the medium-run.
For the above reasons, a recursive dynamic computable general equilibrium (DCGE)
model is developed. Capital accumulation assumptions are more similar to those mod-
elled by Springer (2002); Klepper et al. (2003); Thurlow (2007), who use a virtual
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firm that characterizes the capital market as described in Section (5.7).7
Our model solves a sequence of static one-period equilibria, in which future periods
are connected through capital accumulation. The focus is on how malaria impacts
the labour force and labour efficiency. Future malaria preventive scenarios are not
integrated into the current optimal decision of agents. Instead, it “surprises” them.
The model somewhat resembles a Solow-Swan model, which has exogenous sav-
ings rates and human capital accumulation (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996; Barro and
Sala-i Martin, 2003; Acemoglu, 2009). It is, however, different because it is a small
open economy (SOE) with the rental rate of capital pinned to the world level, and
with flexible capital in-flows (out-flows) as described in Section (5.7). The following
summarizes the main elements which are incorporated into the recursive behaviour
of the DCGE model.
5.9.1 Capital accumulation
The standard capital accumulation assumption is used, where
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It (5.57)
and δ as the depreciation rate.
In addition, it is assumed that a price next period relative to its current price is
equal to a fixed discount rate in the model. Therefore, all one-year future prices in
terms of present value are
pt+1 =
pt
1 + r (5.58)
Similar to Lau et al. (2002), capital has two types of prices at each time period:
7Kinnunen (2007); Breisinger et al. (2008a,b); Diao (2009), for example, have a different class
of assumptions in which newly invested capital is influenced by each sector’s initial share of gross
surplus, and the final allocation depends on depreciation and sector specific profit-rate differentials.
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(1) the rental price of capital, rKt , and (2) a unit purchase price of new capital, pK,t.
Assuming capital markets are competitive, the purchasing price of one unit of new
capital equals the rental earnings of that unit plus the value of the remaining capital
sold in the subsequent period, i.e., a zero profit condition. The complementarity
formulation of this problem is
0 ≤ Kt ⊥ pK,t ≥ rKt + (1− δ) pK,t+1 (5.59)
Furthermore, an agent decides between using goods for consumption or invest-
ment, and as in Section 5.8, pInvt is the unit cost of building an investment good. As-
suming that this model would have been fully dynamic, the Euler condition equates
the marginal utility of investment and capital accumulation by
0 ≤ I ⊥ pInvt ≥ pK,t+1 (5.60)
Since goods prices of two adjacent time periods are pInvt = (1 + r) pInvt+1, it implies
that the capital purchase price equals 1 + r times the current cost of investment
consumption,
(1 + r) pInvt ≥ pK,t (5.61)
Combining equation (5.61) with equation (5.59) leads to
rKt = (r + δ) pInvt (5.62)
Normally, social accounting matrices do not supply capital stock, but rather the
capital earnings from services denoted by V Kt, which equals the capital stock, Kt,
times the rental price of capital, rKt ,
V Kt = rKt ·Kt (5.63)
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Thus finally, using equation (5.62) with equation (5.63) into the capital accumu-
lation equation (5.57) yields
V Kt+1 =
1
1 + r
[
(1− δ)V Kt + (r + δ) pInvt It
]
(5.64)
I0 ≥ 0
V K0 ≥ 0
and initializing the model using V K0 and I0 from the SAM, and with pInv0 = 1 and
rK0 = r + δ. Equation (5.64) is used for all agents in the model: h households,
government, and the rest of the world.8
Notations are:
V K: capital earnings from services,
K: capital stock,
I: investment level,
r: exogenous discount rate,
rK : rental price of capital,
pK : unit cost of building an investment good
pInv: unit cost of the investment good.
8Being a developing country, it is expected that the social accounting matrix of Ghana is less
than perfect. In the 2007 Ghana SAM, government is not endowed with capital, and therefore we do
not use Equation (5.64) with the government. However, in the original SAM, the rest of the world
(ROW) is also not endowed with capital, a fact that seems unreasonable because foreign direct
investment is officially reported. Therefore, we had adjusted the SAM so that ROW, i.e., a foreign
entity owing domestic capital, is endowed with New Cedis 150 million of domestic capital, which
is less than the official figures, but closer to reality. The SAM was slightly modified by assuming
that instead of having Accra’s high-income households owning all foreign capital, and transferring
foreign capital earnings through remittances to ROW, some of the capital is directly owned by
foreign imports of capital and foreign payments.
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As mentioned previously, and discussed by Lau et al. (2002) and Paltsev (2004), a
forward-looking model would require that the initial values in the SAM and especially
investment, would be on a steady state growth path, so that the results in the final
time period approximate the path of the infinite horizon. However, in a recursive
model, these assumptions are not necessary.9
5.9.2 Updating labour recursively from the health models
The DCGE model is integrated with a health model that includes two main com-
ponents to account for the impact of malaria disease: (1) a population projection
component for the size of the labour force, using the cohort-component method that
accounts for changes in fertility, migration, and mortality; (2) a labour effectiveness
component that takes into account the impact of malaria on production and pro-
ductivity for three malaria-specific health statuses: (a) malaria status of an adult
worker, (b) malaria status of the child of an adult worker, and (c) malaria history of
an adult worker (as a child). A probability and productivity factor is associated with
each status, where the productivity factor accounts for absenteeism, presenteeism, re-
duced school attendance and cognitive ability. As described in Chapter 4, the impact
on productivity of each status was retrieved from the literature. The probabilities
were derived from a stochastic Poisson process as a function of the mean malaria in-
9For example, if in the base year, an economy is on a steady-state growth path, then all quantities
(capital, labour, output, consumption) grow at the same rate gt, and capital stock would therefore
grow by,
Kt+1 = Kt · (1 + gt) (5.65)
This would mean that combining equation (5.57) with equation (5.65), steady state investment
should follow
It = Kt (δ + gt)
and using equation (5.62) with equation (5.63), steady state would mean that investment must be
I0 =
g0 + δ
r + δ V K0 (5.66)
Assuming that growth rate is 5%, depreciation is 5%, and discount rate is 5%, the Ghanaian
economy is approximately 14% over invested above the steady state levels.
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cidence rate reported in each epidemiological zone. Finally, this disaggregated health
model is mapped back onto households in the DCGE model.
In each period of time, labour L¯h,l,t is disaggregated across three occupational
categories
{skilled, unskilled, self-employed} ∈ l
and over nine epidemiological urban-rural regions by five income quintiles, i.e., 45
households {h1 · · ·h45} ∈ H. Labour is assumed fully employed and mobile across
sectors, with flexible real wages.
A Harrod-Neutral labor-augmenting production function Yt = F
[
Kt, L¯lt · Elt
]
is
assumed, where L¯hlt are the units of labour supply for household h and labour type
l, with Ehlt as their level of labour effectiveness index (Barro and Sala-i Martin,
2003, p. 52). Recall that both enter exogenously into the DCGE model from the
satellite health models, and depend on the regional epidemiological assumptions, and
the specific scenario details, as discussed in Chapter 4. Therefore, labour supply, Lhlt,
is derived by
Lhlt = L¯hlt · Ehlt (5.67)
and update yearly by
Lhl,t+1 = L¯hl0 · (1 + ghlt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
labor force
·Ehl0 · (1 + ehlt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
effectiveness
(5.68)
with L¯hl0 supply given from the base year in the SAM, and base year effectiveness
as Ehl0 = 1. The household-specific labour growth, ghlt, and labour effectiveness
index, ehlt, are inputs in the DCGE model from the health model.
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5.9.3 Updating recursively other variables
In each period, exogenous stock variables in the model are updated based on their
levels from previous periods, and growth assumptions that exogenously capture demo-
graphic and technological changes. The exception is capital accumulation, which oc-
curs through endogenous linkages with previous-period investment as described in
equation (5.64).
To maintain transparency and simplicity, we assume that net transfers from the
government and the ROW to the various households rise by the rate of working age
growth, ght, with a similar assumption to the minimum subsistence quantity, and the
total direct tax paid to the government. These assumptions mean that the variables
are fixed to the per-capita levels.
As discussed by Breisinger et al. (2011), agricultural growth in Ghana has been
mainly driven by land expansion, rather than productivity, which continues to rise at
an annual rate of 2.8%. This is currently higher than the average population growth
rate. However, because such a high level of land expansion is not sustainable, and
is expected to gradually decline, I assume that land expansion rises at the same rate
as the working age population, i.e., the effective quantity of land inputs are constant
per capita. In other words, even though land is practically in fixed supply, their is an
implicit technological improvement in land-use in this model.
Variables are updated exogenously by the following equations,
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(HGh,t+1 −GHh,t+1) = (HGht −GHht) · (1 + ght) (5.69)
(HRh,t+1 −RHh,t+1) = (HRht −RHht) · (1 + ght) (5.70)
c¯ih,t+1 = c¯iht · (1 + ght) (5.71)
T dh,t+1 = T dht · (1 + ght) (5.72)
Lndh,t+1 = Lndh,t · (1 + ght) (5.73)
Recalling notation:
HGht −GHht: net household receipts from the government,
HRht −RHht: net household receipts from the ROW,
c¯i: subsistence level requirement,
T dht: direct tax by household h,
Lndh: land endowments by household h.
Both the net transfers between the Government and the ROW GRt − RGt, and the
base year net exports NXbase, rise at the same proportion to the ROW working
age population. Total factor productivity increases by gTFPt , which we obtain from
economic studies on Africa and Ghana. Finally, as discussed in Sections 5.4 and 5.5,
a simple closure rule is used in equation (5.77) that transfers a share of household
income to cover the government deficit. These are summarised by the following:
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(GRt+1 −RGt+1) = (GRt −RGt) · (1 + rowt) (5.74)
NXbaset+1 = NXbaset · (1 + rowt) (5.75)
TFPi,t+1 = TFPit ·
(
1 + gTFPt
)
(5.76)
Φht =
Cht∑
htCht
(5.77)
Notations are:
GRt −RGt: net government receipt from ROW,
NXbase: initially endowed net imports (a net exports from the perspective of do-
mestic economy),
Ch,Φh: household consumption and the share of consumption from total private
consumption,
TFPi: total factor productivity for sector i.
5.10 The values used for the model parameters
This section summarises the deep parameters used in the DCGE model: Frisch para-
meter, total factor productivity, and the long-run interest rates.
5.10.1 Income elasticities of demand
As discussed in Section 5.5, the household demand functions are derived from the
Stone-Geary utility function, in which the income elasticity of demand is not neces-
sarily unity. Al-Hassan and Diao (2007) and Breisinger et al. (2007, 2009) estimate
values for the income elasticity of demand for specific sectors within Ghana, while
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Table 5.1: The parameter values
Income elasticity of demand
Sectors Urban Rural Overall
Agricultural 0.66 0.68
Industrial 0.91 0.86
Services 1.52 1.30
Frisch parameter -3 -5
Total factor productivity (TFP) 1.6%
Long-run interest rate 5%
Nganou (2005); Hertel et al. (2008); Shimeles (2010) estimate these for sub-Saharan
Africa in general.
In this study, however, production is aggregated into three general sectors: agri-
culture, industry and services, and I do not have the income elasticities of demand at
this aggregate level. Therefore, in order to estimate them, I collect the income elasti-
city values for various sectors from the literature, and calculate a weighted average
income elasticity based on the consumption shares of the specific sectors from within
the original highly disaggregate Breisinger et al. (2009, 2011) Ghana SAM.
Using a simple average, for example, would be incorrect because a sector with a
high income elasticity but a low consumption share would lead to an overestimate of
the aggregated income elasticity of demand. Table 5.1 summarises the main values
used in this model.
5.10.2 Other deep parameter
Equation (5.38) uses the Frisch parameter to estimate the subsistence levels. Nganou
(2005) estimates the Frisch Parameter for Lesotho at -2.415, and in the GTAP 3
version, Hertel et al. (1997) use -5.85 for sub-Saharan Africa, and an approximate
value of -3.3 for a middle income country. We therefore use a value of -3 for urban
and -5 for rural agents (see Table 5.1).
For the purpose of analysing the welfare implication of malaria prevention, we do
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not actually need to add a total factor productivity (TFP) parameter into the model.
This is because our analysis relies on comparing counterfactual scenarios of malaria
intervention to a baseline with no additional intervention. In other words, we are
not interested in a forecast model, but rather to compare one scenario to another.
However, for the sake of making the model and its projections more realistic, we use
a total factor productivity of 1.6%, which is an approximate figure reported by Arora
and Bhundia (2003a); Bezabih et al. (2010), who have studied sub-Saharan Africa.
Finally, the long-run interest rate is fixed to 5%, which is a value used in many
applied general equilibrium papers.
5.11 Conclusion
Chapter 4 is a synthesis of three models: (1) a Dynamic CGE model; (2) a cohort-
component demographics model; and (3) a labour effectiveness model, which together
impute the economic value of malaria reduction in Ghana. Chapter 5 provides a
thorough description of the dynamic CGE model in order to make the conclusions
discussed in Chapter 4 fully transparent.
As previously mentioned, the study finds that even under a limited intervention to
only the under-five population, malaria reduction contributes to economic growth and
development in Ghana. Furthermore, our approach can easily be framed as a cost-
benefit analysis. Therefore, if governments and donor countries aim for a positive net
present value (NPV), they must consider malaria prevention as a long-term investment
strategy.
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